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ABSTRACT 
 
 In the early years of the twentieth century, the unique new medium of motion pictures 
was the focus of significant theorization and experimentation at the fringes of the American 
advertising industry.  Alongside the growth of the nickelodeon, and the multiple shifts in the 
American cinema’s business model in the ‘transitional era,’ various individuals at the margins of 
the advertising industry attempted, and most often failed, to integrate direct consumer-goods 
advertising regularly into motion picture theaters.  Via techniques as diverse as the glass slide, 
the commercial trailer, and the advertising wall-clock, cinema patrons of the 1910s witnessed 
various attempts by merchants and manufacturers to intrude upon their attention in the cinema 
space.  Through research in the trade presses of the cinema, advertising, and various consumer 
 goods industries, along with archival ephemera from the advertising companies themselves, this 
dissertation explores these various on and off-screen tactics for direct advertising attempted in 
silent cinemas, and their eventual minimization in the American cinema experience.  Despite the 
appeal of the new, popular visual medium of cinema to advertisers, concerns over ticket-prices, 
advertising circulation, audience irritation, and the potential for theatrical ‘suicide-by-
advertising,’ resulted, over a mere fifteen years, in the near abandonment of the cinema as an 
advertising medium.  As a transitional medium between the 19
th
 century forms of print and 
billboarding, and 20
th
 century broadcasting, the silent cinema was an important element in the 
development of modern advertising theories. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Advertising, Silent cinema, Transitional era, Film exhibition, Film 
spectatorship, American cinema, Magic lantern, Trailer, Animation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PROFIT MARGINS: 
THE AMERICAN SILENT CINEMA AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF ADVERTISING 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
JEREMY GROSKOPF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Jeremy Wade Groskopf 
2013 
 PROFIT MARGINS: 
THE AMERICAN SILENT CINEMA AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF ADVERTISING 
 
 
by 
 
 
JEREMY GROSKOPF 
 
 
 
Committee Chairs: Kathryn H. Fuller-Seeley 
Ted Friedman 
 
Committee:  Alisa Perren 
Cynthia B. Meyers 
 
Electronic Version Approved:  
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
August 2013
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
A moving-picture audience ought to be an inspiration to an advertising man. 
I have sat in a moving-picture theater full of kids and grown-ups and have thought, 
'If I only knew how to reach these people, I would know all about advertising.' 
 
- Don Herold, September 1915 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION: THEATERS, COMMUNICATION, AND ADVERTISING 
IN THE AMERICAN SILENT CINEMA 
 
 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a much remarked turn in the American cinema 
experience occurred.  Often described (erroneously) as an intrusion upon a previously 
uncontaminated medium, direct consumer goods advertising in motion picture theaters began its 
meteoric rise in the United States.  The formation of Screenvision and the National Cinema 
Network (soon to become National CineMedia [NCM]) for the purposes of pre-film slide and 
trailer advertising in the late 1970s, the boom in product placement in the wake of Reese’s 
Pieces’ star turn in E.T.: The Extra Terrestrial in 1982, and the accelerating use of cinema 
advertising at the turn of the 20
th
 century following advertiser’s fears of the fading effectiveness 
of television,
1
 have combined to produce a sense that a venue once dedicated solely to onscreen 
entertainment has been colonized by the ever expanding American advertising industry.  This 
sense of newness is common not only among spectators, but also among scholars and advertising 
practitioners and proponents.  Kim B. Rotzoll, author of one of the earliest studies of cinema 
advertising after its rebirth, mentioned in passing that “there was some [cinema advertising] 
present in the ’50s,” but appears to have been aware of no other precursors.2  Advertising Age 
columnist Matthew Grimm gave the appearance of an even shorter lifespan for cinema 
advertising when he asserted, in 2003, that “turning the big screen into a cross-category ad 
                                                          
1
 Deron Overpeck, “Subversion, Desperation and Captivity: Pre-Film Advertising in American Film Exhibition 
Since 1977,” Film History 22.2 (2010): 220-221, 224; Kerry Segrave, Product Placement in Hollywood Films: A 
History (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland & Company, 2004), 140; and Michael T. Ewing, Erik du Plessis, 
and Charles Foster, “Cinema Advertising Re-Considered,” Journal of Advertising Research 41.1 (January/February 
2001): 78. 
2
 Kim B. Rotzoll, “The Captive Audience: The Troubled Odyssey of Cinema Advertising,” Current Research in 
Film 3 (1987): 82. 
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medium did not happen until the mid-1990s.”3  Marketing scholar Herbert Jack Rotfeld, in 2006, 
declared vaguely that “cinema advertising for unrelated products or services…is relatively new 
in the USA.”4  In that same year, Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble’s research into 
audience sentiments about cinema advertising revealed, among many preconceptions, the same 
sense that the intrusion of advertising was recent, with one respondent claiming that “prices for 
the movies keep going up, and now there is advertising that you got to put up with.”5  In the 
eruption of studies of the promise and problems of cinema advertising that has appeared in 
advertising oriented journals, the reader frequently encounters the assumption that cinema 
advertising is a new field.
6
 
 Marginalized in many analyses, then, is the fact that the techniques currently enjoying 
such a wave of popularity among advertisers are actually more than 100 years old.  Product 
placement dates at least as far back as the Edison Company’s ubiquitous train films of the 
1890s.
7
  The pre-film digital advertising slides and trailers circulated by Screenvision and NCM 
have roots at least as far back as the physical advertising slides circulated by Boston’s Preston 
                                                          
3
 Quoted in Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes 
Toward the Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 81. 
4
 Herbert Jack Rotfeld, “Misplaced Marketing: Movie Theaters’ Suicide-by-Advertising with Income from Abusing 
Customers,” Journal of Consumer Marketing 23.7 (2006): 481. 
5
 Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the 
Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 88.  Emphasis added.  As the article 
was published in Spring of 2007, I presume that the response was given sometime in 2006. 
6
 A small sampling: Keith F. Johnson, “Cinema Advertising,” Journal of Advertising 10.4 (1981): 11-19; Jason 
Dunnett and Janet Hoek, “An Evaluation of Cinema Advertising Effectiveness,” Marketing Bulletin May 1996: 58-
66; Alain d’Astous and Francis Chartier, “A Study of Factors Affecting Consumer Evaluations and Memory of 
Product Placement in Movies,” Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising 22.2 (Fall 2000): 32-40; Pola 
B. Gupta, Siva K. Balasubramanian, and Michael L. Klassen, “Viewers’ Evaluations of Product Placement in 
Movies: Public Policy Issues and Managerial Implications,” Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising 
22.2 (Fall 2000): 41-52; Michael T. Ewing, Erik du Plessis, and Charles Foster, “Cinema Advertising Re-
Considered,” Journal of Advertising Research 41.1 (January/February 2001): 78-85; Joanna Phillips and Stephanie 
M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the Cinema as an Advertising 
Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 81-94. 
7
 Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon, and Susan Chang, “The Hidden History of Product Placement,” Journal of 
Broadcasting & Electronic Media 50.4 (December 2006): 580, 590. 
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Lombard in 1908
8
 and the film-trailer advertisements of Houston’s Southern Film Service in 
1914.
9
  Concerns over the effectiveness of given techniques feature equally well-worn tropes.  
The attitudes which Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble connect to ‘Reactance Theory’ 
(combative behavior resulting from the sense of curtailed freedoms), ‘Equity Theory’ 
(decreasing attendance due to a sense that the cost of a ticket exceeds the pleasure derived if 
advertising is added to the cinema experience), and ‘Expectancy Disconfirmation Theory’ 
(displeasure resulting from the cinema experience failing to meet preconceptions)
10
, were being 
voiced, albeit in different terms, about cinema advertising throughout the ‘transitional era’ 
(roughly 1908 to 1917).
11
  In this study, I contend that advertising and the cinema not only have 
a long history of interrelation, but that, until Depression era radio, they were mutually defining 
institutions.  Cinema advertising of the transitional era, as an overt foil for many cinema 
commentators, played a formative role in the American rebranding of cinema as a highbrow 
entertainment.  Simultaneously, the marginalization of these practices from the mainstream 
theaters established a cultural hostility to direct advertising in new media which would require 
years of broadcasting experience to overturn. 
                                                          
8
 Display Ad, Moving Picture World 2.15 (11 April 1908): 329. 
9
 Display Ad, Moving Picture World 19.10 (7 March 1914): 1330. 
10
 Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the 
Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 82-83. 
11
 Periodization of the American silent cinema generally reduces the era to three hazily dated phases: the ‘cinema of 
attractions,’ the ‘transitional era,’ and the ‘feature film era.’  During the time when cinema was an ‘attraction,’ the 
fact of film mattered more than the content, as the very act of seeing a film was noteworthy.  In the ‘feature’ era, 
most of the practices we recognize from pre-World War II American cinema, except for the use of pre-recorded 
sound – major studios, feature films, vertical integration, the Hays Office, etc. – were already in operation or shortly 
to be born.  The ‘transitional era’ in between thus encapsulates the institutionalization of the cinema, as the original 
practices were abandoned, sometimes in multiple phases, resulting in the mature industry of the 1920s.  For a 
detailed study of the vagaries of periodization, see: Charlie Keil and Shelley Stamp, “Introduction,” and Ben 
Brewster, “Periodization of Early Cinema,” both in American Cinema’s Transitional Era: Audiences, Institutions, 
Practices, ed. Charlie Keil and Shelley Stamp (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 
2004).  See also: Tom Gunning, “Cinema of Attractions,” Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas 
Elsaesser (London: British Film Institute, 1990), 58-59; Tom Gunning, D.W. Griffith and the Origins of American 
Narrative Film: The Early Years at Biograph (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991); and David 
Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of 
Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 
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 For cinema studies, this dissertation on the direct advertising tactics used in transitional 
era cinema – including slides, trailers, and offscreen materials like advertising clocks – reveals a 
new breadth of local cinema experiences which were slowly pushed into the margins by the 
vertically integrating industry.  For an era in which the tension between mass and class audiences 
was a driving factor for innovation (leading, for example, to the creation of feature films and 
palatial theaters), cinema advertising was a key way in which cinema theaters were 
differentiated.  Though cinema advertisers were eternally chasing the affluent, cinema 
advertising itself became a marker of lower class and independent theatrical experiences.  
Opinions about poor quality cinema advertising – cracked slides, cheap animation, and light 
polluting clocks – became entangled with the notion that advertising was inherently lowbrow.  
The entire field was increasingly condemned as a boorish intrusion on the refined American 
cinema of the future.  By examining the history of transitional era American cinema advertising, 
through the lens of supportive and critical rhetoric, this study reveals how the American film 
industry intentionally divorced itself from commercialism.  This dissertation thus contributes to 
our understanding of the ways in which the “business pure and simple” of American cinema was 
distanced from alternative exhibition practices in order to strengthen its new institutional 
standing as an art. 
For the history of American advertising, this study of silent era cinema advertising erases 
the dissonance in canonical advertising history caused by juxtaposing the proliferation of direct 
advertising via periodicals and billboards at the turn of the century, with the hesitation about 
direct advertising on radio throughout the 1920s.  What appears to be simple hesitation in the 
face of a new technology is revealed to be the legacy of the failure in the cinema.  As Kenneth 
Lipartito has said, in the history of technology and ideas, 
5 
 
 
failures…contribute to the construction of the frameworks of meaning that guide 
decisions in an open-ended technological world.  They fit into a narrative about 
technology that helps to shape the range of choices we can make.
12
 
 
Cinema advertising is thus an important failure, in which the faltering dream of an advertising 
supported cinema sowed seeds of doubt about the suitability of direct advertising in new media.  
The American silent cinema is, thus, a missing link in the history of the advertising industry’s 
relentless 20
th
 century expansion – a largely failed attempt to colonize the first moving medium, 
which, by the very fact of its failure, directly influenced developments to follow. 
 Much like the concepts of pre-recorded sound,
13
 color photography,
14
 and widescreen 
aesthetics,
15
 cinema advertising is not an era but an idea, threaded through the history of both the 
American cinema and advertising industries – now present, now absent, but always in the air as 
an option.  The cultural antagonisms bound up in the history of cinema advertising – audiences 
vs. advertising, exhibitors vs. studios, the film industry vs. the advertising industry, and 
advertising agencies vs. non-print media – are still with us, as are many of the preconceptions 
which developed around the experimentation.  In the interplay between onscreen and offscreen 
space, audience captivity and audience hostility, downtown and neighborhood theaters, and the 
many attempts to culturally define the cinema, advertising in American film theaters shaped 
future conceptions of what modern advertising and the cinema experience could be. 
  
                                                          
12
 Kenneth Lipartito, “Picturephone and the Information Age: The Social Meaning of Failure,” Technology and 
Culture 44.1 (January 2003): 57. 
13
 James Lastra, Sound Technology and the American Cinema: Perception, Representation, Modernity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000); Richard Abel and Rick Altman, ed., The Sounds of Early Cinema (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2001); and Rick Altman, Silent Film Sound (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005). 
14
 Richard Misek, Chromatic Cinema: A History of Screen Color (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); and 
Joshua Yumibe, Moving Color: Early Film, Mass Culture, Modernism (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2012). 
15
 John Belton, Widescreen Cinema (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Harper Cossar, 
Letterboxed: The Evolution of Widescreen Cinema (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011). 
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Topics and Terms 
 Before going any further, it is important to introduce the exact subject of this dissertation.  
While ‘consumer goods advertising in American silent theaters’ may seem quite specific, 
advertising can be researched from a number of angles.  This dissertation will not focus, to any 
large degree, on the aesthetics of advertising content, the growth of consumer culture, or the 
importance of government regulation to advertising proliferation.  Though short discussions of 
all of these elements will be included where relevant, my focus will be on the debate surrounding 
the adoption of the motion picture theater (in both the on and offscreen spaces) for direct 
consumer goods advertising.  Cinema advertising ‘agents,’ film audiences, and exhibitors will be 
the predominant human subjects.  The central subject of the study will, thus, be the silent motion 
picture theater and the theories and practices of film consumption.  If cinema is a ‘medium,’ it is 
a medium made of wood and brick, and must be conceptualized through the interplay of spaces 
and crowds.  To quote Andre Gaudreault, cinema is not a device, but “a social, cultural, 
economic, etc. system.”16  Shifting focus from the screen to the venue allows us to reconsider 
cinema as a gestalt entity.  Before the sound revolution, the cinema was a multiple media 
environment.  Reconsidering transitional era cinema from the perspective of advertising allows 
us to see the ways in which American silent cinemagoing was an untidy event, in which a 
number of divergent experiences coalesced. 
Therefore, various tactics for integrating direct advertising into a cinema theater will be 
discussed, with the center of debate always being between the goals of advertisers and the desires 
                                                          
16
 André Guadreault, “The Culture Broth and the Froth of Cultures of So-Called Early Cinema,” A Companion to 
Early Cinema, ed. André Guadreault, Nicolas Dulac, and Santiago Hidalgo (Malden, MA, and Oxford: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2012), 16.  Gaudreault has spent a number of years rethinking the silent cinema from this perspective.  See 
the following examples available in English: Gaudreault, Film and Attraction: From Kinematography to Cinema, 
tran. Timothy Barnard (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2011); and Gaudreault and Philippe Marion, “A 
Medium is Always Born Twice…,” trans. Timothy Barnard, Wendy Schubring, and Frank Le Gac, Early Popular 
Visual Culture 3.1 (May 2005): 3-15. 
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of filmmakers, exhibitors, and audiences.  Chapters will be structured not around copy style, or 
ideological opinions, but around tactics for invading the theatrical space – lantern slides, 
commercial trailers, and offscreen technologies.  As this is a study of the early adoption of a 
medium, the multiplicity of available tactics, and the way those tactics were distinguished, are 
the most important subjects.
17
 
In basic terms, cinema advertising tactics fragment along three important axes: the 
directness of address (camouflaged via integration with entertainment, or overt standalone 
messages), formal properties (moving or still imagery), and physical position (onscreen or 
offscreen).  The first axis – directness – is a distinction that frames the entire selection of topic 
for this study.  Via direct advertising slides, trailers, or offscreen imagery, the viewer is 
introduced unambiguously to the availability of a product (up to and including a mention of the 
price and a merchant’s address).  Indirect advertising tactics, like product placement and 
sponsorship, link a product to a film without overtly calling attention to product qualities or 
price.  In the American silent cinema, direct and indirect advertising were distinct practices, 
which were offered by different advertising companies, and financially benefitted different 
sectors of the film industry.  Direct cinema advertisements were brief and independent messages, 
the theater ‘space’ was openly purchased from exhibitors, and the producers were typically small 
companies dedicated exclusively to one tactic.  Indirect advertising was often circulated 
surreptitiously (only the film producer, not the exhibitor, was paid), and the producers were often 
mainstream American studios like Universal.  Thus, the two represent distinct projects.  As 
                                                          
17
 Similar analyses of what Rick Altman has termed the “chaotic diversity” of early developmental periods can be 
found in numerous previous studies.  For two film related examples, see: Rick Altman, Silent Film Sound (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 23; Tom Kemper, Hidden Talent: The Emergence of Hollywood Agents 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2010). 
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indirect tactics have received the lion’s share of previous scholarly attention,18 I have opted to 
devote my energies to the lesser known direct advertising methods.
19
 
 The remaining two axes – formal properties and physical position – help to fragment 
direct advertising discussions still further.  The dominant area of debate in direct cinema 
advertising in the silent era was regarding formal properties.  It is important to remember that the 
transitional era cinema remained, for a time, a mixed media venue.  During the 1910s, though 
motion picture theaters were defined by the centrality of film to their offerings, still images 
through lantern slides, live musical performances, and even brief stage shows remained a part of 
programs.  As such, a significant amount of time and ink was expended in cinema advertising 
debates on the topic of still imagery, and whether the use of stills was an aid or a hindrance to 
advertising effectiveness.  (For example: Was a still image a welcome ‘rest’ from motion picture 
eye-strain, or was it a boring disruption of the flow?)  Slides were also cheaper to produce and 
circulate than films, adding an element of practical financial concern to an otherwise complex 
biological and psychological debate. 
 Physical position was a less common, but no less compelling, topic which fragmented 
debate on cinema advertising in the United States.  For a minority of cinema advertising 
proponents, it was not the lack of motion but the usurpation of the screen which caused the most 
trouble for cinema ads.  For these ad men, the walls, chairs, and air were all seen as viable 
location alternatives for advertising content, as long as such advertisements did not obstruct the 
screen or otherwise interfere with its viewing.  Such advertising would occur to the side of the 
                                                          
18
 See, for starters, the following works.  Charles R. Acland and Haidee Wasson, eds., Useful Cinema (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2011).  Lee Grieveson, “The Work of Film in the Age of Fordist Mechanization,” Cinema 
Journal 51.3 (Spring 2012): 25-51.  Other examples will be referenced over the course of this introduction. 
19
 The issue of ‘hard sell’ and ‘soft sell,’ on the other hand, does come up.  Through the use of humor and animation, 
trailers were decidedly more ‘soft sell’ than slides.  Though ad content is not a primary topic of this study, this 
distinction between ‘dry’ slides and ‘fun’ trailers became part of the rhetoric that differentiated the two tactics, and 
shall be explored in chapters three and four. 
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entertainment, as marginalia to a simultaneously available focal point.  In the debate over 
physical position, theories of permanent visibility (as opposed to the ‘fleeting’ nature of an 
onscreen ad) and the importance of viewer choice (could the viewer ‘opt out’ of reading the 
advertisement) came to the fore.  Emerging from the tradition of printed handbills and theater 
curtains, the chair-back, wall, or waste receptacle sign were proposed as alternative advertising 
forms for the cinema space.
20
  As such, the distinction between temporal and spatial advertising 
became one of the central and most influential aspects of silent cinema advertising debates.  
Concerns over the consequences of temporal advertising (primarily, the possibility of ‘ill will’ 
created by audience compulsion) grew to dominate the discussion of cinema advertising, and 
were formative concerns for early radio (see chapter six).
21
 
 Identifying these fault lines is important as they drove both competition and innovation in 
all areas.  While commercial trailers were designed to compete with lantern slides, on the 
grounds that stationary slides were undesirable, the inventors of ‘motion slides,’ using liquid-
chambers and moving parts, used the same logic to try to improve their wares.  The importance 
of evading a fleeting impression drove many slide and trailer makers to suggest offscreen parallel 
advertising (like a simultaneous printed ad in the theaters handbill).  As such, identifying the 
                                                          
20
 Non-cinematic precursors also informed this debate.  Probably most important was the then comparatively recent 
shift of magazine advertising out of a bookend position (where all advertisements were restricted to their own pages 
at the beginning and end of each issue) and into the regular pages.  See: Hugo Münsterberg, “Social Sins in 
Advertising,” Psychology and Social Sanity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1914), 229-249. 
21
 Perceptive readers may note a similarity between the spatial arrangements of the theater and the spatial 
arrangements of a screen.  As product placement has become more complex, similar issues have been discussed; 
how ‘central’ should an advertisement be?  Amanda Lotz identifies a product placement split which she terms 
‘organic’ (non-obtrusive product placement which doesn’t call too much attention to itself – like a logo appearing in 
the background) versus ‘inorganic’ (very forced and obvious placement – like a close-up of a car logo, or the 
inclusion of the product name in the dialogue).  (Amanda Lotz, The Television Will Be Revolutionized (New York 
and London: New York University Press, 2007], 168; see also Jean-Marc Lehu, Branded Entertainment: Product 
Placement & Brand Strategy in the Entertainment Business [London and Philadelphia: Kogan Page, 2007], 114-
115.)  The increasing visual and verbal centrality of inorganic product placement is similar to the usurpation of the 
screen that was criticized by offscreen advertising proponents in the silent era.  Despite the parallel, Lotz’ terms do 
not really fit with the offscreen / onscreen split.  As such, they have not been adopted here. 
10 
 
 
conceptual lines is not simply an exercise of differentiation, but also an introduction to many of 
the debates to come. 
 Studying transitional era American cinema advertising by fragmenting out tactics and the 
thinking underlying them allows us to see not only the importance of cinema advertising to the 
development of the classical Hollywood exhibition paradigm, but also the complicated debates at 
the time over how best to define the audience.  Perspectives on the formal properties and 
positioning of cinema advertising, including the belief that advertising had no place in the 
cinema, were tied to perspectives on audiences.  Were audiences grateful for services?  Annoyed 
by interruption?  Accepting of humorous or pleasant advertising messages?  Disdainful of all 
things commercial?  By separating the study into tactics for direct advertising, we can see clearly 
the ways in which a single topic – in this case, cinema advertising – produces a mass of 
conflicting interpretations which are then smoothed into a single, mainstream institutional 
definition of the medium.  Such a study is of added relevance to current scholarship due to the 
parallels with current digital culture.  The mass rethinking of advertising in the wake of the 
digital transition has given new life to these audience debates which occurred in the silent 
cinema as the now virtual ‘venue’ of digital media can contain marginalia as well as ‘spots’ and 
‘placement.’ 
 
Technological ‘Failure’ and the Study of History 
 In the wake of the postmodernist critique of historical practice in the 1970s – in which 
historical writing was criticized, among other things, for hiding interpretive claims in formal 
structures and erroneous assertions of ‘objectivity’22 – it is helpful to define and justify, at the 
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outset, one’s particular historiographic approach.  History as a discipline has its operating 
theories as well.  (Indeed, it is in deference to this critique that history is an interpretive act, 
structured by various interpretive preconceptions, that my writing is at times worded in the first 
person [“I argue…”] rather than in an omniscient third person.) 
In brief and explicit terms, my perspective is that dead ends, failures, abandoned ideas, 
and stagnant theories are vital to the telling of history, as successful and immediate adoption of a 
concept is not a pre-requisite for historical influence.  Indeed, as Kenneth Lipartito argues, 
[f]ailed technologies, far from being dead ends or even mere cautionary tales, may 
persist well beyond their material life.  They may reinforce rather than undermine 
technological paths, even when those paths are questionable or undesirable. […] 
Failure…stem[s] not from some functional flaw in the product or from a 
traditional notion of consumer demand, but rather from a contingent sequence of 
actions that reflec[t] the influence of expectations, assumptions, uncertainty, 
politics, and self-reinforcing decisions.
23
 
 
In short, the existence of an idea matters, regardless of its breadth of adoption, as it is imbricated 
in a way of thinking and a larger process of social development.  This is, to my mind, the 
primary reason why the main line of development in any given field is always susceptible to 
jarring paradigm shifts or unexpected recurrences of ideas that seemed to have died long ago.  
Progress, if indeed we can call it that, is not always (perhaps even rarely) rational.  To treat the 
less successful elements of history as ipso facto unimportant is to commit the error of thinking 
that the present has never lost or temporarily mislaid ideas from the past.  The telling of history 
must not abandon counter-histories, cyclical repetitions, and coincidence in favor of causal logic.  
Nor, of course, should the inverse be true.  We must be capable of telling both the ‘master 
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narrative’ and the marginal history simultaneously.  One of the ways in which we can do this is 
to find those moments – those seemingly minor, barely-influential ideas – which prefigure later 
turns in the ‘master narrative.’ 
 The historical turn towards studying failures is comparatively recent.
24
  Scott A. Sandage 
asserts in his 2005 book Born Losers that, from the early 1800s to the late 1900s, American 
culture at large – and, by extension, the historians and other scholars who studied it –commonly 
“fixed blame [for failure] squarely on individual faults, not extenuating circumstances.”25  The 
deterministic assertion that failure was somehow predictable due to technological or personal 
fault became axiomatic.  The “‘reverse Whig’ histories” described by Lipartito, in which 
technologies that failed in the market become “cautionary tales of error or hubris,”26 are thus a 
longstanding tradition in American (mis)interpretation.  Sandage stresses that prominent business 
historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., as recently as 1975, still confidently asserted “that studying 
failure in and of itself would not be a useful enterprise.”27  In the latter half of the 1980s, scholars 
began to attack such deterministic thinking and rethink the importance of the study of failures to 
culture, both as prerequisites to later successes and as important markers of the contingent nature 
                                                          
24
 I use the term ‘failure’ here as scholarly studies of the importance of ‘non-successes’ typically use the term, in 
deference to their case studies (most commonly, technologies abandoned after a cool market reception).  However, 
as Graeme Gooday has pointed out, the definition of ‘success’ is hazy – even when one restricts the discussion 
solely to economics; the diesel engine may not have dominated the market, but it was still successful.  Sales figures 
and their duration therefore remain open questions.  As cinema advertising is a particularly complicated case, I will, 
over the remainder of this study, use the more open term ‘marginalized’ rather than ‘failed.’  Cinema advertising 
businesses may have failed, but the techniques and technologies rarely died with them.  In most cases, they were 
simply pushed out of the mainstream.  As such, the late 1970s cinema advertising renaissance was merely an 
expansion of long, low-level usage.  ‘Failure’ of silent cinema advertising is, thus, solely a measure of scale, not a 
complete disappearance.  Graeme Gooday, “Re-Writing the ‘Book of Blots’: Critical Reflections on Histories of 
Technological ‘Failure’,” History and Technology 14 (1998): 269. 
25
 Sandage, Scott A., Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 17. 
26
 Kenneth Lipartito, “Picturephone and the Information Age: The Social Meaning of Failure,” Technology and 
Culture 44.1 (January 2003): 53. 
27
 Sandage, Scott A., Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 8-9. 
13 
 
 
of success – that any ‘success’ emerges from a field of related marginal ideas.28  The study of 
failed, abandoned, and unexpectedly recurrent ideas has thus already added significantly to our 
understanding of the development of technology, discouraging deterministic descriptions of the 
impact of technological invention on history (asserting that success or failure of an idea, and its 
impact on culture, is inevitable due to traits of the invention), and encouraging a focus on the 
contextual elements driving both the invention and adoption of a technology.  However, as 
Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman assert, 
[a]t too high a level of generality, the knowledge of social shaping is vacuous, 
except as a polemical counterpoint to simplistic technological determinism.  If the 
idea of the social shaping of technology has intellectual or political merit, this lies 
in the details: in the particular ways technology is socially shaped.
29
 
 
Important to the history of failure, then, is understanding the way that the act of invention is 
integrated into longer histories of ideas, from the overdetermination of the act of invention, to the 
polysemy (or “interpretive flexibility”) of a technology once it has been released into culture. 
The field of technological history provides numerous examples of the importance of 
failed technologies to longer histories of ideas.  An exceptional example is the research into the 
failure of Picturephone by Kenneth Lipartito, in which he links the concept to longer standing 
notions of visuality and ‘distance learning’ – going so far as to assert that the Picturephone, 
given different circumstances, could have filled the same cultural niche that the internet now 
occupies.
30
  Randall Patnode argues that technologies can fail (and succeed) due to institutional 
inertia in competing areas, as was the case with ‘wired wireless’ transmission, which both AT&T 
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and RCA failed to push as an alternative to commercial radio in the 1920s.
31
  Steven Boyer 
connects Nintendo’s Virtual Boy videogame system to the discourse of virtual reality, asserting 
that niche appreciation connects technologies to wider cultural concerns even in the wake of a 
mainstream failure of a product to sell.
32
  Paul Atkinson asserts that even ‘non-products’ like the 
Kitchen Computer (a piece of technology designed for reasons other than sales) can connect to 
broader ideas;  in Atkinson’s words, the aesthetics of the Kitchen Computer were significant for 
design history, regardless of the circulation of the technology, as “it was purely the idea of the 
product that was being consumed.”33  Patrick McCray makes a similar argument for the 
influence of one discarded concept on future scientific developments, in his study of the 
abandonment of the National New Technology Telescope.
34
  As mentioned above, cinema 
studies has its own examples of this historical rethinking; studies of the persistence of 
experimentation with color, sound, and widescreen ground particular failed efforts in longer lines 
of conceptual development.
35
  Such studies, to varying degrees, stress the complex array of 
influences on the development of any given device, putting the importance on the life of an idea 
rather than an invention.
36
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Recent work in media history has been more interested in the second approach to failure: 
studying the ‘broth’ of alternative uses from which the successful mature form of a medium 
emerges.  Rick Altman has proposed a model of research which he calls ‘crisis historiography,’ 
in which one studies the ‘identity crisis’ of  new technologies caught between competing cultural 
ideologies before finally settling into their stable form.
37
  André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion 
call this moment the “incubation period” between a medium’s “integrating birth” (its moment of 
invention when it is seen as a continuation of old forms) and its “distinguishing birth” (when it 
becomes fully institutionalized as a unique medium).
38
  Carolyn Marvin, using a spatial 
metaphor that I literalize in studying exhibition structures, forwards a notion that new mediums 
are like undiscovered country, slowly being ‘mapped’ by minds slanted by cultural 
preconceptions.
39
  Lisa Gitelman calls this phase the development of ‘protocols,’ in which one 
particular usage of a technology becomes ‘common sense’ as all other possible uses are publicly 
forgotten.
40
  For media, the state of newness requires the existence of a multiplicity of 
interpretations and competing uses, many of which must, by the fact of later institutionalization, 
be eventually marginalized.
41
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It is my contention that the study of cinema advertising – a concept which not only had 
the long gestation period of widescreen cinema, but also the flurry of early conflicting 
interpretations of an ‘identity crisis’ – can helpfully join these two approaches to ‘failure.’  By 
studying the early adopters, foundational concepts, and the everyday men and women of 
American history bound up in the ‘identity crisis’ of early cinema advertising (and early cinema 
itself), in the wake of a later renaissance of the substantially similar techniques in substantially 
similar venues, we can link the marginalized ideas of one generation to a reoccurrence.
42
  In the 
American cinema, as it turns out, advertising techniques behave like weeds; they grow in hidden 
places and occasionally overrun the garden, and a long line of cinema ‘guardians’ have 
continually tried to pull them out.  What follows is a first step: a study of the ‘identity crisis’ of 
cinema advertising, analyzing the large-scale insertion and removal of consumer goods 
advertising in American silent movie theaters, decades before the contemporary renaissance. 
Experimentation with direct advertising in the American silent cinema was a social event, and its 
fate was determined by expectations, preconceptions, and struggles to define the medium.  An 
emerging rhetoric of cultural hierarchy (with cinema as a highbrow medium), along with rapidly 
codifying preconceptions about the incompatibility of direct advertising with both pleasure and 
ticket prices, were important social determinants for the initial marginalization of cinema 
advertising. 
 
Literature Review: Media Studies 
 This study is placed at the intersection of two major fields of study – histories of film and 
histories of advertising – each of which is large enough to require its own sub-heading here.  In 
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this section, I will deal exclusively with media studies.  Four specific sub-fields in media studies 
have bearing on this research: aesthetics (specifically animation), reception studies, studies of 
silent film exhibition, and media industries studies (specifically silent film).  Combining these 
four branches of study allows us to restore the marginal practice of direct consumer goods 
advertising in the American silent cinema to a place of formative importance for film history.  
For formal aesthetics, direct cinema advertising techniques compel us to rethink the received 
wisdom about the origins of animation, which was a practice tightly connected with commercial 
trailers in the mid-1910s.  For reception studies, this research can help to re-insert cinema 
advertising into the discussion as an interpretive frame for the cinema experience, both then and 
now.  For histories of transitional era exhibition, early American advertising experiments provide 
an important element of marketing context to the development of a middle-class cinema culture, 
as the rebranding of cinema as highbrow occurred with overt reference to the supposed lowbrow 
qualities of advertising funded entertainment.  For studies of media industries, transitional era 
cinema advertising research provides a parallel with radio, television, and internet industrial 
studies, describing the dalliance with consumer goods advertising which resulted in the cinema 
becoming the only mass medium to predominantly reject direct advertising.  Each of these four 
topics shall be reviewed in turn in this section. 
 Aesthetic concerns dominate early work in scholarly cinema studies.  Vachel Lindsay 
published the first aesthetic analysis of film, The Art of the Moving Picture, in 1915, in which he 
laid out an early taxonomy of ‘genres’ he labeled films of ‘Action,’ ‘Intimacy,’ and ‘Splendor.’43  
As cinema studies emerged as a distinct field in American universities at mid-century, aesthetics 
dominated the discourse, with the concept of ‘auteurism’ (the study of cinema as a work of a 
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particular author – usually the director) dominating the discourse.44  American silent era auteurs 
like D.W. Griffith and Charlie Chaplin,
45
 and genres like the Western and the adventure serial,
46
 
have received significant scholarly attention, ranging from purely formal analyses to broad 
biographically and culturally informed studies, as pure formalism has become less dominant in 
the field.  Although much of the study to follow is not oriented towards the screen or the creators 
of the advertising content, one highly pertinent sub-field of aesthetic research is relevant: studies 
of animation.  While the field is understandably oriented around major figures and studios from 
the golden age of cinema – like Walt Disney and Warner Bros.47 – a few scholars have 
researched the early history of film animation.  Donald Crafton’s Before Mickey is the 
touchstone for silent era animation, in which he studies the makers and styles of early 
entertainment animation, taking particular interesting in the slow and difficult evolution of the 
form as techniques were invented to streamline and cheapen the process.
48
  Giannalberto 
Bendazzi takes a longer view, studying a hundred years of animation history, while helpfully 
providing a global context for developments – providing brief overviews of unstudied national 
animation cinemas like Sweden (where the animation “grew in the field of advertising”).49  The 
very early silent film work of Walt Disney has, of course, also received significant attention as a 
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developmental period for his work, including (often brief) discussions of his introduction to 
animation at the advertising oriented Kansas City Slide Company.
50
  These scholars have already 
given us a suitably nuanced conception of the interplay between art, technology, and business 
acumen in early American animation. 
 However, the importance of cinema advertising history to animation has remained 
predominantly off the radar.  The references to advertising cartoons in the works of both Crafton 
and Bendazzi are slim, and the early work of Disney is studied only as a precursor to his later 
fame, not as part of a broader culture of commercial animation.  This study of direct cinema 
advertising, particularly the early years of consumer-goods trailers, and their relationship to the 
even older concept of hand-drawn lantern slides, provides a shadow history of the origins of 
animation – a history in which advertising dollars were equally responsible for technological 
innovation.  Animated trailers were circulated regularly in American cinema theaters as early as 
the work of the entertainment pioneers.  This history is thus very important to a complete 
understanding of the development of animation from a cinema novelty to an institution.
51
 
Research into reception is as established as aesthetic studies of cinema, although early 
work was conducted from a social scientific angle, rather than the literary inflection of scholars 
of the cinema as an aesthetic form.  Scholars have been interested in ways in which cinema 
transmits meaning to viewers, and the elements which frame and delimit interpretation, since 
Hugo Münsterberg published The Photoplay: A Psychological Study in 1916.  In this work, 
Münsterberg codified the early film theory of “psychical infection,” in which the communication 
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of information via motion pictures was deemed too rapid to allow for critical thinking, thus 
effectively ‘implanting’ information into the viewer’s mind.52  After significant revision to this 
‘passive audience’ thesis over decades of social scientific research,53 the current theory of ‘active 
audiences’ and interpretive flexibility emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.  Post-Structuralists like 
Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes introduced the concept of ‘intertextuality,’ in which a text, for 
both the writer and the reader, must always be filtered through connotations both social and 
personal.
54
  Meaning is thus not in the books, but created through the interaction of a mind and a 
text.  Through Cultural Studies theorists, this concept has taken on the status of theory of 
interpretation.  Stuart Hall proposed the possibility of ‘negotiated’ and ‘oppositional’ 
interpretations of messages in his 1973 argument “Encoding and Decoding in the Television 
Discourse” – an essay which was a driving force for the explosion of Cultural Studies 
scholarship in the years that followed.
55
  Since the turn to ‘active audience’ thinking, some 
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scholars have begun to study elements of the cinema experience which, while they do not 
determine, can at least delimit interpretive freedom.  A foundational text in this line was 
Lawrence W. Levine’s Highbrow/Lowbrow, in which he asserted that the distinction between 
high-class and popular American culture emerged over the course of the 19
th
 century, resulting in 
the ”sacralization” of high culture as inherently valuable and deserving of reverence and respect.  
This cultural hierarchy became a fundamental interpretive frame in consumption of cultural 
works.
56
  Silent era studies have also pursued this notion productively.  Various scholars have 
studied the American film industry’s quest for respectability in the mid-1910s, which had the 
ultimate goal of rebranding the cinema experience as a highbrow entertainment.
57
  As this 
attempt at rebranding the experience of cinema became more and more successful, it acted as a 
frame on interpretation, skewing the viewer’s reading towards artistic appreciation.  Kathryn 
Fuller-Seeley has studied the development of storefront theater advertising during the early silent 
era, asserting that the content of film posters helped to train audiences how to view the content 
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on the screen.
58
  Richard Abel has asserted that the production of Westerns, for example, was 
part of a concerted effort to train viewers to notice, and appreciate, that American films were 
American made and thus attuned to American beliefs.
59
  Research into the theory of the 
‘balanced program’ – in which more sedate, intellectual and ‘educational’ films were used to 
avoid “continual stimulation from exciting dramas,” and thus (in theory) gave the program a 
psychologically comfortable flow of tones – has even provided some knowledge of how silent 
era American film practitioners themselves conceived of factors which influenced viewer 
reception.
60
  As such, scholars have provided a significant working knowledge of the contextual 
elements of interpretation in American silent theaters. 
 We can add to this work on silent era context through a study of cinema advertising.  A 
glaring absence in research into American silent era interpretation and framing is the structuring 
presence (and equally structuring absence) of direct consumer-goods advertising within the 
cinema space.  In the transitional era, a large number of cinema fans and practitioners accepted 
without question the notion that the presence of advertising in the cinema theater would 
influence the viewer’s interpretation of the films and the experience.  Generally this sense of the 
intertextual impact of advertising was linked overtly to a Levine-esque cultural hierarchy, in 
which advertising was described as ‘degrading’ to the cinema experience.  The marginalization 
of advertising is a moment in which the mainstream film industry asserted that advertising 
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content, specifically, would not be allowed to delimit the viewer’s interpretive independence.  
Commerce was to remain outside of the experience; the cinema was a place to escape from 
exhortations to consume. 
 Tightly connected to research into the vagaries of audience reception and interpretive 
framing, is research into exhibition – particularly the variations in silent cinema exhibition 
practices.  Early scholarship on the American silent cinema was predominantly concerned with 
national norms of exhibition.  As such, the turn to the feature film model of exhibition, the 
formation of large chains of theaters, the construction of palatial theaters, and the vertical 
integration of the industry (in which the major studios took over the chains) were all studied as 
elements in the creation of the ‘classical Hollywood cinema’ model – the homogenization of 
American cinema culture.
61
  Recent scholarship into the silent era has begun to stress the 
vagaries of this transition, pointing to the prevalence of old and alternative exhibition practices 
alongside the mainstream palatial model.  The particularities of segregation have allowed for 
significant research into the fragmentation of American silent era exhibition.  Mary Carbine, 
Gregory A. Waller, and Jacqueline Najuma Stewart have all studied the ways in which 
segregated and exclusively black theaters provided unique experiences for the audiences within 
them.
62
  Ben Singer has shown that the transition from the ‘variety program’ of shorts to the 
‘feature program’ took place over a number of years, indicating that, between 1914 and 1918, 
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both ‘feature program’ and ‘variety program’ houses were in operation simultaneously.63  
Kathryn H. Fuller-Seeley has differentiated between rural and urban exhibition models over the 
course of the 1910s, arguing that nickelodeon-style exhibition continued in rural areas until the 
studios made a concerted effort to link palatial exhibition with ‘quality’ cinema.  In this same 
work, Fuller-Seeley also points to the importance of regional variations (like the South’s 
pioneering use of air-conditioning) and movements for non-theatrical screenings (like the 
censored and/or ‘educational’ church and school shows) to the exhibition culture(s) of the 
1910s.
64
  Richard deCordova’s earlier research into children’s matinees provides further 
information on the proliferation of censored shows.
65
  With the recent turn to regional and local 
studies of American cinema, significant research into ‘educational’ film exhibitions in non-
theatrical spaces has also been done.
66
  We now have a sense that the transitional era was one of 
various interlocking exhibition cultures, in which a number of key determining factors – 
including race, censorship, region, etc. – are important to understanding any individual 
exhibition site. 
 My research adds another element to our knowledge of the ways in which exhibition 
practices in the American silent cinema were fragmented.  Much like Fuller-Seeley’s notion that 
rural cinema practices were increasingly derided as culturally inferior to the urban palatial 
cinemas, the theaters which chose to integrate consumer goods advertising into the experience – 
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whether it be through slides, trailers, or offscreen technologies – came under increasing attack as 
well.  As it became more and more common to assert that direct advertising within the cinema 
space was not in keeping with the ‘dignity’ of motion picture exhibition, both the integration and 
rejection of advertising became a point of distinction for American silent theaters of the 1910s.  
Those theaters which rejected cinema advertising often publicized their decision boisterously.  
Thus, whether or not a given theater included advertising was an important distinguishing 
element. 
 Comparatively recently, scholarly studies of production and exhibition cultures have 
coalesced into broader studies of the industrial structure of media.  In general, media industries 
scholarship focuses on production cultures and the elements which impact the creation of media 
forms and content.
67
  For example, Michael Curtin has argued for the importance of regional 
specificity to production cultures in, for example, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Hong Kong.
68
  A 
common topic of study in media industries research is the importance of advertising dollars to 
production.  Philip M. Napoli, Robert McChesney, and the team of David Croteau and William 
Hoynes, have variously studied the ways in which advertising becomes entwined with media like 
radio and television.  The ‘dual market model’ of business, in which content is sold to viewers in 
order to sell viewer numbers to advertisers, can skew production towards the (presumed) tastes 
of popular target audiences.
69
  Although media industries studies are not exclusively focused on 
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contemporary events, historical research is less common.  In many ways, the first three volumes 
of Scribner’s “History of the American Cinema” series remain the best reference texts for the 
American silent cinema as an industry, as their wide ranging contents provide easy access to 
broad knowledge of the American film business.
70
  While most of the previously cited work in 
silent cinema deal, partially, with culture and aesthetics as industrially determined, book length 
research explicitly focused on the industrial structure of the silent cinema remains rare.  Tino 
Balio studied the development of the American cinema from a historical angle in 1976, stressing 
the importance of transitional era events like the developing hierarchy of theaters, and the 
competing groups of the Motion Picture Patents Company and the Independent film producers.
71
  
Janet Staiger’s portion of the 1985 study The Classical Hollywood Cinema extended our 
understanding of the evolution of the American industry through a discussion of the shifting 
production models common to studio filmmaking, and how the alterations in the structures of 
power impacted production.
72
  Staiger’s later research into the adaptation of advertising practices 
for film marketing added further detail to our understanding of the growth of American film as a 
cultural industry.
73
  The institutionalization and competitive conditions of transitional era cinema 
are thus relatively well understood, even if the information is dispersed. 
 A study of cinema advertising in the 1910s adds helpfully to the discussion, in that it 
brings one particular conversation from media industries scholarship – advertising and its impact 
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on industry structure and content production – into an arena where it has been largely left aside.  
As a rapidly marginalized practice in the American cinema, research into early cinema 
advertising has remained limited – likely under the assumption that cinema advertising failed to 
gain significant traction in this medium, and that it thus had no significant impact.  However, it is 
my contention that, since the development of advertising as an industry in late 19
th
 century 
America, all American mass media have negotiated their own relationship to the dual-market 
model.  There is no medium that is outside of the advertising question in a market economy 
where media operate as private, for-profit businesses.  For a significant stretch of time, the 
cinema was a prominent example not of the absence of advertising, but of a large-scale rejection 
of it.  As such, debates over cinema advertising add greatly to our understanding of the early 
institutionalization of the medium in this country.  As exhibition culture was still seeking its 
stable form, practices of financing were in flux; it was not entirely clear that ticketing and 
concessions would be the predominant means of funding the cinema experience, as exhibitors 
attempted many means to underwrite cinema expenses.  The marginalization of direct advertising 
was, thus, as important as the acceptance of advertising would have been; it was a conscious 
response to a question which demanded an answer. 
 
Literature Review: Advertising History 
While this study of cinema advertising adds an easily identifiable component to extant 
transitional era cinema scholarship, what it offers to advertising scholarship is both more subtle 
and more modest.  In the early decades of the 20
th
 century, cinema advertising in the United 
States was a marginal practice dominated by upstarts and charlatans.  However, as we have 
learned from scholarship on failure, the historical importance of a venture is measured not by its 
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institutional or financial success, but the way it connects to ideas.  In short, this dissertation helps 
to smooth the historical progression from printed messages – be they distributed through 
periodicals, billboards, or printed lithographs and novelties – to the ‘moving media’ of radio and 
television.   Although radio itself had a long transition from agency indifference to agency 
domination, radio research tells only a part of the story.  Experimentation and disillusionment 
with moving media occurred in the American cinemas of the 1910s.  Arising at a moment when 
the American advertising industry was in significant flux, this history of American cinema 
advertising adds helpfully to our understanding of the redefinition of advertising in American 
culture over the 1910s, and the ways in which this decade set the terms for the new debates of 
1920s.  Three topics of study in previous advertising scholarship are thus central to this work: 
institutionalization of the advertising industry as an adjunct to industrial manufacturing, theories 
of audience hostility and how to overcome it, and theories of medium form and advertising 
placement. 
Modern scholarly studies of the institutionalization of American advertising begin with 
the pioneering work of Daniel Pope and Quentin J. Schultze.  Pope, in his 1983 study, The 
Making of Modern Advertising, persuasively argued that the rise of modern advertising agencies 
was directly tied to the rise of large industrial manufacturing.  Pope’s work reveals two important 
elements underlying the institutionalization of the ‘full-service agency,’ which provided copy 
writing, market research, and placement services: the need of large-scale manufacturers to create, 
rather than follow, demand; and the financial benefits of having middle men create, coordinate, 
and negotiate vast campaigns.
74
  Quentin J. Schultze, whose research was roughly 
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contemporaneous with Pope, studied the latter stages of institutionalization, when agencies 
attempted to gain ‘professional’ status.  Schultze argues that the industry encouraged the growth 
of advertising as a part of college curriculums, intending to improve the sense that advertising 
was a legitimate profession, complete with its own high-level skills and training.
75
  In a study of 
the trade journal Judicious Advertising, Schultze also revealed that, by the first half of the 1910s, 
the opinion that advertisers held of advertising was clearly on the rise, indicating that the public 
relations campaign was having positive impact on the agent / client relationship.
76
  Roland 
Marchand helped to clarify the master-narrative of American advertising development through 
an analysis of the conflicting theories of advertising active in the early 20
th
 century.  Marchand 
differentiated between the thinking of what he termed the ‘real pros,’ who saw the value of 
advertising solely in financial terms, and the ‘uplifters,’ who believe that advertising should 
serve the needs of education, public service, and cultural uplift.  In short, as advertising 
institutionalized, an internal schism developed around whether or not advertising should aim for 
a highbrow aesthetic.
77
  Cynthia B. Meyers’ recent research into early radio has shown the 
persistence of this particular conflict, as ‘real pro’ and ‘uplift’ advertisers had different notions of 
the value of the medium.
78
  Pamela Walker Laird added the element of medium specificity to the 
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complexities of advertising’s institutionalization with her 1998 book Advertising Progress.  
Laird asserted that periodical-oriented agencies became the central figures in American 
advertising by engaging in direct competition with billposters and job printers.  By directly 
attacking the use of other forms, while simultaneously engaging in a massive public relations 
campaign describing periodical advertising as trustworthy, moral, and helpful, agencies 
consolidated power not simply through the appeals Pope identified, but through a competitive 
campaign to boost the perceived merits of their offerings.
79
  In her 2004 book Buyways, 
Catherine Gudis studied the standardization of practices in the billboard industry specifically, 
providing clear evidence of the distinct challenges each branch of the advertising industry faced 
in becoming an accepted part of the market matrix.  For example, a central crisis for early 
billposting was the likelihood that any given advertisement would be covered or torn down 
within minutes of being posted; it was not until 1909 that the national Association required 
billboard companies to contract only for “listed and protected showings.”80  In sum, industrial 
studies of the American advertising industry provide a sense of an industry simultaneously 
institutionalizing and remaining deeply divided by both medium selection and theories of 
persuasion. 
Closely connected to the professionalization and institutionalization of particular 
branches of the advertising industry, is the public standing of advertising with its audience.  It 
was not solely advertisers who had to be convinced that advertising men were useful.  In the 
political atmosphere of muckraking literature and Progressive political action, the general public 
– which tended to see advertising in relation to patent medicine or P.T. Barnum’s circus hokum – 
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was increasingly hostile.  Advertising as an encouragement to consume has been a part of 
sociological criticism of American culture since at least 1899, when Thorstein Veblen described 
the acquisition of particular goods by the rich as ‘conspicuous consumption.’81  A number of 
contemporary scholars have approached the public acceptance of advertising as part of the 
ideological growth of a consumer culture, often analyzing how copy trends dovetailed with urban 
modernity: such as T.J. Jackson Lears’ notion that the tone was ‘therapeutic’ and designed to 
meet the emotional needs of modern, urban life.
82
  More important to this study than large-scale 
shifts in cultural ideology are the various ways in which advertising men consciously attempted 
to defuse or pre-empt public hostility.  The ‘Truth in Advertising’ movement represented 
industry concerns about audience hostility writ large and acted, as Pamela Walker Laird has 
asserted, as a public-relations campaign to “advertise advertising.”83  Research into industrial 
practices also provides numerous examples of smaller, more specific efforts to give particular 
types of advertising positive connotations.  Often these efforts were attempts to associate 
advertising with ‘public service.’ Richard Ohmann’s research into the emergence of mass 
magazines, which were sold below cost and derived a profit through advertising, has shown that 
audience hostility can be circumvented through direct reference to the audience’s pocketbooks.  
Though the magazines were not free, the reduction in subscription cost, combined with a 
simultaneous increase in quality, was enough to make the advertising appear to be providing a 
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literally valuable service.
84
  Laird has asserted that the late 19
th
 century explosion of lithography 
as an advertising medium was largely due to the vast circulation that could be attained through 
distributing artwork to merchants and consumers for free, “[i]n a culture not yet saturated with 
manufactured images.”  Although, as Laird says, there are no records for advertising work at this 
date, the democratization of art images through advertising lithography has the appearance of 
intent, not accident; courting a culture of image ownership was the lithograph equivalent of 
boosting circulation.
85
  More obvious are the actions of the billboard industry, where public 
hostility towards ‘defamation of the landscape’ was a persistent problem.  Throughout the 1910s, 
as Catherine Gudis asserts, billboard companies began filling unsold billboard space with 
pleasurable content (such as nativity scenes for the Christmas season), and advertisers began 
weaving elements of practical use value – such as thermometers, clocks, and tourist information 
– into their advertisement.86  Studies of radio and television again provide evidence of the 
continuation of such thinking.  Alexander Russo discusses the “Bulova Time Signal” of 
American radio – a regular announcement of the current time, overtly sponsored by Bulova 
watches.
87
  In short, the use of advertisements themselves, ad space, or public rhetoric to 
encourage a sense that advertising provided a public service was a widespread tactic for defusing 
audience hostility towards advertising. 
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This dissertation can add helpfully to this literature on the rise in the standing of 
advertising among both clients and the public, as the experience of silent era American cinema 
advertisers provides a significant example of the extreme difficulties faced in earning the 
approval of these groups.  For cinema advertisers, precedents in viewer appeasement were 
problematic at best.  Theaters already featured very low pricing; as such, cinema advertisers 
could not claim a demonstrable impact on prices without subsidizing the experience completely 
through the creation of free-theaters.  Charitable or public service use of space was equally 
problematic for two reasons.  First, demand for space dramatically exceeded supply; thus, in this 
environment, utilizing limited space for public service displays was unlikely.  Second, unlike 
billboards, which were the possessions of the billboard companies, theaters were independent 
entities; as such, even when public service imagery – like Liberty Loan advertising – was 
integrated, it was the exhibitors, not the cinema advertisers, which received the praise.  The only 
means concocted at the time to concretely link cinema advertising to public service were 
sponsored time-pieces, produced both as onscreen slides and fully-functioning offscreen wall 
installations.  When the mainstream film industry began overtly deriding advertising as a piece 
of its own public relations campaign – asserting that advertising was explicitly degrading to 
highbrow cinema – cinema advertisers effectively lost the battle, and were pushed into “hole in 
the wall type” of theaters for decades.   In short, the thorniness of entrenched cultural hostility 
towards advertising becomes much more apparent when one studies a branch of the industry 
which failed to effectively combat it.  In the absence of a sense of significant public service, and 
with no public support from the film industry, cinema advertising was left out of the general 
trend towards greater respect for advertising.  As such, this cinema oriented study of advertising 
adds some important context to the early 20
th
 century public relations efforts by the advertising 
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industry.  The parallel efforts of the film industry and the advertising industry to climb the 
cultural hierarchy became, in the limited arena of cinema advertising, conflicting goals.  Public 
hostility towards cinema advertising did not simply remain active; it was intentionally increased 
by the film industry.  Though the advertising industry in general improved its standing in this 
era, the mainstream cultural sense that cinema advertising was conducted by parasites and 
charlatans, by and large, remained. 
Connected to the issues of client and audience appeals, is the ever expanding literature on 
the relationship between media, advertising form, and viewer acceptance.  Scholarly interest in 
the relationship between form and response dates at least to 1914, when Hugo Münsterberg 
published an aggressive critique of magazine advertising; asserting that it should always be 
restricted to a ‘bookend’ position before and after the traditional content, Münsterberg argued 
that interleaving advertising with content produced “a sermon of bewilderment and scramble,” 
and had a devastating impact on a reader’s psychological well-being.88  Recent scholarly studies 
have frequently focused on the thorny problems of spatial and temporal sequencing in electronic 
media.  Cynthia B. Meyers has shown that a subset of advertising men at the J. Walter Thompson 
Company were indifferent to radio in the 1920s because they doubted that indirect, good will 
advertising was effective enough to justify the cost of program production.  In this case, a 
doubtful audience response was cause to question the sponsorship model.
89
  Alexander Russo 
asserts that the growth of ‘spot’ advertising in daytime radio was directly connected to the 
shifting sense of the prevalence of inattention; if daytime listeners were not suitably focused on 
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the programs, then the risk of alienating viewers through hard-sell spot advertising was 
considered to be a better than the risk of more subtle soft-sell advertising being missed.
90
  In the 
wake of the digital transition in media, such concerns have taken on a sense of urgency.  As 
Amanda Lotz has said, digital technologies and ‘spot’ skipping through DVR has shaken 
television advertising out of “fifty years of complacency,” as placement, sponsorship, and new 
spatial tactics (like the corner ‘bug’) now appear better suited to contemporary television 
viewing patterns than the traditional 30-second spot.
91
  As the newest and therefore least settled 
medium, research into internet advertising formats has received perhaps the most attention.  See, 
for example, the avalanche of research into ‘banner blindness’ – the fear that a magazine-esque 
direct advertisement in the margins of a website will be ignored – includes research not only on 
the applicability of the form, but even screen positioning.
92
  Through these studies it is clear that, 
in ‘transitional eras’ for any medium, advertising methods are subject to wholesale rethinking. 
This dissertation adds to the existing literature by providing a thick description of the 
variety of tactics proposed in the era of cinema advertising’s advent.  A broad array of possible 
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advertising methods arose for cinema use.  Some methods treated the cinema like a projected 
magazine, inserting direct advertising as pauses in the flow.  Other methods treated the cinema 
like a single entertainment, inserting indirect advertising – through product placement and 
sponsorship – into the flow of otherwise entertainment oriented films.  Some cinema advertising 
proponents even treated the cinema walls like the outside environs, proposing to erect lighted 
billboards around the periphery of the cinema screen, as though the moving pictures were like 
passing scenery outside a train window.  The indeterminate position of cinema as an advertising 
medium – with both temporal and spatial locations for advertising – produced an array of 
conflicting, but equally plausible, interpretations of cinema spectatorship.  This study of the 
thinking of the silent cinema era provides a clear precursor to later debates about electronic 
media.  Temporal rather than spatial advertising grew to dominate the thinking of the time, but 
national circulation was a persistent problem.  As such, experience and frustration with rigid 
temporal restrictions – what the J. Walter Thompson Company criticized as broadcasting’s 
‘fleeting’ nature – began with the silent cinema. 
 
Literature Review: Silent Era Cinema Advertising 
A small, but growing body of research has already begun to fill this gap and connect the 
early 20
th
 century American cinema and advertising industries.  The early days of in-cinema 
advertising are not entirely undiscovered country.  Beginning in star studies, with research into 
testimonials and the ‘halo effect’ of stardom,93 scholars have expanded research into American 
silent era product advertising to include multiple forms of in-cinema advertising.  Two particular 
                                                          
93
 Charles Eckert, “The Carole Lombard in Macy’s Window,” Quarterly Review of Film Studies 3.1 (Winter 1978): 
1-12.  Jane Gaines, “From Elephants to Lux Soap: The Programming and ‘Flow’ of Early Motion Picture 
Exploitation,” Velvet Light Trap 25 (Spring 1990): 29-43. 
37 
 
 
forms have received the bulk of attention: product/brand placement (and the related practice of 
sponsorship), and industrial/educational films. 
As the only book length study focusing exclusively on cinematic permutations of 
advertising, Kerry Segrave’s book, Product Placement in Hollywood Films: A History, is the 
widest ranging take, as yet, on the topic.  Covering just over 100 years of cinema advertising – 
focusing, as the title would suggest, on product placement – Segrave’s book provides a good 
starting point for future studies.  Despite devoting only sixteen pages to the thirty years of silent 
cinema, Segrave manages to cover many of the high point, including both tactics (lantern slides, 
trailers, industrial films, product placement) and theories (such as the rising faith that ‘trade 
follows the film,’ and the notion that placement was an abuse of the exhibitor – which 
culminated in an official ban on paid product placement, by Will Hays, in 1922).
94
  Indeed, this 
split between swelling advertiser interest and equally increasing exhibitor reticence was the 
central reason for the proliferation of tactics in the era, as advertisers tried many different 
approaches in an effort to find a workable model.  Despite the value of Segrave’s work, however, 
the analysis can be expanded significantly.
95
 
Jean-Marc Lehu, and the team of Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon, and Susan Chang have 
both provided valuable expansions to the analysis of the growth of product placement in the 
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silent era.  Lehu, with a practitioner’s interest in placement (resulting in both an extremely brief 
analysis of the history and an unfortunate lack of concrete examples), asserts that filmic product 
placement had important precursors in 19
th
 century stage theater, citing (but not dating) a Sarah 
Bernhardt performance.  Lehu thus helps to link cinema advertising to longer traditions in 
American advertising practice.
96
  Newell, Salmon, and Chang have more helpfully added 
significant nuance to our knowledge of the permutations of transitional era placement, arguing 
that its development was largely a means of subsidizing early film production, as ‘tie-ups’ could 
provide props and result in the circulation of film stills (which would help market the film), both 
with no direct cost to the studio.  The watershed moment was the Edison Company’s passenger 
rail placement, which occurred repeatedly (52 films) in the first decade of cinema, in exchange 
for which the company received free transportation for its camera crews.  Newell, Salmon, and 
Chang likewise connect the struggles of product placement to exhibition culture, indicating that 
placement was “controversial almost from the start,” and that “negative reactions…from theater 
owners, foreign distributors, and motion picture critics…dr[o]ve [it] underground.”97  
Knowledge of this reluctance provides two important elements for a study of cinema advertising: 
first, stagnation of the cinema advertising industry likely resulted primarily from exhibitor, not 
                                                          
96
 Jean-Marc Lehu, Branded Entertainment: Product Placement & Brand Strategy in the Entertainment Business 
(London and Philadelphia: Kogan Page, 2007), 17. 
97
 Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon, and Susan Chang, “The Hidden History of Product Placement,” Journal of 
Broadcasting and Electronic Media 50.4 (December 2006): 580, 586-587.  It is unclear from the authors’ word 
choice exactly what they mean by ‘underground.’  My presumption is that they mean coerced and non-reciprocal 
placement, like the example of the Lux Soap campaign studied briefly by Jane Gaines.  In the Lux campaign, J. 
Walter Thompson provided free soap to Hollywood actresses in order to sow the seeds for a massive collection of 
testimonials.  What Gaines does not reveal in her essay is that, after a time, brand placement occurred in films as a 
consequence of this action, despite the lack of a direct request from J. Walter Thompson.  By 1928, there were two 
films (one in release, and one then still in production) which Lux Toilet Sopa appeared positively in the inter-titles 
“purely as a voluntary gesture.”  Jane Gaines, “From Elephants to Lux Soap: The Programming and ‘Flow’ of Early 
Motion Picture Exploitation,” Velvet Light Trap 25 (Spring 1990): 29-43.  “Special Production and Representatives’ 
Meeting – Monday, April 9, 1928,” p. 11, Box 1, J. Walter Thompson Company, Howard Henderson Papers, David 
M. Rubinstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University.  Though the comparison is never direct in their 
paper, the motion picture experience clearly prefigured later television battles over product placement, in which 
unpaid advertising was “seen as a threat to the existing revenue stream.”  The same could be said of silent era 
exhibitors, who, as we shall see, were deeply afraid of advertising’s possible impact on box office receipts. 
39 
 
 
production company, pressure; second, opposition to product placement gave impetus to the 
experimentation with the direct advertising tactics to be discussed in this study – tactics which 
included payment to exhibitors for their screen time.  As such, the history of early product 
placement is foundational for a study of direct advertising, in which the exhibitors – so 
concerned about studios profiting from their screens without sharing the revenue – were paid 
directly for the use of the screen. 
Though product placement remains one of the most important elements of cinema 
advertising practice, in the past few years the lion’s share of attention has been given to a 
common, but until recently understudied, alternative in silent cinemas: industrial films 
(educational films produced specifically for advertising value).  Drawing attention initially via 
the pioneering work of both collector Rick Prelinger and NYU’s Orphan Films Symposium, the 
industrial film has emerged as one of the focal points in scholarly studies of non-theatrical and 
local film practice.  Studies of industrial films have helpfully stressed the importance of context, 
rather than aesthetics, to the study of advertising oriented films.
98
  This research is helping to 
pave the way for future work by theorizing methodology.  For example, in the edited collection 
Films That Work, multiple interpretive schema are proposed which are helpful for the broader 
study of cinema advertising: most notably Thomas Elsaesser’s tripartite focus on the 
‘commissioning/funding,’ ‘purpose,’ and ‘addressee’ of such films (or, what he terms the 
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Auftraggebur, Anlass, and Addressat – the “three A’s”), and Vinzenz Hediger and Patrick 
Vondereau’s “three R’s” (the corporate values of recording, rhetoric, and rationalization).99 
Beyond methodology, research into industrial and sponsorsed films has provided 
indications of their importance to cinema aesthetics and exhibition.  In the realm of aesthetics, 
Stephen Bottomore has asserted that the development of mainstream documentary cannot be 
understand without a knowledge of such advertising inflected precursors as “travelogues, 
industrials and educational films,” and their use in the building of balanced programs throughout 
the 1910s.
100
  Lee Grieveson similarly encourages us to see Ford films as central to the growth of 
an American filmic address promoting both industrialization and consumption as redeeming 
values.
101
  From an exhibition standpoint, Joseph Corn has connected the industrial advertising 
style to the notion that cinema audiences are active and irritable, and in need of courting.  For 
Corn, successful theatrical circulation of advertising films was only attainable when advertisers 
learned to use indirect methods, stressing educational content rather than “bludgeon[ing] 
viewers” with a direct sales exhortation.102 
In short, the various studies of the growth of product placement and industrial films – 
though their number remains limited – provide a number of valuable foundational concepts.  
These studies stress the importance of audience irritation to the stagnation of in-cinema 
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advertising practice, indicate that a history of exhibitor hostility towards advertising may play an 
important role, and encourage a focus on contextual issues (including not only what advertisers 
hoped to gain from a given film, but what exhibitors and audiences might have hoped to gain 
from viewing or refusing to view such films).  Despite these previous studies, however, the 
bigger picture remains under-researched.  What relationships drove the proliferation of product 
advertising tactics in the silent era?  Was there a pattern of development, or were all tactics 
experimented with simultaneously?  And what elements of American cinema history led to the 
failure and marginalization of certain models and the partial acceptance of others?
103
  The 
following study is an effort to answer these question, as the three little studied direct advertising 
tactics (lantern slides, consumer goods trailers, and offscreen advertising techniques),
104
 when 
analyzed in parallel, add significantly to our understanding of the ebbs and flows of cinema 
advertising theory and practice during its formative years between 1908 and 1922. 
 
Scaffolds and Structure 
 This project is a model of the type of research now possible with internet based archiving.  
While terrestrial holdings provided important content – including Duke University’s complete 
run of Printers’ Ink during this date range – this research was simplified significantly by Google 
and by the Internet Archive.  The scanned materials from the Media History Digital Library 
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provided an invaluable repository of motion picture industry trade papers like Moving Picture 
World and Motography, in a searchable format so that minor references to particular terms like 
‘trailer’ and ‘slide’ would not be missed.  ProQuest provided the same value for searching old 
issues of Billboard.  Google’s ‘Book Search’ likewise provided significant searchable access to 
advertising trades like Printers’ Ink and Advertising & Selling, which pinpointed a number of 
articles and display advertisements which made only casual reference to cinema advertising, 
while their ‘Patent Search’ allowed me to easily find motion picture theater related patents which 
would otherwise have remained in the dustbin of history.  Online newspaper holdings at 
ProQuest, though not frequently used here, added the occasional nuance.  Without full-text-
searchable online archives, this dissertation would have required unwieldy research time and 
would likely have been abandoned as an unworkable concept. 
This wealth of digitized trade materials – ranging from theoretical articles, to diatribes of 
condemnation, to self-advertising from cinema oriented ad men – is unfortunately balanced by a 
corresponding absence: there are virtually no internal business materials to draw from.  Only the 
Alexander Film Company material held in Colorado Springs, the collection of Kansas City Slide 
Company catalogs in Kansas City, and the (extremely small) collection of Publicity Clock 
Company trade materials held by Duke University provided significant information.  Large and 
promising archival holdings of advertising papers, like the J. Walter Thompson archive at Duke 
University, turned out to contain very little of use, as mainstream advertising agencies were, by 
their own description, apathetic about cinema at this early date.
105
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As an industrial history, therefore, the primary documentation is imperfect, as no income 
figures or internal strategy discussions can be cited.  The material was simply never archived, 
except for the few pieces of pre-1930s material in the Alexander Industries holdings.  It would 
take a heroic effort to even determine incorporation and dissolution dates for the nearly 200 
businesses mentioned in these pages.  As such, much of the argument to come is inferred from 
the swelling and receding quantities of trade-press advertising, persuasive claims made in the 
copy of these advertisements, and more nuanced discussions from trade articles.  This is an 
approach fraught with unsolvable problems.  How much of self-advertising copy was false, or at 
least inflated rhetoric?  Does a decrease of self-advertising mean that a business was at risk of 
failure (lack of advertising budget) or that it was flourishing (operating at peak capacity would 
leave no value to further advertising)?  How much of the difference in rhetoric is attributable to 
changes over time and how much is simply regional or personal variance in opinion? 
Even more problematically, the internal politics of industries and trade presses could 
have dramatically impact what was discussed.  The trade presses, in deference to their own 
circulation numbers, had reason to minimize discussion of issues deemed both sensitive and trite 
by the mainstream of their industry.  It is plausible, then, that the contours of the discourse are 
skewed by prominent journals pushing particular agendas about cinema advertising.  The Moving 
Picture World, for example, seems to have devoted less time to the topic of cinema advertising 
than it might – publishing regular columns from Epes Winthrop Sargent and F.H. Richardson 
(both of whom opposed the commercialization of cinema) but featuring a dearth of articles in 
which cinema advertising men were allowed to speak directly.  Even more compelling is the case 
of Nickelodeon (which became Motography in 1911) which published articles by industrial film 
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producer Watterson R. Rothacker roughly twice per month for more than two years (from 14 
January 1911 to 5 April 1913), after which point discussion of the topic occurred significantly 
less frequently.  The reason for the reduction of focus on cinema advertising is unclear, but the 
moment of the change is suspiciously near to the historic nadir of slide advertising.  The trades 
thus fail to provide a reliably impartial record of cinema advertising in either their articles or 
display ads. 
Without the ability to see internal correspondence from a suitably large number of 
companies, there is little opportunity to study the undercurrents and unspoken covenants driving 
the public face of the debate.  Nor do we have the ability to study the internal contradictions and 
conflicts that occur within any industry.  As David Hesmondhalgh has said, the media industries 
are “complex, ambivalent, and contested,” as various opinions exists between companies and 
even within an individual company.
106
  Unfortunately, the extant evidence emerges almost 
entirely from sources which were speaking to particular public audiences.  The individual, 
unvarnished voices are largely missing.  As such, this study will, by necessity, lay perhaps undue 
stress on the sales rhetoric of the companies themselves, and the opinions of trade presses which 
may have had hidden agendas and editorial policies. 
The study will proceed in five further chapters, the last of which acts as both a standalone 
argument and a conclusion.  Chapter two sets the tone for the dissertation as a whole, providing a 
broader introduction to a central concept in the American advertising industry’s media 
proliferation: the notion of the ‘receptive mood.’107  The belief in an inherently receptive 
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spectator of electric media arose in response to two key elements of early twentieth century 
American discourse: the rise of medium specific psychology; and the notion that image based – 
and specifically cinematic – communication resulted in a ‘passive audience.’  The captive 
audience of the motion picture theater was often described as captivated by what they witnessed.  
Although cinematic advertising faltered, the myth of the ‘irresistible medium’ persisted.  The 
dream of a captive and receptive audience continues to define the ad industry’s hopes for any 
new medium, as abandoned and marginalized cinema techniques re-emerge across the media 
landscape.  The rise of this logic is a key legacy of silent cinema advertising.  Understanding the 
rise and use of this rhetoric not only renders silent cinema advertising debates comprehensible, 
but adds important foundational knowledge to our understanding of the ways in which the 
American advertising industry has interacted with new media. 
The remaining three body chapters predominantly function as two overlapping pairs.  The 
first (chapters three and four) shows the rise and fall of the ‘commercial break’ model in motion 
picture theaters, and the methods that arose from this model.  Chapter three, “The Front Cover 
Medium,” details the history of the so-called ‘magic lantern’ advertising slide, which opened up 
a space for in-cinema advertising by staking claim to the gaps which necessarily existed between 
films prior to the advent of the multiple-projector model of exhibition.  In the early days of 
experimentation with this form, many nickelodeon theaters operated much like contemporary 
television stations, with an advertising ‘break’ at regular intervals during the entertainment – 
here, at the end of each roughly fifteen-minute reel.  As screening spaces improved – by adding 
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an additional projector or increasing the comfort and opulence of the space – and audiences grew 
weary of the imposition, slide advertising lost ground.  However, slides set the standards; all 
other direct advertising techniques concocted in the silent era would be based in lessons learned 
from the fading of advertising slides. 
Chapter four, “Screen Sugar Pills,” discusses the upgrading of the ‘slide’ into the 
commercial film ‘trailer’ – a roughly one-minute advertisement designed to be appended to the 
ends of film reels – and the permanent abandonment of the regular commercial pause.  As the 
slide faltered around 1913, the trailer form was developed to partially replace them.  The shift to 
a multiple projector system could have allowed trailers to completely replace slides, as they 
would have been spliced into the program in the same places, artificially maintaining the gap 
between reels without forcing a pause in the projection of motion pictures.  However, exhibitor 
reluctance, combined with the trailer producers’ need to regularize income resulted in the 
development of a less obtrusive model.  Theaters sold a certain number of minutes of their 
program duration to trailer producers, and the trailer advertisements, initially conceived for 
piecemeal circulation, began to be screened in series of five to ten as a ‘chaser,’ indicating that 
the program had reached its end and was about to restart.
108
  Over the course of this process, 
what is recognizable as the commercial advertising ‘spot’ was developed, but almost 
immediately moved into a limited ‘bookend’ position in a small subset of American film 
theaters.  
 Chapter five, “Profit Margins,” provides a discussion of an alternate ‘corrective’ to the 
faults of slide advertising: offscreen advertising technologies patented in the 1910s and 1920s.  
Although they were only rarely integrated into cinema spaces – and remain little used in the 
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contemporary resurgence of cinema advertising – lighted clocks, lighted signs, wall units, 
branded trash bins, and other elements of cinema advertising at the periphery of the screen, were 
created to stress the interactivity of the theatrical space.  Designed as alternative sites of visual 
stimulation, offscreen advertising was not only a conciliatory gesture in response to audience 
desires not to have advertising forced upon their attention, but also a means to provide potential 
secondary entertainments.  When paired with the analysis of slides in chapter three, the history of 
peripheral advertising technologies provides evidence of an alternative argument arising in the 
realm of moving advertising, in which ad content was nearly literalized as billboards at the edge 
of a viewer’s celluloid based ‘travels.’ 
Chapter six, “The Cinema Wants to Be Free,” wraps up the study with a discussion of the 
various attempts to use direct advertising tactics to create a free, fully advertiser-funded cinema.  
Ranging from simple coupon models, to television-like collections of shorts interspersed with 
long commercial breaks, a minority of film advertising proponents encouraged the 
marginalization of the ticket price, rather than the marginalization of advertising, as a way to 
solve the persistent problem of spectator irritation.  Had either of these models become the 
common method of cinema spectatorship, film culture would have developed in a way parallel 
with television and internet content distribution, with ‘free’ content underwritten by the intrusion 
of direct advertising messages.  The presupposition that advertising and ticketing are 
incompatible remains at the core of critiques about cinema advertising, and the case study in this 
chapter proves that the concern (and that the correlated support for advertising supported free-
media) is decades old.  On the heels of the discussion of free theaters, chapter six returns to the 
issues which have opened the dissertation, describing the multiform reasons for the partial 
abandonment of the cinema as an advertising medium.  A coda on the contemporary rebirth of 
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cinema advertising will add clarity to the analysis, analyzing the important distinctions between 
silent era and 21
st
 century cinema advertising which help to explain why the previously 
unsuccessful experiments are unexpectedly prosperous nearly a century later.
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CHAPTER 2.  “A NOVEL AND IRRESISTIBLE MAGNETISM”: ADVERTISING LOOKS 
AT CINEMA, 1908-1921 
 
 [M]oving Pictures…ha[ve] a novel and irresistible magnetism 
which demands and receives an undivided attention. 
- Watterson Rothacker (June 1911)
1
 
 
 In 1925, prominent cinema exhibitor Samuel ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel co-authored a book called 
Broadcasting: Its New Day.  In this book, Rothapfel declared that the newly developing medium 
of radio, with which he had experimented, could not use direct advertising funds to become self-
sustaining on the grounds that “if you try to sell…some brand of shoes or anything else over the 
radio [then] you’ll have no radio audience” regardless of the non-advertising component of the 
programming.
2
  While the quote makes sense as part of radio history, as the form was just then 
developing and Rothapfel was an early adopter, the identity of the speaker stands out.  Rothapfel 
was, above all, a film exhibitor.  To assume that his impression of direct advertising on the radio 
came solely from two years of radio experimentation would be ludicrous.
3
  Rothapfel’s opinion 
was formed over the course of more than a decade in the cinema.
4
  The myth of the vanishing 
audience, asserted so confidently at this early date – and disproven with gusto by the decades of 
direct advertising on American radio and television – became widely held during the 1910s 
through debates about the plausibility of advertising in the cinema.  It was the standard rhetoric 
                                                          
1
 Watterson R. Rothacker, “Moving Pictures Sell Real Estate,” Motography June 1911: 123. 
2
 Technically Rothapfel was quoting the words of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover here, though that does 
nothing to diminish his faith in the theory.  Cited in Michele Hilmes, Hollywood and Broadcasting: From Radio to 
Cable (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 34. 
3
 Hilmes clarifies that Rothapfel’s work in radio began in 1923.  As such, by the time the final manuscript was 
written, Rothapfel had, at best, roughly two years of experience in the field.  Michele Hilmes, Radio Voices: 
American Broadcasting, 1922-1952 (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 61. 
4
 See, for example, the following article from 1916, in which Rothapfel is clearly already wrestling with the issue.  
He expresses doubt about onscreen advertising, but is still willing, at this date, to see it as a problem whose solution 
is determined by local tastes: “This question of advertising is one which has to be faced and worked out by each 
exhibitor individually. […] Study your patrons and you will find here the answer as to how much or how little of 
this advertising you should allow to be shown in your house and what method you should choose.”  S.L. Rothapfel, 
“First Aid to Theater Men,” Motography 16.2 (8 July 1916): 77-78. 
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of men who opposed advertising in cinemas, and the certitude with which Rothapfel made the 
claim cannot be understood without reference to the years of debate from which it emerged.  The 
American cinema – for Rothapfel and others – set the terms of debate for early radio advertising 
theory. 
 In this opening argument, I wish to give prominence to a particular element of  the 
American cinema advertising debate of the 1910s – the part which was most relevant to 
Rothapfel’s 1925 radio claim, and which continues to inform advertising theory to new media to 
this day: the dialectic of the ‘captive audience’ and the ‘receptive mood.’  The belief in an 
inherently receptive spectator arose in response to two key elements of early discourse: the rise 
of medium specific psychology; and the notion that image based – and specifically cinematic – 
communication resulted in a ‘passive audience.’  The captive audience of the motion picture 
theater was often described as captivated by what they witnessed.  As cinematic advertising 
faltered, American advertising culture normalized the assumption that pausing a public pay-per-
view entertainment in order to integrate advertising was tantamount to abuse of the spectator. 
Advertising was, eventually, only minimally integrated into American cinema, due to the 
assumption that the audience would always resist the otherwise promising techniques devised for 
it.  Product placement, pre-feature stills, and trailers – even in 21st century America cinema 
advertising – are heavily delimited in deference to the likelihood of audience frustration.5  There 
is a tacit understanding between audiences and exhibitors that consumer-goods advertising 
should predominantly occur before the house lights are dimmed, with coming-attractions 
predominating once the house is darkened.
6
  Indeed, much direct advertising is screened during 
                                                          
5
 Deron Overpeck, “Subversion, Desperation and Captivity: Pre-Film Advertising in American Film Exhibition 
Since 1977,” Film History 22.2 (2010): 225. 
6
 Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the 
Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 85. 
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the intermission between showings of the feature, when theaters are devoid of all but a handful 
of spectators.  This placement is the legacy of more than 100 years of compromise between 
cinema audiences and cinema advertisers. 
 
Medium Specific Psychology and the ‘Passive’ Cinema Spectator 
 In the 1910s, as the number of viable advertising mediums began to proliferate beyond 
the simple binary of print publications and posters, it became common in the American trade 
press to argue for the adoption of a specific medium through appeals to the psychology of its 
consumption. In 1902 the magazine Cosmopolitan claimed that the power of popular magazines 
for advertising rested in their status as “peculiarly the companion of leisure hours, when the mind 
is free to accept new impressions.”7  Over the course of the early decades of the twentieth 
century, the psychology of a medium’s ‘readers’ became a common rhetorical trope.   Shredded 
Wheat publicity director Truman A DeWeese offered an even more personal rationale in 1915, 
when he proclaimed that “[t]he newspaper stands first as an advertising medium because it is 
peculiarly a home institution and sustains an intimate relation to the family circle.”8  By 1920, 
outdoor advertisers claimed that it was not the home that created a positive psychological state 
for advertising, but nature which “puts people in a friendly, cheerful, optimistic frame of mind” 
                                                          
7
 John Brisben Walker, “Beauty in Advertising Illustration,” Cosmopolitan 33 (September 1902): 491.  Referenced 
in Pamela Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore 
& London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 279-280.  The 1919 self-advertising for film magazine Film Fun 
is an example of the persistence of this psychological rhetoric: “[a]ddress your prospect when they are in a 
responsive mood, in their homes, where the conversation drifts from their ‘favorite star’ to their daily needs.”  
Display Ad, Advertising & Selling 29.14 (6 September 1919): 47.  Earlier competition between magazines, 
newspapers, and job printers, had parallels with this psychological argumentation, but the more common approach 
was to stress class issues.  For example, see George P. Rowell’s assertion that newspaper, unlike lithographs reached 
“a class that…never would think of gazing into a shop window for what they desire.”  Magazines were targeted and 
generally reached a national, affluent audience, while newsprint could reach massive local populations often 
regardless of class distinctions.  Pamela Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of 
Consumer Marketing (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 158. 
8
 Truman A. DeWeese, “The Lazy Dollar and How to Put It To Work,” Advertising & Selling December 1915: 49. 
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and leaves them “most open to suggestion.”9  Strauss Theatre Programs asserted that the live 
theater was the best venue for advertising as it was the site of the “Emulative Attitude of 
Mind.”10  As the advertising industry expanded, and medium options grew, such theorizing was 
commonly seen as a viable means to attract advertisers to a given medium. 
 The rise of this rhetoric of receptivity coincides with the growth of a theory of image 
power which culminated in mid-1910s debates about cinema censorship.  The psychological 
interpretation of film by Hugo Münsterberg, the ‘impressionability’ theory of the film reform 
community, and the legalese of the Mutual Decision all display an obsession with the ability of 
motion pictures to ‘infect’ the viewer.  In short, a swelling sense of the cinema audience as the 
passive recipient of an ‘injection’ of pictorial information is clear in this era.11 
Lee Grieveson, in discussing early academic study of film in the United States, asserts 
that Hugo Münsterberg’s 1916 book The Photoplay was the first academic endorsement of the 
growing public sense that cinema was akin to hypnosis.  Prior to Münsterberg’s work, numerous 
film reformers published arguments expounding a similar thesis.  In 1909, for example, Jane 
Addams, organizer of the well-known Chicago reform community at Hull House, described film 
as a “mimic stage” which, specifically in crime films, had a pernicious influence on children.12  
In 1911, Reverend H.A. Jump asserted that “movies operated through ‘psychic suggestion,’ to 
                                                          
9
 C.H. Bristol, “Introducing Sunoco Motor Oil,” Poster 11.4 (1920): 10.  Referenced in Catherine Gudis, Buyways: 
Billboards, Automobiles, and the American Landscape (New York and London: Routledge, 2004): 50. 
10
 Full Page Display Ad, Printers’ Ink 98.6 [8 February 1917]: 40.  A decided anomaly in this wave of medium 
psychology arguments was the Emerson Advertising Record, which was advertised as a medium which the listener 
would “preserve…indefinitely and repeat…over and over again to their friends.”  This sense that the listener was not 
just receptive, but infatuated with their new technological toy and would therefore help spread the message to other 
receptive listeners, is unique in my research.  Half-Page Display Ad, Printers’ Ink 96.5 (3 August 1916): 97. 
11
 It is important to note that this is largely an aspect of pop-psychology.   While direct social science research at the 
time – and even the first hand experiences of reformers – indicated that the transfer of information from film to 
spectator was complicated, as a rhetorical trope and a popular faith what became known as the ‘hypodermic theory’ 
of media expanded dramatically in this era.  For a fuller discussion of the complexity of thought at the time, see 
Richard Butsch, The Making of American Audiences: From Stage to Television, 1750-1990 (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
12
 Lee Grieveson, “Cinema Studies and the Conduct of Conduct,” Inventing Film Studies (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2008), 11-12. 
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put ideas in the viewer’s head without his knowing it.”13  Belief in ‘impressionability’ – 
specifically in women, immigrants, and children – and the cinema as capable of ‘implanting’ 
ideas in unsuspecting viewers, steadily increased over the course of the 1910s.  As Richard 
Butsch argues, the cinema represented the first instance in which “reformers concentrated their 
attention on the effect of the show rather than on the behavior in the audience as a primary 
concern.”14  Münsterberg’s book helped to institutionalize the critique as a cinema-specific 
concern, asserting that film spectatorship produced a mental state where ideas are “forced upon 
us,” and that the cinema environment produced the possibility of “psychic infection.”  As Lee 
Grieveson has asserted, “the power of movies over subject-spectators hovers at the margins of 
[Münsterberg’s] account.”15 
What Münsterberg did for academia, the Mutual Decision (1915) did for law.  With this 
decision, the American judicial system – while famously declaring cinema to be “a business pure 
and simple” – effectively codified ‘psychic infection’ theory as a legal concept.  As Samantha 
Barbas asserts, the court rejection of film as protected speech act was, at its base, an extension of 
the notion that images were more manipulative than words and were prone to trump reason.  The 
case, centering on newsreels as an argument against prior restraint, was an attempt to legally 
assert that film was as good, if not a better disseminator of news than print.  The argument ran 
aground on the widespread faith that images held spellbinding powers.  In the words of the court, 
motion pictures had a power for evil “the greater for their attractiveness and manner of 
exhibition.”  Clarifying this interpretation, the court declared that “those who witness the 
[movies] are taken out of bondage to the letter and the spoken word.”  Barbas is correct to assert 
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 Richard Butsch, The Making of American Audiences: From Stage to Television, 1750-1990 (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 154. 
14
 Ibid., 152, 157. 
15
 Lee Grieveson, “Cinema Studies and the Conduct of Conduct,” Inventing Film Studies (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2008), 3-4. 
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that this shadowy wording represented the court’s agreement with the notion that the viewing of 
motion pictures was, in essence, “a passive, noncognitive act.” 16  As such, legal rhetoric 
paralleled the popular conceit that the cinema was a venue in which mental sponges soaked up 
ideas from the screen. 
Of course, a reform community is a largely optimistic one; negative rhetoric is marshaled 
in support of a presumable positive alternative model.
17
  While it is undoubtedly true that 
descriptions of film “play[ing] on the keyboard of our mind[s]”18 have an implication of terror, 
the sentiments were actually expressed ambivalently.  Münsterberg’s book was ultimately a 
defense of the film as art: a medium, unlike any other, in which reality was resequenced to match 
mental activity (where a close-up was the equivalent of directed attention, and a flashback was 
visualization of a memory link, for example).  Likewise, the Mutual Decision was not designed 
to destroy cinema, but to allow for oversight from censors to make sure that the presentation of 
information was handled agreeably.  Notions of an ‘injection’ of information were, even then, 
not a reason to abandon or destroy the cinema.  Opponents simply saw the possibility of damage 
as evidence of the need for oversight. 
Underlying all of this concern with media infection, therefore, was the reformer’s hopeful 
sense of cultural ‘uplift’ – the assumption that socially impactful media could be harnessed for 
                                                          
16
 Samantha Barbas, “How Movies Became Speech,” Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper Number 
2012-048: 16-17.  For more on the Mutual decision, see: Garth S. Jowett, “‘A Capacity for Evil’: The 1915 Supreme 
Court Mutual Decision,” Controlling Hollywood: Censorship and Regulation in the Studio Era, ed. Matthew 
Bernstein (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 16-40. 
17
 Richard Butsch likewise uses the terms ‘pessimistic’ and ‘optimistic’ to refer to the two poles of the reformist 
sense of cinema in the 1910s.  Richard Butsch, The Making of American Audiences: From Stage to Television, 1750-
1990 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 157. 
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 Hugo Münsterberg, The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (New York and London: D. Appleton and Company, 
1916), 83.  Some other pertinent quotes: In film, a thought process is compulsory, as “suggestion…is forced on us” 
as the associations are not personal thoughts, but “something to which we have to submit” (108); it may erode 
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good, to ‘infect’ the viewer positively.  Influence was only pernicious if it was allowed to be.  
The world of film reform, arising in parallel to this ‘psychic infection’ theory in the 1910s, was 
the optimistic outgrowth of ‘passive spectator’ ideology.19  The National Board of Review, 
Better Films Committees, and ‘uplift’ groups nationwide waged a massive campaign for the 
improvement of film, designed more to elevate the masses than it was to limit the release of 
pernicious films.  Louise Connolly, speaker on behalf of the Better Films Committee, described 
film as “a great new avenue for…God to pour Himself out into the genius of man for the uplift of 
the joy of men,” and argued strongly that the film reform community should act as “guardian 
angels for the motion pictures” by encouraging the production of moral films.20  The rise of 
Saturday morning, age-segregating children’s matinees, and the boom in non-theatrical 
educational screenings were both tied directly to this ‘uplift’ corollary to fears of cinema 
infection.
21
  Despite the legal standing of film censorship, the drift of public sentiment, in the 
upper and upper-middle class reform community, was towards reformation rather than 
restriction.
22
 
                                                          
19
 It should not escape our attention that the history of early film analysis has been largely written from a top down 
perspective – focusing on academics, lawyers, courts, and media producers.  But film study arose from both the top 
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20
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21
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the ‘Passive’ Censorship Experiment” (M.A. thesis, Emory University, 2008). 
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As such, as the cinema was transitioning into the classical Hollywood form, it became 
increasingly common for parties interested in but external to the film industry to feel that film’s 
defining feature was an ability to bypass rational thought, and that cinema therefore had 
unprecedented possibilities for both social damage and social control.  Although it is impossible 
to know just how widespread the faith became in American culture, we can safely emphasize 
that, over the course of the 1910s, it became increasingly common to assert that film needed a 
guiding hand to keep it educative rather than retrograde.
23
  Although this definition of the 
audience – to use Philip Napoli’s advertising-oriented term, this ‘predicted audience’24 – was 
massively out of sync with the observed audiences of the time (a distinction which will become 
important below), reformers turned to it time and time again as a shorthand description for 
cinema psychology. 
 
The Captive Audience and Receptive Mood 
 From the earliest days, the discussion of the cinema by the advertising community 
contained numerous references to this growing popular theory of image power.  The words of 
professional advertising man Don Herold, in 1915, provide a well written summary of early 
thinking: 
An advertising man ought to spend a nickel now and then and go to a picture 
show and sit among his parishioners.  He should not only sit among them, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Review’s successes and failures.  See my unpublished Masters Thesis, “A Tempest in a Tub” (Emory University, 
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reconceived their work in the wake of industry attacks. 
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should think about them.  And he will find it hard to think about anything except 
the picture on the screen.  That fact alone should make him think harder than ever 
when he gets away from the grip of the picture story.  Why does a picture compel 
him to concentrate?
25
 
 
Among the many interesting turns of phrase in Herold’s article (not the least of which is the 
slippage between consumers and ‘parishioners’ here), is the telling insinuation that motion 
pictures on a screen would force a virtual cessation of all other thinking.  For Don Herold, image 
power was an element of communicative simplification: “Good copy makes men think in 
pictures[; g]ood pictures make thinking easy.”26 
 Among cinema advertisers, Herold was clearly not alone.  The power of visual 
communication was repeatedly used to assert the supremacy of motion pictures for the purposes 
of advertising.  The International Harvester Company used image-power as a primary argument 
for their film work as early as 1911, declaring that “the things we see have a habit of staying with 
us more clearly than the things we hear.”27  By 1913, the superiority of images to words had been 
commonly reduced, in cinema advertising circles, to the maxim that “[e]ighty-five per cent of all 
impressions upon which we act are received through the eye.”28  Hierarchical notions of imagery 
developed quickly as an elaboration of image-power.  As cinema advertisers clearly wanted 
others to see film as the advertising medium par excellence, the addition of motion to images 
was commonly asserted as a means to increase the potency of image-based communication.  
Advertising theorist Ernest A. Dench asserted that film could allow advertisers to evade the need 
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“to compel the spectator to imagine things,” implying – as Münsterberg suggested the same year 
– that the motion and editing of cinema would made it possible for advertisers to construct an 
advertisement that would do the thinking for the spectator.
29
  Harry Levey, head of Universal’s 
Industrial (read: advertising film) Department, argued that “the eye is quicker than the mind,”30 
clearly connecting the needs of advertisers to film’s supposed ability to bypass reason.  A wave 
of other cinema advertising articles likewise described cinema advertising as a form of ‘mental 
photography’ for sales messages,31 as though moving images could circumvent critical thinking 
regardless of content and chemically develop advertising directly within the brain. 
 An outgrowth of this conception of the cinema as a copying machine (imprinting 
advertising information on the brain) was the cinema advertising community’s obsession with 
the notion of the captive audience – an idea which has since developed into not only a common 
idiom, but the impetus for a legal expansion of First Amendment rights.
32
  Examples of the 
captive audience as a marketable trait of cinema audiences appeared as early as 1910, and 
continued to appear in articles at least as late as 1921.  The assertions ranged from the simple 
notion of the audience being unable to leave (without forfeiting their ticket price), to the complex 
assumption that viewers would stare at moving images in much the same way that moths 
approach flame.  The trade presses of the 1910s were inundated with countless examples, many 
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of which reduced the entire issue to the euphemism that film was “a 100% medium.”33  For 
example, the Neosho Slide Company asserted that slides had “[n]o waste circulation” because 
“Ad Slides Compel Attention.”34  Even industrial film producer Watterson Rothacker, a 
proponent of indirect advertising methods, promoted his product with the claim that “moving 
pictures…ha[ve] a novel and irresistible magnetism which demands and receives an undivided 
attention.”35  In cinema advertising rhetoric, then, the very act of sitting in a motion picture 
theater provided the advertisement with a direct conduit to the brain.  The rhetorical implication 
was that a spectator would have had to possess an almost inconceivable force of will to resist 
cinema advertising. 
In most cases, an assertion of audience captivity was followed immediately by a claim 
that the audience was in a ‘receptive mood.’  Expanding on mass magazine trade rhetoric which 
connected “pleasant, leisure hours” to a receptive state of mind, cinema advertising proponents 
asserted a connection between the medium and a positive mindset.
36
  Advertising film advocate 
Joseph B. Baker asserted as early as 1911 that cinema advertising could deliver content 
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central figure.  The Industrial Moving Picture Company (later the Rothacker Manufacturing Company) was an 
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methods makes him an outlier for all but the most general claims in this study. 
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“with…ease and certainty” due to the fact that the intensely focused audience was “in the mood 
to be entertained.”37  Lantern slide proponent Frank Farrington claimed, in 1913, that no other 
advertising could possibly be “received in so favorable a frame of mind” as that seen in a motion 
picture theater.
38
  By 1921, ad man Francis T. Kimball went so far as to describe the cinema 
patron’s mood as “absorbent.”39  For cinema advertising thinkers, then, entertainment and 
audience passivity were coalescing into a perfect storm; cinema spectators were effectively 
described as jovial sponges. 
 
The ‘Combative Spirit’ and Film’s Stagnation as an Ad Medium 
Despite the common use of ‘passive spectator’ theory, across both advertising and reform 
culture, a large contingent of film industry workers and cinema fans were simultaneously 
advocating for an alternative description of the audience – that the cinema was a site of ‘active 
audiences’ whose attention needed to be both respected and courted.  While reformers and 
advertisers often took a prescriptive approach to cinema audiences, trying to fit them into 
particular conceptions of an ideal society (be it a moral society or a consuming one), film culture 
saw the audience as endlessly differentiated and in need of proper courting in order to maximize 
profit.  Studios and exhibitors therefore tried to cater to spectator tastes in hopes that they would 
define themselves.  Indeed, it is this dialectic between the reformist’s description of an absorbent 
spectator, and the film industry’s fear of a bored one which kept advertising from being more 
broadly integrated and caused the cinema to remain a perpetually third class advertising medium. 
Fears of a backlash against compulsory viewing have effectively the same date range as 
their ‘receptive’ counterparts, as examples have turned up from 1909 to 1921.  If assertions of 
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audience receptivity were tied to the over-optimistic assumption that a mind attuned to pleasure 
would not rebel against an advertising message, notions of distaste were tied to the equally 
problematic assumption that advertising could not occur in a venue for which one had to pay a 
ticket price.
40
  Presuming that advertising would generally occur on the screen, exhibitors, film 
fans, and their rhetorical allies asserted that the viewer would rebel against an advertisement due 
to the fact that a pause in the entertainment for advertising was a hijacking of the paying patron’s 
time.  Such a compulsory pause could result in audience irritation at best, and could escalate to 
“hisses,” antipathy, and even a complete abandonment of the offending theater at worst.41  
Francis Holley of the Bureau of Commercial Economics – which specialized in the non-
theatrical circulation of advertising films – went so far as to claim that such aroused not a 
receptive mood but a “combative spirit.”42  Perhaps the most compelling comment along this line 
came from actor Edward Earle who declared that advertising on the screen was generally 
unacceptable in the United States because “[n]othing is more distasteful to Americans than 
compulsory methods.”43 
More importantly, such arguments often became an implicit critique of the notion of 
passive audiences, as boredom and irritation were traits of ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’ minds.  
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Contrary to the nearly unavoidable attention posited by Don Herold, exhibition oriented 
descriptions of the audience considered avoidance of advertising to be so mundane as to border 
on childish petulance.  Businessman and film fan George M. Rittelmeyer recounted stories of 
audiences “passing the time away the best they could” during advertisements with chit chat.44  
An unsigned 1921 article in Moving Picture Age declared that when an advertisement is “in front 
of [the viewer]…he has to look at it or close his eyes.”45  The willful rendering of oneself 
temporarily blind may be relatively petty behavior, but for these writers it was a legitimate 
concern.  Designers of offscreen advertising technologies, like lighted signs and advertising 
clocks (see chapter five), expanded this ‘active audience’ rhetoric into an advertising theory of 
their own, proposing that the wandering eye of the spectator, while a problem for slide and film 
advertising, could be positively courted if offscreen tactics were used.
46
  The creation of 
alternative viewing objects – even if they were advertising oriented – was offered on the grounds 
that it would increase the spectators’ ability to freely choose what to see. 
Among these latter advocates of the active, discriminating spectator, we read not just the 
typical rhetoric of positive differentiation of media – ‘x’ is the supreme advertising medium 
because of ‘y’ – but also negative comparison.  Roy D. Mock, among many thinkers critical of 
the concept of an absorbent spectator, noted that a primary difference between advertising in the 
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cinema and advertising in all other venues was the concept of choice.  In magazines, for 
example, the reader could simply turn the page or ignore advertising content; in the cinema, that 
choice was not possible, as the focal point of the room was out of the spectator’s control.47  
Electronic advertising demanded a new notion of spectatorship – one attuned to the promise and 
problems of temporal constraint.  Despite the predominantly theoretical thrust of the public 
conversation –no academic studies of viewer antipathy to advertising in these early days have yet 
resurfaced in the historical record – the assumption that temporal compulsion and ticket price 
combined into an unsolvable problem for cinema advertising naturalized over the course of the 
decade, through a combination of exhibitor reluctance and trade press discouragement. 
 
The Happy Captive and Twentieth Century Advertising 
In these debates over the merits of the cinema as an advertising site – ranging, in their 
initial appearance, at least from 1909 to 1921, and engaging minds as diverse as advertisers, 
exhibitors, actors, and early cinema theorists in the trade presses – the persistent concern that 
culture was wrong to attribute unilateral power to image-based communication kept the 
advertising industry from leaping into the motion picture arena with both feet.  For every cinema 
advertising proponent who argued for a view of the motion picture patron as a smiling cash 
machine waiting for input, there were likely a hundred exhibitors, film fans, and advertising 
theorists decrying the practice as an intrusion.  While neither viewpoint was ultimately entirely 
correct – as a small amount of advertising was eventually accepted in nearly every film (via 
product placement) and theater (via stills and trailers) in the country – a rhetorical stalemate 
between the two positions kept growth in American cinema advertising very slow. 
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Forms of electric advertising were designed, tested, and accepted in theaters across the 
country, but no tactic was discovered which could satisfy both film industry concerns for viewer 
pleasure and advertiser desires to directly address a captive audience.  The failure to find a 
commonly acceptable approach is apparent in the wide variety of tactics attempted – ranging 
from temporal alternation (screen as medium), to product placement (celluloid entertainment as 
medium), to lighted offscreen signs (venue as medium), etc.  The end result was that the cinema 
remained an outsider in the growing advertising industry.  Small, start-up advertising businesses 
(and dedicated film men) experimented with cinema advertising, while mainstream agencies 
were hesitant, and would remain so until the television revolution compelled them to use cinema 
advertising as a training ground.
48
  The perpetual disconnect between captivity and receptivity is 
one of the fundamental reasons why cinema advertising was kept in a holding pattern in the 
United States. 
However, although advertising in cinema theaters has remained limited and inconsistent, 
even in the comparatively more permissive decades at the end of the twentieth century, the 
debate over cinema’s suitability for advertising furthered the creation of a collection of rhetorical 
tropes which would help to shape new media advertising theory over the course of twentieth 
century American history.  The ‘captive audience,’ ‘receptive mood,’ ‘combative spirit,’ and 
‘vanishing audience’ have all, to various degrees, continued to inform thinking about modern 
electronic advertising. 
Some examples of the perpetuation of ‘receptivity’ theory are obvious in American 
advertising history.  Radio appeals, for example, were described as the most powerful due to the 
idea that the radio voice had the “supple power to move people and mold them, to enlist them 
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and command them[; f]or people do what they are told.”49  Additionally, advertiser created and 
sponsored radio programs were considered to “creat[e] a subconscious obligation [to buy] in the 
mind of the listener” on the grounds that the audience would feel indebted for the free 
entertainment.
50
  The power of the voice, and of ‘public service’ (providing freely available 
entertainment), are thus asserted to create a receptive mood for broadcast advertising.  
Contemporary interactive media receive similar rhetorical treatment.  Scholar Paul Skalski has 
described video game product placement as “a relatively new way to reach…not just consumers, 
but engaged consumers.”51  Internet marketing professional Greg Jarboe has described YouTube 
similarly, arguing that it is an excellent advertising venue on the grounds that its users “come 
predisposed to ‘lean forward’ rather [than] ‘lean back.’”52  Note that, in interactive media, the 
physical posture of the user can become shorthand for receptivity.  As advertising men and 
women attempt to interest advertisers in new forms, notions of psychological receptivity 
continually arise.
53
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Captivity, meanwhile, has been a driving theory not just for the adoption of particular 
mediums for advertising, but for the intentional integration of advertising outlets into previously 
ad-free spaces.  In the 1950s, the United States Supreme Court heard a case on the growing issue 
of advertising on public buses and streetcars.  Enterprising advertising men had provided bus 
companies with free radios permanently tuned to a single station – a station for which they sold 
advertising.  The piping of commercial radio into public spaces has only expanded since this 
early iteration, in which “[t]he passengers listen[ed] to what the people at the station want[ed] 
them to hear, whether they like[d] it or not.”54  Attempts to turn individuals in public venues into 
de facto captive audiences also resulted in the creation of Channel One in 1989, in which, much 
like the example of buses, schools were provided with free television equipment in exchange for 
the guarantee that the channel’s twelve minute program (which included two minutes of 
advertising) would be watched every day by at least 90% of students.
55
  Both public transit and 
classroom advertising continue as legal and profitable advertising venues.  Although it has not 
yet been put into use, video gaming giant Sony has even patented technology which would turn 
electronic game players into ‘captive audiences,’ by providing a simple means for “suspending 
playing of the interactive content, displaying an advertisement, and resuming playing of the 
interactive content.”56  As there could be significant repercussions to a game experience if the 
player was not present when play resumed, the user would effectively be held captive during 
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such an advertisement, unable to move away from the screen.
57
  With the popularity of captivity 
as a description of audiences, even the old medium of billboarding, in contemporary theorizing, 
has been reconceived as a means to reach captive audiences; as a Warner Bros advertising 
executive asserted in 1999, “[t]here’s no way to avoid it if you do a large enough showing.”58  
Despite long-standing concerns about captivity being ‘abhorrent’ to American citizens, then, the 
advertising industry has continually sought out audiences which were unlikely or unable to 
completely avoid an advertising message.
59
 
As such, the rhetorical battle over the cinema screen – at the time, a unique dialectic 
between the emerging fields of media effects and audience psychology – has been highly 
influential.  The cinema bears the most obvious marks of the conflict, as the poles of audience 
receptivity and frustration continue to dominate the discourse.  However, the concepts at the 
heart of the cinema advertising debate – including, most importantly, ‘captivity’ and ‘receptivity’ 
– have taken on a life of their own as foundational concerns for media selection in the American 
advertising industry.
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CHAPTER 3.  “THE FRONT COVER MEDIUM”: MAGIC LANTERN SLIDES, 
TEMPORALITY, AND ONSCREEN ADVERTISING 
 
Films may come and films may go, but the advertising slide seemingly goes on forever. 
- North Tonawanda Evening News (1917)
1
 
 
As the epigraph opening this chapter would indicate, the commercial magic lantern slide 
was a pervasive and long-lived form of theatrical advertising in the United States.  Experimented 
with or used heavily to ‘get the word out’ for such diverse purposes as local piano tuning, 
running for government office, and furthering the awareness of a major brand, magic lantern 
advertising slides were a common and influential element of early cinema programs in America.
2
  
Via witty phrasing – entangling the screening duration of a single slide, the extent of a slide 
‘break’ in the program, and even the repeated use, for months on end, of a single slide in a single 
theater – the above quote humorously derides the multivalent interminability of lantern slides.  In 
hindsight, a fourth layer of meaning also arises from this statement.  The lantern slide as an 
advertising form also seems to ‘go on forever.’  Indeed, a high-tech variant of the form persists 
to the present day in American theaters; although cheap digital production and distribution is 
aiding in the final phasing out of still advertising, Screenvision, the second largest cinema 
advertising company in the United States, still offers ‘slides’ – in both 35 mm and digital formats 
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– as one of their wares.3  Still-imagery, peddling merchants and services, continues as a means to 
fill the interim. 
 When integrated with filmed entertainment – the first medium in which temporal, rather 
than spatial, sequencing was of prime importance – the lantern slide was the first widely 
successful attempt to reconceive advertising towards a ‘single voice’ model.  Prior to the advent 
of lantern slide advertising in motion picture theaters, the driving theories of advertising 
placement were spatial: nearness to a site of stimulation (interspersed with reading material, or 
erected near a beautiful vista) or simple repetition (papering every available surface with 
posters).  Film – at least, the celluloid portion of it – began the 20th century transition in media 
towards temporal structuring.  The ethos of advertising changed to a fleeting integration – folded 
into narratives, or even pausing the entertainment for commercial messages – rather than an 
existence at the margins.  To use a contemporary travel metaphor, slides mark the first shift in 
placement ideology from the optional billboard to the mandatory stop sign, and caused much 
handwringing about the rights of the audience.
4
  This structuring of sequential media messages 
(entertainment, advertisement, entertainment, etc.) – which would become the model for 
broadcasting – was introduced with the magic lantern slide. 
Though old and seemingly outdated, even at its first appearance in cinema theaters,
5
 the 
form was highly successful and became foundational for advertising development in 20
th
 century 
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electronic media for two reasons.  First, the cheapness of the form allowed for adoption by local 
advertisers, providing a broad and relatively large early-adopter base despite its lack of previous 
triumphs.
6
  This cost-efficiency allowed for persistent use of the formative medium, prior to its 
adoption by national advertisers – a necessary element for the rapid development of movie 
theater advertising despite persistent early reluctance from exhibitors.  Second, and more 
importantly, the unavoidable fact of reel-change pauses in nickelodeon theaters opened an 
obvious gap in motion picture display – a gap which advertising has attempted not only to fill, 
but to maintain as a defining element of ‘moving’ media.  The concept of an advertising 
‘caesura’ is an intentionally maintained shadow of a technological limitation of early cinema.  
The adoption, abuse, and partial abandonment of the form as a part of the silent era film 
experience is the structuring incident underlying all other attempts at ‘new media’ advertising 
over the course of the 1910s and the following decades.  The slide-model’s influence, either as a 
success to be emulated or a failed style to be avoided, is apparent in future development ranging 
from the cinema’s experimentation with product placement, advertising shorts, trailers, and 
offscreen technologies, to broadcasting’s development of sponsor produced programming and 
participatory sponsorship via commercial ‘spots.’  A thorough understanding of its advent and 
marginalization is crucial to the history of advertising in twentieth-century media. 
 This chapter will describe the rise, rationale, and specifics of slide advertising in the 
atmosphere of expanding national advertising and expanding cinemagoing in the early 1910s, 
and will explain its popularity at the time, its longevity as a form, and the perceived flaws in its 
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structure which compelled advertisers to experiment with other cinema advertising models.  The 
chapter will begin with a description of the lantern advertising slide and its place in the silent era 
program, revealing a history of the business of slides from its emergence around 1908, through 
its boom-period as a reel-change ‘commercial break,’ and concluding with its increasingly 
marginal usage following World War I.   Following this, a study of the rhetoric both for and 
against slides as a cinema advertising medium will show what slide manufacturers, consumer 
goods manufacturers, and exhibitors expected to gain – and sometimes lose – by the use of 
slides.  This rhetorical analysis will include a section on Ernest A. Dench’s nuanced theory of 
‘slide psychology,’ a complex take on the tone of the slide pause from a moment – 1916 – just 
before the advertising slide permanently lost its prominent position in the program.  Dench’s 
writings inspire thinking about what might have been, had the regular slide ‘break’ not been 
abandoned as an exhibition form.  The chapter will culminate with an analysis of two forms of 
‘high tech’ slides – motion slides and clock slides – showing how the presence of technological 
variants clarifies some of the most commonly perceived flaws of slides as a medium. 
 
What Was a Lantern Slide? 
 Lantern slides were, generally, still photographs, printed onto a coated plate in order to be 
displayed on a large screen, either via an attachment to the motion picture projector, or a 
specially designed projecting device (little more than a light-source and a lens).  Most commonly 
the plates were glass, though a minority of slide manufacturers also used mica, which tended to 
fade but was lighter and harder to break, reducing the cost of shipping.
7
  Non-professionally 
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produced advertising messages could also be created via various home-use processes – including 
‘scratch slides’ (painting a slide with an opaque coating then scratching in a message), typewriter 
slides (a sheet of typewritten text sandwiched between two pieces of glass), adhesive letters 
(affixed to plain glass), or even pencil on “draftsman’s tracing cloth” (again, sandwiched 
between two pieces of glass for screening).
8
  The simplicity of these home-made options, 
however, rendered them decidedly uncommon for advertising use.  Though advertisers 
appreciated cost-efficiency, they rarely wanted their names associated with such aesthetically 
simplistic forms as home-made slides.  Professional advertising slides were almost always 
photographic reproductions on glass or mica. 
Commercial mass-reproduction of slides was a multi-step process, the first of which was 
the making of a usable image.  An artist would draw the advertisement at an overlarge size – up 
to 16 square inches – and generally in black and white; photographs could also be used9, but 
drawn images were far more common in early advertising slides.  The industry standard was to 
paint an image in white onto black paper, as a design “on a background of solid, impenetrable 
black” was considered more pleasing to the eye.10  From a practical standpoint, this ‘white 
figure’ style would keep the focus on the copy (rendered as the brightest thing on the screen) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
intended to be ephemeral, cut metal was rarely, if ever, chosen for the purpose.  Frank B. Howe, “Commercial 
Lantern Slides,” Camera Craft 24.2 (February 1917): 69; “How to Use Ad Slides,” Moving Picture Age May 1921: 
19.  Metal slides from Omaha’s Never Break Slide Company, and the Kansas City Slide Company: Display Ad, 
Moving Picture World 18.9 (29 November 1913): 1006; and “Some Slides for Advertising in the Moving Picture 
Show,” p. 82, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing Company Records (K0637), State Historical Society of 
Missouri Research Center – Kansas City. 
8
 These home-made slides were more commonly used for announcements, especially when spontaneous 
communication with the audience was required – for example, calling a patron to the lobby.  Typewriter slides from 
Utility Transparency Co: Display Ad, Moving Picture World 19.7 (14 February 1914): 826.  Pencil slides from the 
Seattle Slide Co.: Display Ad, Moving Picture World 11.1 (6 January 1912): 52.  Tracing Cloth: “Projection 
Department: An Announcement Slide Scheme,” Moving Picture World 16.6 (10 May 1913): 591. 
9
 The Kansas City Slide Company, for example, offered photographic reproduction, but the process was 
approximately twice as expensive as drawn slides: $1.50 per slide in 1913.  “Some Slides for Advertising in the 
Moving Picture Show,” p. 5, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC. 
10
 Thomas P. Mason, “Commercial Slide Making,” Camera Craft 24.8 (August 1917): 315.  See also: Frank B. 
Howe, “Commercial Lantern Slides,” Camera Craft February 1917: 66; and “Some Slides for Advertising in the 
Moving Picture Show,” p. 1, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC. 
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would simplify the process of hand-coloring the slides (dye could be generally washed over 
particular areas, as the dark background concealed sloppy work). 
Commonly these drawn images were generic creations of the slide company’s own copy 
writers, designed to advertise classes of, rather than specific, products: for example, the Kansas 
City Slide Company’s restaurant slide: “‘Too many cooks spoil the broth.’  That’s why we have 
one good one.”11  These ‘stock slides’ were designed to be ordered from catalogs in order to turn 
a profit from repeated small sales (no more than a few copies at a time) to merchants across the 
country.
12
  Sometimes ‘stock slides’ were just ‘billboard slides,’ with attractive borders designed 
around an empty white space which could be filled with custom copy.  Alternatively, the artwork 
could be commissioned, or produced from client copy, for a ‘special slide’ – mass produced, in 
exactly the number desired by the advertiser, immediately after the drawing was approved.
13
 
In any case, written copy was always brief, as one could never be sure how long a given 
projectionist would leave the slide on the screen, and film viewers were presumed to be 
“incredibly slow” readers under the best of circumstances.14  Slide advocate Frank Farrington 
suggested no more than four words per line, while the Kansas City Slide Company advocated a 
ten word maximum for finished slides.
15
  The bottom quarter of the image was generally left 
                                                          
11
 “Some Slides for Advertising in the Moving Picture Show,” p. 77, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing 
Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC. 
12
 By 1917, Thomas P. Mason asserted that anyone desiring to open a commercial slide business should immediately 
begin production on stock slides to match the local business environment.  Thomas P. Mason, “Commercial Slide 
Making,” Camera Craft 24.8 (August 1917): 315.  Mid-19th century advertising lithography featured many direct 
parallels with lantern slide advertising.  One prominent parallel is the centrality of stock images, sold repeatedly to 
various local merchants, to their business models.  See: Pamela Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: American 
Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 69. 
13
 The terminology for these three slides comes from Kansas City Slide Company catalogs, though any given slide 
company produced the same products with roughly the same names for the styles. 
14
 G.R. Lowe, “Slide Advertising for the Retail Druggist,” American Druggist and Pharmaceutical Record April 
1914: 44.  See also: “Use Slides to Advertise,” Furniture Worker 37.5 (May 1920): 178; and D.H. Harris, “Making 
‘Slidevertising’ Pay,” The Advertising Yearbook for 1921-1922, ed. Noble T. Praigg (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
Page & Company, 1922), 211-212.  
15
 Frank Farrington, “Advertising in Moving-Picture Shows,” Bulletin of Pharmacy 27.6 (June 1913): 250; Slide 
News May 1922, p. 4, Box 4, Folder “KC Slide Co – Flyers ‘Slide News’,” Kansas City Slide Manufacturing 
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blank in order to insert a local dealer’s name, although the positioning of this empty space could 
vary depending on the slide producer or the copy design. 
Once completed to the above specifications, the image would be placed in front of a 
camera (all images were drawn at the same scale so that the camera wouldn’t have to be 
refocused), and a negative would be created from the drawing.  A specially-made, pedal-operated 
printing box was used so that a single operator could rapidly expose a large quantity of slides.
16
  
Once a suitable number were printed, they would be run through developing fluid and washed, 
leaving completed black and white slides, at a uniform (American) size of 3 ¼ x 4 inches.
17
  The 
printed glass slides would then be hand colored.
18
  Finally, a mat (complete with the slide 
maker’s name and address) and a second piece of glass were laid on top to protect the image 
coating, and the layers were bound together with paper tape.
19
 
 Advertising slides – just one of many types of glass slides then being made – were 
available for purchase by any size business, and even by proxy.  National advertisers could make 
bulk orders to be sent to local dealers as ‘helps’ (shorthand for a piece of advertising material 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC.  Farrington also warned against the use of all capital letters, as they made 
copy harder to read.  Frank Farrington, “Practical Talks With the Shop Butcher,” National Provisioner 49.26 (27 
December 1913): 40.  There are important links between the development of billboard copy and that of slides and 
trailers.  The billboard industry, as rapid transit via rail and then automobiles began to dominate the thinking of the 
time, developed what Catherine Gudis calls an ‘aesthetics of speed’ and distraction.  Temporal limitations on 
reading were seen as a reason to decrease written content (such as limiting headlines to three words) and increase 
image use (known at the time as the theory of “picturization”), creating advertisements which could have an impact 
quickly, and without the requiring the full attention of the reader.  Catherine Gudis, Buyways: Billboards, 
Automobiles, and the American Landscape (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 66-68. 
16
 Given the three-second exposure time, Two dozen plates could be printed in five minutes with time to spare.  
Silent era slide-analyst David E. Ardley asserted that an operator, working at peak efficiency, could make “[f]ive 
hundred slides in a working day of eight hours.”  David E. Ardley, “Commercial Slide Making,” Camera Craft 
27.10 (October 1920): 317. 
17
 Standard sizes were different around the globe.  The British used a square 3 ¼ inches on all sides, for example. 
18
 I have, as yet, encountered no evidence of color photography being used to quickly and efficiently reproduce a 
color advertising image, but it is possible, as non-advertising slides were capable of this at least as early as 1915.  
“Natural Color Slides are Startling,” Moving Picture World 25.6 (7 August 1915): 1035.   
19
 All drawing and developing information is from David E. Ardley, “Commercial Slide Making,” Camera Craft 
27.10 (October 1920): 317-321.  Final assembly information is my own generic knowledge. 
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sent out by the manufacturer to help the dealer move the goods).
20
  Local merchants could order 
one or a few slides solely for their own use.  Exhibitors could even order multiple one-off slides 
on behalf of a few local advertisers, as a way to both lower total shipping costs for merchants, 
and engage in a bit of censorship over what would appear on their screen.  Although early slides 
were mailed out immediately upon receipt of the order, with instructions for the customer to 
hand-write their own dealer information into the blank space at the bottom, by 1913 multiple 
companies offered to professionally append dealer information, via a sticker or piece of 
celluloid, before the slide went into the mail.
21
 
Completed slides could be projected in any space where a ‘magic lantern’ and screen 
were available – generally a motion picture theater, though vaudeville theaters and window 
displays were also used.  In theaters, the end result was a single massive advertisement projected 
on the screen and looming over a seated audience.  In the over the top rhetoric of the Neosho 
Slide Company, this unavoidable, lighted, massive ad would “stamp [the advertiser’s] name, 
trademark, package, goods, or proposition indelibly upon the buying sense of moving picture 
show audiences.”22 
                                                          
20
 In their 1913 catalog, the Kansas City Slide Company claimed that 75 percent of their business was from national 
manufacturers.  Only 25 percent was from exhibitors and merchants.  However, this may have been intentional 
misinformation designed to encourage national advertisers to adopt the form on the grounds that others had 
supposedly already done so.  “Some Slides for Advertising in the Moving Picture Show,” p. 7, Box 4, Kansas City 
Slide Manufacturing Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC. 
21
 It is unclear whether professional appending of name-plates ever became an industry standard.  An unsigned 
article in Moving Picture Age from 1921 still claimed that only “some” companies insisted on the practice, despite 
the same journal deriding the practice of hand writing, earlier that year, as a “blotchy illegible scrawl.”  One of these 
must have been the Kansas City Slide Company, which once declared that hand writing a dealer name on a 
professionally designed slide was the equivalent of “going to a ball in evening clothes and gym boots.”  Some 
evidence exists of attempts by other companies to eliminate the practice as well.  For example, Kansas City Slide’s 
patented process, from 1912, in which celluloid name plates could be inserted, was echoed in the Troy Slide and 
Sign Companies description, the following year, of what they called the “Troy Photoprint Method.”  “Some” 
companies: “How to Use Ad Slides,” Moving Picture Age May 1921: 19.  “Blotchy”: “Screen Advertising with 
Slides and Films,” Moving Picture Age January 1921: 24.  “Gym boots”: Slide News May 1922, p. 4, Box 4, Folder 
“KC Slide Co – Flyers ‘Slide News’,” Kansas City Slide Manufacturing Company Records (K0637), SHSMO-KC.  
KC Process: A.V. Cauger, “Lantern Slide,” U.S. Patent 1,142,143, filed 11 June 1912, and issued 8 June 1915.  Troy 
Photoprint: Full-Page Display Ad, Printers’ Ink 85.10 (4 December 1913): 89. 
22
 Display Ad, Printers’ Ink 79.3 (18 April 1912): 88, and 79.10 (6 June 1912): 83. 
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Like a high-tech version of hanging a sign on a theater curtain (visible when the curtain 
was closed between each act), the advertising slide separated the pieces of the film program, 
acting as a buffer zone in the intermissions between short films and between program repetitions 
as a whole.  For films longer than one reel, slides would have acted as an intermission.  As such, 
lantern slides were an onscreen but formally distinct type of advertising, in which the 
advertisement was delivered in the same space as the entertainment, but in a form distinctly 
different from its ‘moving’ nature (and possibly containing content disruptive to an ongoing 
multi-reel film narrative).  Additionally, unlike the advertising curtain, where the quantity of 
advertisements had no necessary impact on duration, lantern slide advertising was ‘discrete’ but 
‘fleeting’: only one advertisement appeared at a time, giving it the best possible chance of being 
read, but an advertisement had to clear the screen (never to return during that program turn) 
before another could take its place.  As such, an onscreen disruption (or, if one chooses to 
discuss the slides individually, a collection of disruptions) would occur repeatedly, every fifteen 
minutes, as the theater changed reels, and the duration of the disruption would be measurable, 
roughly, by the number of slides shown.  The advertising lantern slide was, therefore, the nearest 
sibling the silent era cinema possessed to the contemporary television commercial spot: it was 
seen, at least in the early 1910s, as a caesura integrated into the film program at regular intervals, 
and was as often as not regarded as an imposition to be avoided (perhaps with a trip to the 
restroom or a conversation with a friend). 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
A Brief History of the Early American Slide Advertising Industry, 1908-1922 
 The history of the lantern slide as a medium dates back to at least the 17
th
 century, though 
19
th
 century developments in lamp technology were responsible for its widespread use.
23
   
Despite their disparate dates of invention, early motion picture exhibition tended to treat film and 
slides as fellow travelers, as early storefront theaters and itinerant exhibitors would integrate 
motion pictures with slides in their programs.  Indeed, well known itinerant showman Lyman 
Howe toured with slides exclusively before transitioning to films at a later date.
24
  In early 
nickelodeon screenings, with the demand for films exceeding the supply, many exhibitors turned 
to technologies like the “Stereoptigraph” – a motion picture projector with a lantern slide 
attachment – in order to easily integrate song and news slides into film shows.  As such, the 
interaction of lantern slides with the early film industry is a concrete example of an old medium 
helping to delimit and define the horizon of expectations of a newer medium.  Indeed, Charles 
Musser has argued that the experiential and communicative properties of motion pictures were 
largely worked out in direct comparison with stage performance (vaudeville) and the magic 
lantern.
25
  As stable, film-oriented theaters emerged, the ‘combined show’ was, for many, the 
pinnacle of nickelodeon exhibition.
26
 
                                                          
23
 Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907 (New York and Toronto: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1990), 20, 38. 
24
 Charles Musser, High-Class Moving Pictures: Lyman H. Howe and the Forgotten Era of Traveling Exhibition, 
1880-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
25
 Early motion pictures were integrated into both vaudeville programs and lantern show exhibitions.  Charles 
Musser indicates, however, that these might have been independent movements.  Though any combination of two 
was not uncommon, one would rarely if ever see all three in the same show.  Charles Musser, The Emergence of 
Cinema: The American Screen to 1907 (New York and Toronto: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1990), 42.  Lara Cain 
Gray argues, for example, that slides were used to help define the film as a continuation of the legitimate stage, as a 
moving lantern slide giving the appearance of an opening curtain would often be shown just prior to a film.  Lara 
Cain Gray, “Magic Moments: Contextualising Cinema Advertising Slides from the Queensland Museum 
Collection,” Queensland Review 18.1 (2011): 82. 
26
 See Richard Abel’s assertion, referenced below, that the song-slide added a touch of class to theaters in Iowa. 
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However, the pairings appear to have been largely entertainment oriented – the slides 
were generally song slides or news images.
27
  Although there is evidence for the existence of 
direct advertising slides in the late 1800s – the advertising screenings of New York’s 
Commercial Advertising Bureau, Fred A. Clark’s ad subsidized screenings in department stores, 
and an exhibitor who claims to have interspersed Civil War slides in the 1880s with advertising 
material
28
 – this use was presumably uncommon.  Indeed, all such screenings of advertising 
slides would likely have been experimental; every advertising slide would have been either a 
one-off or part of a very limited production run.  The slide was, like the film, a medium 
predominantly of entertainment.  There was simply no market for mass-produced advertising 
slides.
29
 
The transitional moment was 1908, when the major film producers regularized output by 
shifting to studio-bound production of fiction films.
30
  The massive upswing in available product, 
combined with the popularity of cheap amusements in the wake of the Panic of 1907,
31
 allowed 
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 Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907 (New York and Toronto: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1990), 258.  
28
 Charles Musser, “American Vitagraph, 1897-1901,” Cinema Journal 22.3 (Spring 1983): 10-11; “Fred A. Clark 
Goes to Edison,” Moving Picture World 18.8 (22 November 1913): 870; and F.H. Richardson, “Operators’ 
Column,” Moving Picture World 7.7 (13 August 1910): 355. 
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 Regardless of these limitations, historical research into earlier slide advertising would be very helpful.  Much of 
19
th
 century advertising research is slanted towards the growth of agencies.  Only Pamela Walker Laird makes a 
significant attempt to integrate other branches of the emerging American advertising industry into the story of its 
origins.  A history of the development of advertising slides prior to the nickelodeon boom would helpfully open up 
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 century American advertising. 
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 David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style & Mode of 
Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 115.  1908 is commonly cited as the point at 
which American production was successfully regularized, though the transition actually lasted a number of years.  
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between 1905 and 1908.  Richard Abel, The Red Rooster Scare: Making Cinema American, 1900-1910 (Berkeley, 
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York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 150; and Eileen Bowser, “1907: Movies and the Expansion of the 
Audience,” American Cinema 1890-1909: Themes and Variations, ed. André Gaudreault (New Brunswick, NJ, and 
London: Rutgers University Press, 2009), 179.  For background information on the Panic of 1907, albeit with an 
openly free-market slant (describing, for example, political rhetoric about wealth disparity as “impair[ing] investor 
confidence”), see: Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s 
Perfect Storm (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 142-143, 175. 
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for a boom in nickelodeon businesses, and a corresponding boom in slide production.  Song-slide 
usage, already common in earlier exhibition – especially vaudeville – peaked around 1910, as 
sheet-music publishers used the sing-a-long slide performance in motion picture theaters as a 
form of indirect advertising to increase the popularity, and therefore the sales, of their new songs.  
Slide historian John W. Ripley asserts that nearly every motion picture theater regularly 
integrated song slide performances at this time, as a means to avoid the interminable ‘reel 
change’ announcement slide.32  Richard Abel, identifying it as an almost exclusively American 
element of nickelodeon display, argues that the boom was facilitated, at least in small town 
theaters, by its addition of a patina of ‘class’ to motion picture exhibition.33  As such, the song 
slide was a pivotal transitional form – a proto-advertising slide which both stabilized the 
presence of slides in motion picture theaters and provided a backdrop for theorizing the presence 
of advertising within the cinema program.
34
 
The increasing number of theaters likewise produced a greater need for announcement 
slides – such as “Ladies, Please Remove Your Hats” – and increased the circulation of news 
slides (a slide alternative to the irregularly circulated filmed news footage that existed prior to 
the 1911 advent of newsreels).  The demand for such content boosted the flow of film exhibitor 
dollars into the slide industry.  Nickelodeon exhibition, flooding the slide makers with cinema 
related cash, triggered a dramatic increase in both the circulation and quality of slides.  Slide 
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 John W. Ripley, “All Join in the Chorus,” American Heritage Magazine 10.4 (June 1959). 
33
 Richard Abel, “That Most American of Attractions, The Illustrated Song,” The Sounds of Early Cinema, eds. 
Richard Abel and Rick Altman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 145, 149. 
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 John W. Ripley has offered multiple explanations for the death of the song-slide form, ranging from the increasing 
length of films, to the abandonment of home performance in the wake of improvements to recording, to the rise in 
popularity of ragtime over the romantic ballad.  However, even as song-slide popularity was peaking, there were 
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end of its lifespan.  A Song Slide Maker, “The Value of Lantern Slides as Advertisements for Sheet Music,” Moving 
Picture World 4.20 (15 May 1909): 633. 
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makers attempted to outclass each other with their products, and attempted to shame exhibitors 
into purchasing the latest and best slides.  For example, the Levi Company traded on recent 
improvements to slide quality as early as December of 1908, when they declared that only a 
“Bumble Puppy” would still be using announcement slides of the previous generation.35  New 
companies, offering either more aesthetically pleasing, more humorous, or sometimes simply 
cheaper announcement slides flooded the market to compete for these dollars. 
It was this 1908 flourishing of the slide market which also gave rise to the nationally 
circulated, massively reproduced advertising slide.
36
  Frank B. Howe, a silent era slide maker 
writing for Camera Craft magazine in 1917, asserted that “the development of present day 
slides,” including the advertising variant, could be traced to 1909.  As late as 1906, Howe 
asserted, “the only variety of slide in use was the…‘picture slide’…[used for] lectures, 
travelogues, and home entertainments.”37  Howe’s history, unlike many of the early trade press 
histories of in-cinema advertising, appears to be accurate.  The earliest examples of advertising 
slides appear in 1908, we can reasonably date the proliferation and standardization of the form to 
a point prior to 1910.  There were two important logics underlying the shift.  First, the era from 
1910 to 1915 witnessed “rapid growth” in national consumer advertising.38  Tied to rising 
interest in marketing to immigrants and the poor via mass repetition of imagery (technically 
                                                          
35
 Display Ad, Billboard 26 December 1908: 35.  A now very outdated bit of slang, ‘bumble puppy’ most likely 
refers, here, to a variation on the game of whist played with casual disregard for rules and conventions. 
36
 Intriguingly, song advertising may have provided a similar boost to cinema advertising in the early 1980s.  As 
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 Frank B. Howe, “Commercial Lantern Slides,” Camera Craft 24.2 (February 1917): 66.  See also Roy D. Mock’s 
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advertising to the illiterate), the advertisers were also in the market for new, image-based ways to 
reach the masses.
39
  Second, the burgeoning cinema slide market boosted interest in cinema 
applications.  The rapidly developing slide industry became a cut-throat business almost 
overnight, as every successful new concept was imitated by a multitude of competitors within 
months of its premiere.
40
  As such, companies were seeking not only new product lines to sell, 
but also ways to reduce their price point so as to gain market share through lower prices.  
Advertising could serve both of these ends.  Though, as we shall see in successive chapters, the 
relationship that developed between advertisers and slide makers was not a unique one (many 
forms of cinematic advertising developed almost simultaneously), it is very apparent why the 
two would have been drawn together at this juncture.  Advertisers were seeking an audience, and 
the rapidly proliferating slide businesses – in desperate need of regular income – were seeking 
other revenue streams. 
Research into the trade presses of the early twentieth century, with particular focus on the 
display advertisements which slide manufacturers placed within their pages, shows a dramatic 
upswing in advertising slide production between 1908 and 1910.  The first evidence of 
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 The Brayton Manufacturing Company’s ‘Baby Show’ scheme – a simple idea in which theaters were encouraged 
to draw a crowd by showing a series of slides of cute babies – was immediately stolen by countless slide makers all 
across the country.  Hans Meinhardt’s patented ‘clock slide’ concept – discussed at the end of the chapter – was so 
heavily pirated that he was unable to profitably market it himself.  When conceptual theft wasn’t the problem, the 
industry had to contend with simple direct copying.  In an echo of early film industry copyright problems (which 
eventually caused producers to place company logos directly onscreen in their films), the slide industry struggled to 
police copyright in its work, as unscrupulous businesses would rent slide series’ and re-photograph them, eventually 
renting out the duplicates as their own work.  Brayton’s Baby Show: “The Brayton Baby Show Scheme,” Moving 
Picture World 4.20 (15 May 1909): 632.  Novelty Slide Company’s Baby Show: Display Ad, Moving Picture World 
4.26 (26 June 1909): 877.  The Premo Company advertised baby shows on the exact same page!  The same issue 
called Baby Shows “the fad of the summer”: “The Baby Show as a Summer Attraction,” Moving Picture World 4.26 
(26 June 1909): 869.  The ‘baby show’ concept was still going strong as late as 1916.  “The Better Way,” Moving 
Picture World 7 October 1916: 69, and Epes Winthrop Sargent, “Advertising for Exhibitors,” Moving Picture World 
11 November 1916: 847.  Clock Slide: “The Meinhardt Clock Slide,” Moving Picture World 16.7 (17 May 1913): 
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advertising slide production in the Moving Picture World was the April 1908 advertisement from 
Boston’s Preston Lombard, in which he offered “Announcement, Advertising, [and] Special” 
slides.
41
  Although slides were not mentioned directly in the article, the Young Advertising 
Service of Manning, SC, was also engaging in ad slide sales by 25 July 1908.  The Moving 
Picture World declared that the company had “originated a good advertising proposition” in 
which they had “arranged with several moving picture establishments for space upon the canvas 
between acts.”42  Within four months, on 7 November 1908, commercial lantern slides were 
common enough for the Moving Picture World to caution against their proliferation: 
[q]uite a business was done Election Night [November 3
rd
] in several dime 
theaters…with advertising slides.  We venture to caution these places, however, 
that this advertising the grocery, shoe, drug, and other stores in their 
neighborhood will in time drive the people away from their shows.  They come 
there and pay to see moving pictures and illustrated songs and not to get 
quotations on green apples from some local grocer.
43
 
 
During the latter half of 1908, then, the notion of the advertising slide arose – perhaps 
independently in multiple cities – as a viable product for use in nickelodeons.  Importantly, the 
unproven assumption that advertising was incompatible with the cinema audience’s desires was 
                                                          
41
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asserted almost immediately.  Both the use of slides and the assumption that they were an 
inherent evil in the cinema would swell enormously over the course of the next five years.  
Slide manufacturers, both established and newly formed, quickly jumped into the 
advertising slide field.  The Well’s Moving Picture Enterprises’ included the tagline 
“Advertising and Special Lantern Slides Made” in their display ad of 24 October 1908.44  On 21 
November of the same year the Ohio Transparency Company included a consumer goods 
advertising slide – a stock slide for cigar merchants – as the image in their trade press display ad, 
while the copy claimed “[s]ome exhibitors are paying their rent by exhibiting Advertising Slides 
before the show.”45  The Levi Company, Inc. (later to change its name to the Perfection Slide 
Company), offered the “brand new idea” of advertising slides in their display ad of 15 May 
1909.
46
  On this same date, the Brayton Manufacturing Company took out a full-page display ad, 
devoting more than half of the space to their new line of advertising slides.  The ad declared, at 
the top of the left hand column, “Advertising Slides will pay your expenses,” and included two 
photographic examples of their work: one for the Schulze Baking Company, and one for the 
Union Furniture Carpet Company.
47
  Cleary, as far as Brayton was concerned, the market for 
advertising slides had grown so rapidly in the preceding year that the cost of a full-page ad in the 
top flight cinema trade journal, Moving Picture World, was not a wasteful expense. 
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By June 12
th
 of that year, a short article in the Moving Picture World concurred, avowing 
that “[w]ithin the past year a pleasing change has developed in the quality and character of 
the…announcements and advertising slides shown in nickel theaters,” and placed Brayton at the 
forefront of the movement that had “opened up a field of remuneration to the exhibitor.”48  
Between April 1908 and the end of 1910, at least twenty-three slide makers offered advertising 
slides through display ads in the pages of the Moving Picture World.
49
  The major centers of 
slide production – New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia – were also the hub cities for the ad 
slide trade.
50
  Companies dotted the countryside, however, with an unexpectedly large number of 
advertising slide manufacturers sprouting across the state of Missouri, for example, presumably 
to take advantage of a nationally central location.
51
  As such, it is undeniable that the advertising 
slide went through a phase of rapid development between 1908 and 1910, mushrooming across 
the country and attaining early widespread adoption by both slide manufacturers and film 
exhibitors. 
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Though it is clear that the nascent field was in full swing by the end of 1910, it is equally 
clear that small manufacturers and local merchants were the predominant clients in the early 
years.  The unsettled and local nature of early slide business is directly evidenced in the fact a 
pair of sixteen year old boys from Sandusky, Ohio began an advertising slide company of their 
own and, by late May of 1909, were “getting out, after school hours and on Saturdays, two-
hundred advertising slides a week.”52  The fact that young boys in Sandusky had heard of the 
concept implies its commonality, while their audacity in starting up and apparently succeeding 
with a business of this type strongly implies that, to this point, local manufacture was still more 
common than postal order or dealer ‘helps.’  By early 1911, columnist Thomas Bedding, in an 
article in Moving Picture World, came near to directly stating that such conditions persisted.  
Bedding admitted surprise that the ‘soulless’ advertising man, who would “advertise on a funeral 
hearse” if given the chance, had not adopted the motion picture theater for advertising purposes.  
While his mocking tone was not exactly inviting to advertisers, it is clear from his article that 
“Mr. Postum, Mr. Moxie, [and] Mr. Munyon,” among other major advertisers, were not at this 
point attempting national brand advertising through the medium of slides.
53
   As such, the 
quantity of active advertising slide producers in these first few years likely greatly exceeds the 
number advertising nationally in trade presses like the moving picture world, as the bulk were 
producing local slides for local use. 
There are several plausible reasons for the rapid proliferation of commercial slide 
companies at this time.  While local demand may have been the primary determinant for local 
production, part of the proliferation of national advertising slide companies might have been 
caused by what we could term a slide diaspora.  At least one major slide manufacturer ‘gave 
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birth’ to a second around 1910.  A news report from the time declares that A.V. Cauger had 
“formerly lived [in Neosho, MO] and was interested in the Neosho Slide Co.” before moving to 
Kansas City and “start[ing] the Kansas City Slide Co.”54  In the first half of the 1910s, both 
Neosho and Kansas City Slide were in the top tier of national slide companies.  A second reason 
may be the fact that one could open and operate a slide company with very few employees.  
Though the Kansas City Slide Company already had thirty-two employees in 1912 (which 
ballooned further to 64 by 1914), the North American Slide Company of Philadelphia was able 
to operate with only three employees from 1916 to 1919.
55
  Two blocks up the street, the No-
Destructo Slide Company employed only six Philadelphians in 1916.
56
 Third, the explosion of 
spending in the industry would undoubtedly have drawn prospectors to the field.  The relentless 
expansion of both the advertising industry and the slide industry at this point in American history 
created a perfect storm for start-up businesses to enter the field in search of a quick buck.
57
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Fourth, and most important, however, was the established relationship between slides and 
motion pictures in nickelodeon exhibition practices.  Dedicated film theaters delivered a series of 
short films – one reel (roughly 15 minutes) in duration – from a single projector.  Both song and 
announcement slides had developed as common means of filling the pause created during a reel 
change.  This gap was a clear and established zone of indeterminate (but definitely non-filmic) 
content, during which a seated audience patiently waited for the next film.  With exhibitors 
already seeking ways to fill this technologically mandated pause, and already turning to slide 
manufacturers to do so – especially the promotionally-inflected song-slides – advertisers 
interested in reaching the large and growing customer base of the motion pictures had an obvious 
form on which to focus their attention.  Offering to pay the cost of announcement slides in 
exchange for including advertising, or, better yet, offering to pay the exhibitor a small weekly fee 
for the space (helping them ‘pay the rent’), it would not have been difficult for advertisers to 
stake claim to a part of the temporal flow which the film industry proper seemed incapable of or 
uninterested in filling.  As such, though dated, lantern slide advertising emerged specifically as a 
way to capitalize on a large audience rendered idle by a reel change. 
For the first few years, however, the young commercial slide industry was so flooded 
with small businesses – “many of which…were incompetent in the extreme”58 – and was so 
devoid of standards of practice that it looked as though it would soon self-destruct.  Witness, for 
example, the story of the Marshaw Slide Manufacturing Service, criticized not once but twice, in 
early 1909, by the editors of the Moving Picture World.  Though Marshaw claimed that business 
had suffered only a minor hiccup as they transitioned to larger quarters, complaints circulated for 
weeks about their failure to fill orders or even respond to queries.  The World claimed to have 
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received “dozens” of complaints, including that of LeRoy Bickle, of Ardmore, Oklahoma’s 
Theatorium, whose slide order was weeks late – though the check had been cashed – and whose 
letters to the company had been ignored.
59
  While Marshaw itself was singled out as a 
particularly poor business in these notes, the company can be held up as a historical emblem of 
the poor business practices rampant in early advertising slide production.
60
 
The slide industry’s most pronounced problem was price-cutting, resulting in largely 
unsatisfactory slides being made just as they were becoming common in theaters.  As 
photography journalist T. Stanley Curtis asserted, in late 1911: 
a number of men who possessed more business acumen than photographic or 
artistic talent…have entered the field and flooded it with worse than mediocre 
work, cutting their prices to the detriment of the conscientious slide makers. 
 
Curtis also helpfully added that “[i]t was at the time when the demand increased so suddenly that 
the ‘shyster’ slide-makers started their work,” implying the importance of the nickelodeon boom 
to the rise of ‘shysters,’ without directly stating the fact.61  Corroborating evidence for this 
assertion exists at least as early as 1908, when New York song slide makers engaged in a price 
battle.
62
  By early 1909, the Ohio Transparency Company was already using a price-cutting 
reference as its company slogan: “The Best not the Cheapest.”63  By the middle of 1911, the 
Niagra Slide Company humorously attempted the reverse tactic, taking out a display ad in which 
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they claimed to have all been “Arrested…for selling slides too cheap.”64  Publicly declared 
prices – still common in slide company self-advertising during these early years – also show a 
clear downward trajectory.  The Brayton Manufacturing Company was advertising hand-colored 
advertising slides from custom copy for fifty cents each in December 1908.
65
  In March of 1909, 
the Levi Company dropped their price to thirty-five cents per slide, attributing the reduction to 
“increased facilities.”66  Later that same year, the Marshaw Slide Manufacturing Service matched 
that price.
67
  In mid-1912, the Erker Bros. Optical Company of St. Louis used the thirty-five cent 
price as a launch special for their new designs, and even offered to cut further (four dollars per 
dozen, or thirty-three and one-third cents per slide) for larger orders.
68
  That same year, George 
Birt of Indianapolis offered advertising slides for thirty cents each, and had cut corners so badly 
that he was openly admitting that his slides were merely black letters on color-tinted glass.
69
  By 
1913, the Greater New York Slide Company had dropped its offer as low as eighteen cents per 
slide, if ordered in quantities of one-hundred, and (quite accurately) called it “an extremely low 
price for good advertising slides.”70  In the surviving data, the historical low point is found in a 
one-year contract, commencing in late 1914, signed by the Advertising Slide Company of St. 
Louis in which the company agreed to a price of sixteen cents per slide.
71
  However, slide maker 
Frank B. Howe, in his 1917 historical overview of the market, even asserted that hand colored, 
custom designed slides could be had for as little as ten-cents during this period.
72
  Knowing these 
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conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that companies could form and fold in less than a month – 
as Louisville’s Advertising Specialty Company did in early 1912.73 
The quantity of producers and rapidly dwindling pricing had dramatic effects on the 
industry as a whole in its early years, as companies tried every tactic imaginable to gain 
attention.  As early as 1909, the Levi Company attempted to draw the eyes of trade press readers 
by heading a self-advertisement with the title “MURDER,” and then openly admitting that it was 
a ploy to get the reader’s attention.74  Apparently even at that date a mention of slides was no 
longer a draw to the potential client’s eye.  More problematically, in the hyper-competitive early 
years of advertising slides, popular images would be rapidly pirated by unscrupulous opponents.  
Such companies would even publicly boast of their superior renditions of the work of others.  A 
1913 catalog from the Kansas City Slide Company, for example, included a page with eight slide 
images: four of which were the original designs of their competitors, while the other four were 
their own ‘superior’ renditions.75 
In this wildly competitive market, a subset of slide companies – the larger companies 
regularly advertising in the trade press – attempted to add elements to their business model to 
help carve out a stable and profitable niche.  Most of these elements ran directly parallel to 
principles of the established, print-focused advertising agencies: cultivating a notion of 
professional expertise, space brokering, and offering ‘services’ like distribution and screening 
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assistance.
76
  An oligarchy of high-end slide makers developed through these efforts to combat 
the price-cutting problem. 
‘Professional’ rhetoric – assertions that one could be a slide advertising ‘expert’ – ran 
rampant in these early years, as companies attempted to mimic the ‘full service’ notion of 
traditional agencies by marketing themselves as not only manufacturers of slides, but creators of 
both visual and written copy.  The Brayton Manufacturing Company, in their first full-page 
display ad, used the word “Artists” five times (along with the words “Original” and “Alive”) as a 
buffer between the two columns.
77
  The following month, Brayton asserted that profit was just a 
side effect of their public respect as “artists,” with the claim that “money-making is not our 
business or pleasure.”78  As early as 1911, the Lee Lash Company asserted that the weight of 
experience – its long history of ‘censorship’ of advertising curtains – had given the company 
keen insight into advertising copy.
79
  By 1912, the Thornton Advertising Company encouraged 
advertisers to see its hiring of B.S. Presba – described as a man with years of experience in slide 
advertising – as “evidence that…[they had] standardized Theatre Slide Advertising, and brought 
it to such a state of efficiency that it demands careful attention.”80  In 1913, the North American 
Slide Company brought the term ‘expert’ into the industry for the first time when it declared that 
its slides were “made by experts – the copy prepared and the drawings made by trained 
specialists,” resulting in their slides having “character…snap and go.”81  Within a decade – by 
1922 – even the mainstream New York press was able to identify George Toner, of the Unique 
Slide Company, as a creator of “cornucopias, curlicues, and similar ornamental dingbats” under 
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the assumption that the reader would understand the description as a recognizable sub-field of 
commercial art.
82
  For the general newspaper reader of 1922, ‘slide artist’ was a definable, if 
somewhat eccentric, profession.  That same year, the Kansas City Slide Company declared in its 
monthly catalog update “Slide News,” that the price of slides was for the art rather than 
materials; as such, a decrease in the price of glass would not decrease the cost of slides because 
they were “drawn by high-salaried experts.”83 
This, however, was simply the explicit rhetoric.  Many companies also tacitly declared 
expertise by publishing catalogs of stock slides – implying clearly that their creativity was what 
was for sale.  Although A.V. Cauger of the Kansas City Slide Company claimed to have been 
“the first concern in the slide business to put out an illustrated list,” the Levi Company catalog 
was already in its ‘second edition’ as early as 1908 – two years before the Kansas City Slide 
Company opened for business.
84
  Perhaps Cauger was referring to his time with the Neosho Slide 
Company, which offered a sixteen page catalog, with ad slides included alongside announcement 
slides, by the end of 1909.
85
  By 1910, the Brayton company had taken to publicly referring to 
them as “Stock Advertising Slides.”86  Within a few years, many of the more prominent slide 
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producers – including Scott & Van Altena, the Niagara Slide Company, the Erker Bros. Optical 
Company, and Burden & Salisbury - offered catalogs in their self-advertising, and many others 
were likely circulating catalogs without offering them nationally through trade press self-
advertising.
87
  By 1917, the practice was so common that photography expert Thomas P. Mason 
asserted that anyone thinking of starting a commercial slide company should, as their first act, 
“classify his possible customers according to their lines of business and then make up…some 
ready-to-serve designs” that could be made and sold immediately through a catalog list.88  In the 
absence of (or possibly in addition to) a catalog, some companies would even send one slide free 
as an example of the high quality of their work.  Both the Mica Non-Breakable Slide Company, 
in 1912, and the Columbia Slide Company, in 1915, even offered to make a free sample from the 
advertiser’s copy.89  As such, either through direct claims or the weight of catalogs, advertisers 
were encouraged to see slide copy as an expert service provided by slide companies. 
‘Professionalization’ was not just implied in copy writing practices, however.  In an 
attempt to indicate that slide advertising was a stable and accepted medium, slide producers 
either offered, or explicitly guaranteed, distribution in various ways.  Space brokering – the very 
same concept which the print-based agencies had used in the late 1800s to stabilize magazine 
and newspaper advertising
90
 – was the method of choice for the Motion Picture Advertising 
Company and Lee Lash Company, both of New York City, and the Auerbach Advertising 
Agency of Butte, Montana.  Space brokering in motion pictures consisted of the signing of 
exclusive contracts with a number of theaters and then ‘reselling’ the contracted advertising 
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space to clients as part of the cost of a slide purchase.
91
  The Lee Lash Company had enough 
theaters under contract that a one-year advertising deal, running until the 31
st
 of May 1913, was 
valued at $87,946.
92
 
In the absence of space brokering, two other forms of ‘guarantee’ were attempted: 
offering a check-up service, or offering to aid in contracting theaters.
93
  At least one, the 
Thornton Advertising Company, took the former course and attempted “to absolutely guarantee 
service” by using a system of “territorial managers” to personally double-check that slides were 
being screened as promised, and in good condition.
94
  Although Thornton is the only example I 
have uncovered, this method would have been relatively easy for small, locally focused slide 
producers to integrate.  Multiple slide concerns – such as the Harold Ives Company and the 
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Neosho Slide Company – went the latter route and offered to aid in contracting with theaters for 
screenings of finished slides.
95
  These methods of ‘guaranteeing’ circulation in the absence of 
space brokering contracts with theaters were, likewise, attempts to prove that slide advertising 
was not a scattershot and unprofessional affair, and that the professional slide maker had the 
experience and knowledge necessary to get advertising slides onto screens. 
In short order, the larger slide producers began describing themselves as ‘full service’ 
agencies for motion picture theater advertising.  The Neosho Slide Company declared, by 1912, 
that they made slides “complete from the design to the guaranteed delivery of the slides to your 
trade.”96  By 1914, the Kansas City Slide Company was offering contracts for service that 
included new slides weekly, conceived, made and mailed with no need for continual advising by 
the advertiser.
97
  In 1921, the Standard Slide Corporation’s notion of a ‘full service’ slide 
manufacturing concern was clear from the following description: 
We prepare the layout of the copy for the slide; explain how the slides can be used 
to the best advantage; secure the dealer’s cooperation and take entire charge of the 
distribution of slides direct to dealers with return card check-up.
98
 
 
Integrating elements of all of the above – copy writing, consultation, and distribution assistance – 
the slide manufacturer as professional expert on slide advertising became common by the mid-
1910s, as slide manufacturers effectively became cinema-based ad ‘agencies’ in an American 
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advertising culture where medium exclusivity was still a common way of differentiating 
advertising companies. 
 Much of the above professionalization, despite the slide industry’s largely catalog (and 
therefore local merchant) based business, included one further rhetorical spin designed to imply 
strength and stability: the implication was always that slides were plausible for national 
campaigns.  The attempt to draw national advertising contracts as a way to legitimize and 
stabilize both a company (through windfall profits) and the industry (by association with 
mainstream advertisers) was often rhetorically bald-faced.  Overt name dropping, of national 
manufacturers who had once used a slide maker’s service, proliferated in self-advertising.  Often 
such mentions included example images printed as part of the display ad.  For example, well-
known brands and manufacturers like Arrow Collars and the American Tobacco Company 
appeared in the self-advertising for the Greater New York Slide Company and Niagara Slide 
Company respectively.
99
  The Advertising Slide Company of St. Louis even circulated a 
portfolio of previous work for national advertisers like Coca Cola, Sunkist Oranges, and the 
Heinz (“57 Varieties”) Corporation.100  Other companies overwhelmed a lack of concrete detail 
with large numbers – like Neosho’s 1912 declaration that “40 National Advertisers” were using 
their distribution service, or the Novelty Slide Company’s boast that “115 National Advertisers” 
had at one point signed a contract for their slides.
101
  The presumed endorsement of national 
advertisers, on top of full-service appeals, made top-flight ad slide manufacturers look quite 
stable. 
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Despite all these efforts, the advertising slide business, in the short term, was a troubled 
realm.  Price competition by small, often fly-by-night producers had placed individual company 
profit above market health and had devastated the public reputation of the form.  Regardless of 
the attempts by the larger manufacturers to attain professional credibility, cut-rate slide 
producers, and their many clients, created an avalanche of shoddy product and poor display 
practices…and a massive backlash against advertising slides.102  To the vexation of the larger 
slide makers, in-cinema advertising became not only common, but so often ‘incompetently’ 
produced, that public complaints proliferated.  A parade of exhibitor rejections and legal 
restrictions of slides appear in the historical record between 1912 and 1916. 
As spectator complaint expanded, many exhibitors took it upon themselves to try to force 
advertising off of cinema screens.  At least one prominent member of the film press – the Moving 
Picture World’s own Epes Winthrop Sargent – playing on growing anti-advertising feelings, 
made claims to a supposedly higher moral standing that the ‘manager’ had over the ‘billposter,’ 
asserting the need to “[h]ave respect for your business even if you have none for yourself.”  For 
Sargent, the exhibitor who would turn a screening of ‘Quo Vadis’ into a “store show” by 
breaking it up with slides indicating “that the bull Ursus kills represents a well known brand of 
smoking tobacco,” was the epitome of capital influenced moral degradation.103  Exhibitors 
themselves often simply refused to run ad slides (occasionally using such a decision as a reason 
for chest-thumping in the press.)  A few theaters in Louisville, Kentucky, for example, 
voluntarily abandoned slides altogether in 1912 on the grounds that “the public…[was] not 
meeting the show-slide with particular warmth, and that not enough business [could] be secured 
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to make the shortening of the shows worth while.”104  The Dreamland Theater, of Augusta, 
Georgia, was more boisterous in its rejection, asserting not only that “[n]o advertising slides go 
on our screen…at any price,” but also that they would not even place advertising in their printed 
programs.
105
  Multiple public refusals of this nature are recorded in the motion picture trade 
press. 
Two specific legal attacks on slide advertising, in the wake of public outrage, have also 
come to light.  In 1915, Bloomington, Illinois, added an extra $20 per year to the licensing fee 
for theaters using “advertising slides or curtains.”106  Acting as both a deterrent (for theaters who 
did not want to pay an extra $20 before inaugurating a possibly damaging advertising line), and 
an act of acceptance (simply an added tax on increased profits), the Bloomington advertising fee 
indicates not only the commonality of debate of the topic, but also the public’s difficulty in 
knowing quite how to respond to it.  The double-edged law implies the existence of both quality 
professional slides and cheap profiteering.  Legislators in Boston attempted to pass a bill in 1916 
of much less ambiguity: the bill would have made it illegal to show any advertising onscreen in 
Boston – “with the exception of…religious or charitable institutions or events, or when it refers 
to his own theatrical affairs” – with a mandatory fine of $50-200 for violators, and a license 
revocation for repeat offenders.
107
  By the mid-1910s, then, public condemnation of slides had 
reached such a fever pitch that local government was stepping in. 
In the absence of the defunct song slides, and with the growing reluctance to use 
advertising slides to fill the gaps between reels, the advertising slide began slowly slipping out of 
typical theater programs.  Many exhibitors turned increasingly to self-promotion to fill gaps.  
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During the early 1910s, an increasing use of home-made slides to announce either the next film 
in the program, or the program for the following day, led to an eventual professionalization of 
the ‘coming attraction’ or ‘advance’ slide.  In 1911, F.H. Richardson, in early advertising for his 
typewriter slides, declared that “Up-to-date theaters use them for announcing future programs” – 
a practice which surely dated back to old scratch and handwritten slides in the earliest film 
theaters.
108
  Earlier that year, exhibitor Samuel Acri, in a letter to the editor of Moving Picture 
World, requested that the practice be professionalized.  Acri asked studios to circulate advance 
slides with images and names of actors and actresses on the grounds that the drawing power of 
certain performers could improve box office receipts if it was used to advertise.
109
  Over the 
following years, the ‘coming attraction’ slide would be inaugurated in a number of formats, by 
independent (non-Patents Company affiliated) studios, in an effort to increase the competitive 
value of their films.
110
  In July of 1912, both the Crown Feature Film Company and Universal 
were offering ‘announcement slides’ for their upcoming productions.111  Reliance offered 
advance announcement slides – made by high-class slide producers Scott & Van Altena – by 
1913.
112
  Between 1912 and 1913, a number of general slide producers also began circulating 
coming attraction slides (apparently without studio consent or funding), including the Novelty 
Slide Company and the Manhattan Slide Company.
113
  By early 1913, however, the practice was 
still so haphazard that the Windsor Cut-Out Slide Company of Baltimore was offering, for 75 
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cents per week, rudimentary ‘coming attractions’ slides which featured nothing but a list of the 
next program’s titles cut out of plain paper.114  Discussion of the Windsor slides, in Moving 
Picture World, provides evidence for the growing use of the pause between reels to streamline 
audience pleasure.  Rather than frittering away the pause on advertising or songs, only to have 
spectators get up to leave in the early moments of a film (after realizing that the program has 
started to repeat), Windsor advocated for the use of film-title slides not only to announce the next 
program, but even to announce the next picture in the current sequence.  In this way, patrons 
would “have a chance to leave before the [actual film] is thrown on the screen.”115  The 
‘advance’ slide, then, became a standard form of exhibitor discourse with patrons in the early 
1910s, both to keep the program running smoothly, and to entice patrons to return for more. 
Other forms of theater self-publicity joined the ‘coming attraction’ slide in the pauses in 
the program.  One example was the Novelty Slide Company’s advocacy of regular screenings of 
a slide indicating that the theater was “A Member of the Exhibitor’s League of America.” This 
information would supposedly indicate that one’s program was consistently of the highest 
quality.
116
  Such self-advertising tactics are indicative of a transition in exhibition philosophy 
before 1915, when exhibitors would attempt to either phase out the reel change pause (by 
installing a second projector and moving to a model with only one intentional ‘intermission’ 
between turns of the program
117
), or use the pauses for theater business.  This streamlining of the 
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program sequence, purportedly for the benefit of patrons, while not completely incompatible 
with continued advertising slide use, reduced the amount of space available for their integration. 
 Quality cutting had clearly damaged both exhibitors’ and advertisers’ faith in the standard 
advertising slide.  It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the commonly reported ‘hissing’ 
at slides by angry spectators was not a natural response to an unwanted imposition into the film 
program, as silent era critics would contend.  Rather, slide hatred was the outgrowth of a 
particular historical moment in which the slides themselves were ugly and often screened for 
months on end, even when dirty and broken,
118
 and in which the quantity had escalated beyond 
the tolerance level.
119
  Indeed, a 1921 article in Moving Picture Age declared that “[a]lmost any 
theater owner will agree that it is the poor slides that draw the kicks.  For this reason the…theater 
manager…must insist on good slides.”120  Though a minority of voices likely continued to 
oppose advertising slides throughout the silent era – decrying them as a generic ‘evil’ of the 
motion picture theater
121
 – the origin of viewer and exhibitor displeasure was abusive early 
business practices which put slide-industry competition above spectator desires. 
Although the print-based ad agencies were, even then, waging a successful battle against 
public distrust,
122
 the lantern slide industry – less entrenched in the business model of exhibition 
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than print ads were to magazines and newspapers – struggled to fight a battle against public 
distaste in the absence of clear financial underwriting of the exhibition field.  The evolving 
oligarchy of large manufacturers, while shifting their business model to full-service and their 
rhetoric to national advertiser appeals and professionalization, paralleled their self-elevation with 
critique of the problems in their industry.  Decrying price-cutters as the bane of the slide field, 
this minority of major slide makers both admitted and condemned the state of their industry, in 
an attempt to put themselves above the fray.  In seeking to rationalize and solidify their industry, 
and to shift the public perception of slides from ‘parasite’ to legitimate cinema adjunct, major 
slide manufacturers did not simply offer better product, but argued explicitly that quality was the 
opposite of low cost.  High price became almost synonymous with quality production. 
Although T. Stanley Curtis asserted, in late 1911, that the price-cutting situation was 
starting to improve,
123
 the movement for higher quality slides would not become apparent in 
slide-maker self-advertising until 1912 and 1913.  As early as 1912, direct mention of prices in 
display advertising began to disappear.  Many, including the Kansas City Slide Company, 
eventually began to hold the line on prices in order to keep quality up – their minimum price for 
stock advertising slides was fifty cents each in 1913.
124
  Signs of the coming transition to pricier 
slides appear in the advertising from the Niagara Slide Company in 1913, which held to the then 
common thirty-five cent price tag only for duplicates; the first iteration of any ad slide would 
cost fifty to seventy-five cents.
125
  The Neosho Slide Company was attempting a rhetorical 
flourish to justify higher prices as early as 1914, claiming “the best is always the cheapest” (a bit 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1998), 241-242.  Education: Quentin J. Schultze, “‘An Honorable Place’: The Quest for Professional Advertising 
Education, 1900-1917,” Business History Review 56.1 (Spring 1982). 
123
 T. Stanley Curtis, “Lantern Slide Making,” Motography 6.5 (November 1911): 217. 
124
 Frank B. Howe, “Commercial Lantern Slides,” Camera Craft 24.2 (February 1917): 70; and “Some Slides for 
Advertising in the Moving Picture Show,” p. 5, Box 4, Kansas City Slide Manufacturing Company Records 
(K0637), SHSMO-KC. 
125
 Display Ad, Moving Picture World 15.2 (11 January 1913): 197. 
103 
 
 
of linguistic double talk which, though still capable of drawing business from someone scanning 
the page for the word cheapest, actually meant that the greater returns from a more expensive ad 
paradoxically made it a ‘cheaper’ advertisement).126  In their previously cited 1912-13 contract, 
the Lee Lash Company legally claimed the value of its slides at $1 each – a claim that was not 
contested.
127
  In 1914, the Perfection Slide Company offered any two slides, out of a pictured 
eight, for $1.50.
128
  By 1915, a letter to the editor of a journal for piano tuners indicated that 
Neosho’s price for stock slides was also seventy-five cents at that point, and the Best Slide 
Company took to openly deriding price cutting in its catalog, saying “[t]he price cutter never 
commands respect.”129 
Though it is difficult to name a date for when, or even if, the major players in the industry 
entirely ‘won’ the price cutting conflict and rallied around a stable minimum of pricing, it is 
clear that the problem drug on, in some regions, at least as late as 1917.  Camera Craft magazine 
published two articles in 1917 in which descriptions of price-cutting were worded to imply that it 
was a current problem.   Frank B. Howe’s previously cited article of February 1917 still claimed 
that coming attraction slides could be had for nine cents in 1917, and asserted that only two 
companies were then holding the line on prices.
130
  Thomas P. Mason, though he was writing six 
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months later, still took the time to mention that one could not cut costs to twenty-five cents or 
less and maintain quality because“[i]t costs an average of thirty cents each to make and market 
the slides.”131  As such, fading, low-end manufacturers might have persisted in price-cutting up 
until the start of American involvement in World War I. 
In New York, where small, cut-rate producers were so common as to threaten the entire 
local industry, a more direct attack on price competition was attempted.  Rather than simply 
holding the line on prices and attempting to use rhetoric to sway advertisers to better quality 
slides, a small group of slide manufacturers attempted, in 1914, to form a local slide monopoly.  
Late in the year, an undisclosed ringleader company (most likely Joseph F. Coufal’s Novelty 
Slide Company) sent letters to all the prominent New York concerns suggesting a group meeting.  
This ringleader made two arguments for amalgamation: first that one large unit could more 
effectively drive out price cutting – thereby both guaranteeing “a high standard of work 
generally” and a stability of profit that would “encourage new business and ideas”; second, that a 
combine could appeal to national advertisers more effectively.
132
  As such, this was a plan 
designed to combat price cutting by creating a single, large, service-oriented organization, in the 
name of more effectively and profitably courting advertising dollars.
133
 
Though nothing appears to have come of this initial effort in the short run, two years later 
an association, rather than an amalgamation, of quality slide producers went into effect – most 
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likely for the same reasons and featuring the same major players.  Led (in this case definitely) by 
the Novelty Slide Company, seven powerful New York slide companies banded together in an 
official association.  Envisioned as a slide centered adjunct to the National Association of the 
Motion Picture Industry (NAMPI – an early film industry organization designed to ‘clean up’ the 
movies), the group operated under the slogan “Unity of Action Spells Screen Success.”134  This 
association was designed “to promote the quality of the lantern slide, and to insure for exhibitors 
a standard of workmanship in slides” – in part by “[s]tandardization of prices with a fixed 
minimum,” banning the “imitat[ion] of another’s design,” and by eliminating free samples, free 
design work, and other “illegitimate competitive methods.”135  The association thus directly 
attacked poor business practices in the field.  Though no extant information on this organization 
stresses advertising as a fundamental issue, it is worth remarking that, of the seven charter 
members – Novelty Slide Company, Manhattan Slide and Film Company, Perfection Slide 
Company, Commercial Slide Company, Greater New York Slide Company, Excelsior 
Illustrating Company, and Long and Heller, Inc. – all but the latter two had been openly 
soliciting the business of national advertisers for years.
136
  The additional fact that, by 1920, 
“[t]he kind of slides in demand are used mostly for advertising purposes”137 makes any action by 
slide companies effectively into a decision regarding advertising dollars. 
The association of price with quality – so obvious in Coufal’s slide maker association – 
was paralleled by attempts to encourage both advertisers and exhibitors to engage in more 
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responsible screening practices.  For advertisers, this was accomplished through a transition to 
long-term service contracts which included mandatory slide changes on a regular basis.  For 
exhibitors this included exhortations to limit the quantity of slides integrated into the program. 
Changing the slide weekly, or at worst bi-weekly, became something of a mantra for 
those interested in regularizing the form.  G.R. Lowe of the Neosho Slide Company, “Old Man 
Best” of the Best Slide Company, and independent advisors Frank Farrington and Ernest A. 
Dench all encouraged the use of a new slide every week.
138
  Most worded the advice 
pessimistically, citing advancing levels of irritation, though D.H. Harris optimistically declared 
that “change of copy…brought the largest response.”139  Keeping the patrons from seeing the 
same slide multiple times was deemed essential to evading spectator irritation.
140
  For a cinema 
culture not yet used to ‘reruns’ (a common experience for the television and home video 
generations), repetition of slides was seen as an inherent fault. 
 Proliferation was also an issue deemed worth of comment.  It is not uncommon to run 
across, in the trade press of the early 1910s, hyperbolic condemnation of the quantity of 
advertising slides in a given show.  Take, for example, the criticism from “[a] correspondent” in 
Guthrie, OK, sent to the Moving Picture World in 1914, “protest[ing] against a twenty or thirty-
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minute siege of advertising slides at moving picture houses.”141  Excessive slide usage was 
common enough that many slide proponents felt moved to suggest a specific numerical limit.  In 
late 1911, Motography’s resident projection specialist, William T. Braun, proposed that “no 
more than two or three should be run at each show,” and asserted that further congestion could 
be relieved by dispersing that limited number into multiple reel-changes.
142
  By 1913, John B. 
Rathbun – author of a guide to film production and exhibition – asserted that “three slides should 
be the limit in any case,” and warned strongly against screening any outside of the intermission, 
“after the theater is darkened for the show.”143  The most permissive (and most common) 
quantity which has turned up in my research was twelve per program.  Ernest A. Dench asserted, 
in 1916, that in a good theater “the slides do not exceed one dozen.”144  Exhibitor S.L. ‘Roxy’ 
Rothapfel proposed the same number that year as well.
145
  As such, the spectatorial experience 
was to be disturbed minimally, and always with fresh, professional looking advertising material.  
Although no published sales material from slide companies declares such to be the case, it is 
plausible that both space brokering and other forms of exhibition assistance were inaugurated 
specifically for this reason – as a way for slide producers to help limit the number of slides any 
given theater would screen.
146
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Through these efforts by top-flight slide producers to legitimize and professionalize the 
field, at the expense of any small slide producer which attempted to compete on price alone, 
large national advertisers were becoming sold on the value of slide advertising.  More and more 
consumer goods manufacturers dabbled in the field, to varying degrees of success.  The makers 
of Calumet Baking Powder found, in a survey of dealers in 1912 and 1913, that slide 
advertisements were dramatically increasing sales; in one extreme case, a dealer, after regular 
slide advertising for two months, saw a 50% increase in total sales.
147
  The trade press for 
druggists had declared slides the best form of advertising for soda as early as 1914.
148
  The 
“Question Box” section of the 1914 Monthly Bulletin of the National Commercial Gas 
Association was also enthused, as all but one dealer reported good results from slide advertising, 
provided regular changes were maintained, and seasonal articles were stressed.
149
  Goodyear was 
also sold on slide advertising by 1914, as their “Dealer Help Book” for that year asserted that the 
movie theater patron “sees [advertising] at a time when his mind is not only most influenced by 
what you have to say, but when you are sure of his WHOLE attention.”150  Some combination of 
slide producer professionalization, cinema psychology rhetoric, and measurable financial impact 
had developed a distinct appreciation of the short, direct advertising slides in cinema programs. 
As the quality of slides improved, a few exhibition groups changed their tune as well.  
Two state exhibitor leagues – Ohio and Michigan – along with the exhibitors association of St. 
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Louis (which consisted of fifty theaters), went so far as to allow theaters to pay their monthly 
‘dues’ to the association by running a slide for which the association, rather than the theater, was 
paid – effectively making the association itself a space broker.  Although all three groups made 
allowances for exhibitor reluctance, allowing them to pay dues in cash if they desired, the fact 
that regional exhibition groups had accepted slides to such a degree indicates a generally 
dwindling exhibitor hesitancy.
151
  Likewise, tirades about abusing cinema patrons all but 
disappeared from the trade press after 1916.
152
  Every published mention of slide advertising 
from 1918 to the early 1920s was an unreserved recommendation.  Surprisingly, then, the era of 
slide hate – so overblown in the historical memory of the form – was actually relatively brief and 
very early.  It was largely a memory by the mid-teens.  While it may be a stretch to assume that 
advertisers, exhibitors, and spectators had found mutually acceptable ground, at the very least, 
the public debate had burned itself out and moved on to other areas (like product placement, 
industrial films, and advertising trailers, all of which were much more common after World War 
I).  The advertising slide industry was, with the disappearance of large scale public 
condemnation in print, left to persist or dissolve on a company-by-company, and exhibitor-by-
exhibitor basis. 
The fact that it persisted, even in the wake of the advent of advertising trailers (see 
chapter four), indicates that the implied reduction of antipathy was, in practice, an actual one.  
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This stabilization of the commercial advertising slide industry was historically abrupt and must, 
therefore, have owed a debt to tangentially related experiences in exhibition at mid-century.  It 
cannot be coincidence that the apparent stabilization of the form occurred, much like all early 
20
th
 century advertising, in the years immediately surrounding World War 1, when an avalanche 
of patriotic advertising was created for the war, and consumer goods advertising increased in 
response to the excess profits tax.
153
  Indeed, a cursory glance at the wartime issues of the 
Moving Picture World – a journal which openly detested advertising slides during their first 
decade – might lead one to assume not that slide advertising had stabilized, but that it had 
suffered a rapid (and appropriate) death.  The few wartime mentions of consumer goods 
advertising slides in the journal were entirely self-congratulatory descriptions of their supposed 
disappearance under the weight of patriotic slide needs.  An early editorial comment on patriotic 
slides attempted to differentiate them from commercial advertising, openly calling ad slides 
‘business’ and saying “no one ‘talks business at a club,’” while political talk was inexplicably 
described as “wonderfully appropriate.”154  Thornton Fisher, in a delightfully snotty tone, 
included a paragraph of ‘Reminiscences,’ in a 1918 column, remembering the ‘old’ days: 
[w]hen they used to throw slides on the screen between pictures.  After having 
basked in the light of love’s fond dream in one reel your vision would suddenly 
be startled by a slide announcing “Henry Beermeister, Delicatessen, Liverwurst 
and Sausages,” or “Visit Smith’s Emporium.  Clothes for all the family.  Your 
father bought his pants from us.  Why not you?”155 
 
For Fisher, commercial startlement had two contexts: placement between reels of a multi-reel 
film (a practice technologically outdated by 1915, as most theaters had switched to two 
projectors), and the directness of advertising exhortation. 
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The film industry was seemingly incapable of describing this outpouring of unpaid, 
charity and propaganda slides during film screenings (including at least 100,000 Liberty Loan 
slides) as a furthering of cinema ‘advertising’156 – this despite the fact that major ad slide 
manufacturers, like their ad agency counterparts, were central to the movement.
157
  Rarely, in 
published material, was a political exhortation considered ‘startling’ to an entertainment seeking 
audience.  This is likely due to the fact that charity and political advertising was tacitly or 
literally forced on exhibitors.
158
  Two stories of exhibition groups grumbling about charity slides 
were recounted in the pages of the Moving Picture World, in 1915, in which the exhibitors 
lamented the abuse of their generosity.  Social welfare groups pressed so strongly for free 
assistance that refusal to help was tantamount to anti-social behavior.
159
  Election slides were 
equally problematic.  Jamestown, New York exhibitor M.L. Woods, in late 1916, refused to run 
political slides in his two theaters on the grounds that they “stirred up strife and confusion, and 
attracted the attention of our regular patrons from the screen.”160  As such, political and 
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charitable slides were opposed both for their refusal to pay and for their incompatibility with 
entertainment programs; both critiques echoed attacks on cinematic advertising.
161
 
Once the Creel Committee began inundating exhibitors with demands for patriotic 
inclusions, the compulsion for assistance included a real threat of punishment.  New Hampshire 
exhibitor Charles H. Bean made the threat nearly blatant in his letter, late in 1917, in which he 
encouraged cooperation with Creel Committee requests in the following terms: 
In view of the fact that the United States Government has been lenient with 
motion picture exhibitors on the recent proposed tax of 10 per cent of gross 
receipts…every exhibitor…should show its appreciation and patriotism…by 
doing his bit in helping lend the fullest support of his screen to our government.
162
 
 
In November of 1917, one exhibitor – J.H. Ruerup of Bozeman, Montana’s Gem Theater – had 
his exhibition license revoked after purportedly declaring “[t]o hell with the government,” and 
refusing to allow Creel’s ‘Four Minute Men’ – touring patriotic exhorters – to speak in his 
theater.
163
  The following year, H.J. Paradis – manager of the Oasis theater of Wilson, North 
Carolina – was likewise “investigated” for refusing to allow the Four Minute Men to speak on 
the far less inflammatory grounds that “it would disarrange his program.”164  Though Paradis 
was eventually acquitted,
165
 it is clear that rejection of government propaganda (or: political 
advertising) was a dangerous choice which could arouse both cultural and governmental 
retribution. 
In an atmosphere in which public condemnation and even loss of one’s theater were 
plausible outcomes, it is not surprising that exhibitors accepted the intrusion of political 
advertising on their screens.  The film press helped to cover over exhibitor hesitation by heaping 
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praise on theater men as leaders of their communities.  As early as mid-1914, W. Stephen Bush 
declared that the professional exhibitor was to be praised not for being a showman, but because 
“[t]he great forces which to-day are working for the good of mankind are coming after the 
exhibitor to enlist his aid” through the screening of ‘Safety First’ and Department of Health slide 
messages.  Piggybacking on screen advertising rhetoric (see chapter two), Bush described the 
cinema screen as the best way to “reach all the public” because, unlike print pages which could 
be skipped, “you cannot escape the screen.”  The door opened by advertising slides – or, as Bush 
would have it, “[t]he space which the cigarette makers could not buy at any price and which few 
exhibitors sell at any price for any advertisement” – became the avenue for the exhibitor to flex 
his social conscience, as it became the exhibitor’s ‘job’ to “mentally and morally” improve his 
community.
166
  The coerced exhibitor could at least bask in the glow of public praise while he 
struggled to organize a pleasurable show around government slides, patriotic films, and the Creel 
Committee’s mandatory political speakers. 
Regardless of exhibitor consent, however, these political and philanthropic slides – 
shown largely from 1914 to the end of World War I – obliterated any advertiser, slide maker, and 
even exhibitor hesitation about the effectiveness of slides as an advertising medium.  While some 
(perhaps even a majority of) exhibitors may have continued to harbor reservations about the 
intrusion of advertising onto their screens, there could be no doubt after the war that the site was 
an effective means of reaching the public. In 1914 and 1915, the pages of Moving Picture World 
clearly indicate a growing use of slides for these philanthropic and political purposes.
167
  The 
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campaign period of late 1916 witnessed substantial use of slide advertising for drives as disparate 
as voter registration in “a large Southern city,” preservation of Cincinnati’s Zoological Gardens, 
and road improvement in Battle Creek, Michigan.
168
  As often as not, such slides were, in an 
echo of the bygone song-slides, indirect advertising for major manufacturers, such as the ‘anti-
fly’ slides circulated by the International Harvester Company, and the Detroit Brick 
Manufacturers and Dealers Association’s fireproofing campaign.169 
Most common of all was the political campaign slide featuring either the face of a 
candidate for office, or an endorsement for a ballot issue.
170
  As political tensions increased, the 
quantity of campaign slides escalated.  Indeed, many of these slides were ‘justified’ – i.e. not 
seen as an imposition or as patently offensive to the audience – when they became more openly 
self-serving.  Countless theaters took up slide campaigns opposing motion picture censorship and 
Sunday closings.
171
  Exhibitors in the state of Illinois went so far as to mandate that any 
candidate who desired to run a campaign slide in a theater must first publicly oppose legal 
censorship of motion pictures.
172
  Moving Picture World itself circulated anti-censorship slides 
as early as February of 1915, even taking ad agency N.W. Ayer & Son’s old slogan “Keeping 
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Everlastingly at It Brings Success” as their own.173  Renowned film director D. W. Griffith 
himself circulated slides, at his own expense, supporting the re-election of New York Mayor 
Charles S. Whitman, who had vetoed a state censorship bill in his first term.  Whitman won re-
election.
174
  In 1917, theater manager Joseph L. Steurle used cinema advertising slides to come 
within 158 votes of the Democratic nomination for city auditor of Louisville, despite being a 
political unknown.
175
  Though many exhibitors did not consider this a form of intrusive 
advertising, campaign slides were, like any other advertising, generally screened for a fee; 
“[p]ractically every theater in the city” of Louisville was attaining “[a] good price…for this 
service” in 1915.176  With three distinct benefits – profit, furthering anti-censorship, and the 
integration of the theater into the modern information web – it is understandable why so many 
exhibitors would have found ways to integrate them into the program. 
Even openly self-serving advertisements for consumer goods were acceptable to certain 
theaters.  For example, some theaters offered to run slides advertising local papers in order to 
encourage them to have larger film sections.
177
  As the theatrical self-advertising slide pushed 
                                                          
173
 First clear offering: “Facts and Comments,” Moving Picture World 23.9 (27 February 1915): 1259.  Slogan: 
Display Ad, Moving Picture World 24.1 (3 April 1915): 142.  For the text of these twelve slides, see: “No 
Compromise with Censorship,” Moving Picture World 23.12 (20 March 1915): 1743.  Philadelphia exhibitors had 
their own variant known as “Liberty Bell Slides”: “‘Liberty Bell’ Slides,” Moving Picture World 24.3 (17 April 
1915): 420.  Ayer had been using this slogan since 1886: Pamela Walker Laird, Advertising Progress: American 
Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 161.  I 
have found no evidence that Ayer was involved in the anti-censorship campaign, but the use of the motto makes 
such a connection plausible. 
174
 “Griffith Film, ‘A Day with Governor Whitman,’” Moving Picture World 4 November 1916: 722.  Watterson R. 
Rothacker, industrial and advertising film producer from Chicago, took similar action when he encouraged all 
Chicago theaters to run an ad slide for Captain Louis A. Boening free of charge, as Boening was openly anti-
censorship.  Jas. S. McQuade, “Chicago News Letter,” Moving Picture World 27.7 (19 February 1916): 1109. 
175
 “Screens Helped J.L. Steurle Pile Up Votes,” Moving Picture World 33.9 (1 September 1917): 1415.  For local 
coverage of his announcement, “movie advertising,” and “surprising strength” as a candidate, see also: 
“Candidates,” Kentucky Irish American 12 May 1917: 1; “Democrats,” Kentucky Irish American 30 June 1917: 1; 
and “Politicians,” Kentucky Irish American 11 August 1917: 1. 
176
 “Profit From Politics,” Moving Picture World 25.8 (21 August 1915): 1339.  This evidence, and much more from 
the Moving Picture World during the 1916 election period, clearly indicates that the journal’s “man about town” was 
incorrect in his 1913 prediction that campaign slides would soon be banned for causing disturbances in theaters.  
“Observations By Our Man About Town,” Moving Picture World 18.7 (15 November 1913): 723. 
177
 “Getting Co-Operation of Local Newspapers,” Moving Picture World 14 October 1916: 278. 
116 
 
 
traditional advertising slides further and further out of the program, a few consumer goods 
producers found clever means to disguise advertising slides as announcement slides, indicating 
the class and quality of the theater.  In exchange for a price break, the company that provided 
one’s fire extinguishers or air purifiers would also give the exhibitor a slide indicating that their 
equipment was a primary reason why the theater was a safe and healthful environment.
178
   
Post-war histories of the moment, however, would give virtually all credit for the success 
of political and cultural advertising in motion picture theaters to the Liberty Loan and other 
related Creel Committee slides.
179
  Indeed, the U.S. government put a massive amount of money 
into slide advertising for wartime funding.  Two New York companies – the Novelty Slide 
Company and the Unique Slide Company – received multiple payments for services rendered to 
the Departments of Food and Fuel Conservation during the war, some as high as four digits.  For 
example, Novelty – whose president Joseph F. Coufal was part of Hollywood’s War Cooperation 
Committee – received $7,811.76 on the 23rd of October, 1917 from the ‘educational fund’ of the 
department of Food and Fuel Conservation.
180
  Unique received $1,080 from the department of 
Fuel Conservation on 31 August 1918.
181
  The war also brought with it the first definite attention 
in the historical record which slide advertising received from major ad agencies; the food 
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117 
 
 
conservation campaign was being handled, free of charge, by powerhouse ad agency J. Walter 
Thompson.
182
  Wartime advertising dollars and the tacit ‘blessing’ of a mainstream agency may, 
therefore, have stabilizing the oligarchy of quality slide producers that had been developing prior 
to the war in the wake of price-cutting.  It would be an extreme coincidence if wartime dollars 
and prestige did not aid Joseph Coufal’s 1919 combine of slide manufacturers, in which roughly 
half of the founding members of the 1916 New York association officially became a single 
company: the Standard Slide Corporation.
183
 
After philanthropic and compulsory wartime propaganda had legitimized the presence of 
advertising in theaters, on the grounds that it was a public good, it remained only for commercial 
advertisers to reclaim the site.  Over the course of the war, several changes, problematic for 
advertising slides, had become common across the exhibition community.  The integration of a 
second projector, so as to eliminate reel-change breaks, had become the mode of exhibition in 
most theaters.
184
  The construction of picture palaces and establishment of studio-owned chains 
of theaters had solidified both a class divide, and a split between urban and rural viewing.  In the 
cities and/or in the large theaters, overt ‘class’ consciousness was, as often as anything else, tied 
to an explicit rejection of screen advertising.
185
  Additionally, the commercial trailer (see chapter 
four) had grown to prominence and was in competition for the same program space.  As such, 
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the lantern slide never regained the cinematic prominence of the early 1910s, though it did make 
a permanent re-entrance after the war. 
Not coincidentally, an early form of advertising convergence, in which the same ad was 
run over multiple mediums, began to flourish as way for companies to spend ballooning 
advertising appropriations (caused by the excess profits tax) after the war.  As early as January of 
1915, the camera-producing American Optical Company was already running a single image in 
newspaper, slides, posters, circulars, and even ‘blotters.’186  After the war, clothier David Adler 
& Sons was mandating that the Advertising Slide Company of St. Louis “co-ordinate their 
national advertising into slides.”187  The post-war business environment rendered this mode of 
advertising common.  A history of advertising slides in Moving Picture Age in 1921 reveals that 
[d]uring the post-war years slides came to be used in practically every line of 
business.  The tendency was to advertise through every possible medium, and the 
dealers used all channels of help to continue the prosperous times.  This abnormal 
period was so protracted as to allow commercial slides to become firmly 
entrenched as a successful advertising medium, not because the unusual situation 
encouraged products which had no merit, but because dealers used commercial 
slides and found that the investment yielded definite results.
188
 
 
This cross media blitz was tied to a concept of ‘reiteration,’ as multiplying a single message was 
seen as productive advertising.
189
  As such, slide acceptance went hand in hand with advertising 
convergence and proliferation in the post-war boom.  The entrenchment of slide advertising in 
motion picture theaters occurred, therefore, after the period of reluctance, and can be credited to 
the same post-war flood of advertising dollars that drove the entire advertising industry to greater 
heights after their successful work as wartime propagandists. 
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 Though, with the continuing growth of trailer advertising and the repeal of the excess 
profits tax in 1921, slide dollars tapered off,
190
 slide-vertising – as the Standard Slide 
Corporation became fond of calling it – had attained a level of acceptance that it would never 
truly relinquish.  A slowly dwindling number of entrenched companies would continue for 
decades to produce slides that were acceptable and desirable to national manufacturers, local 
distributors, and theater managers alike.  In an almost triumphant note, the Standard Slide 
Corporation estimated that, in 1921, “more than 8,000 theaters in the United States…and many 
more abroad” were open to slide advertising.191  Though estimates vary, this would have 
accounted for roughly half of the active theaters in the United States at the time
192
 – an 
astonishing level of integration for a form of advertising which, a few short years earlier, was 
considered by many to be naturally offensive to film patrons. 
The slide had also made inroads with the mainstream advertising community.  At least 
one prominent slide maker – the Advertising Slide Company of St. Louis – had developed a 
presence in their local advertising association.
193
  By 1920, the Standard Slide Corporation – 
Joseph Coufal’s New York conglomerate – was attending the yearly convention of the Assocated 
Advertising Clubs of the World, and openly solicited established advertising agencies by 
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offering a special “Agency Rate Card.”194  Slides were deemed a safe enough investment that 
mainstream manufacturers were, by the 1920s, generally having custom slides made; as Moving 
Picture Age somewhat inaccurately declared in 1921, “stock slides are practically a thing of the 
past,”195 as the notion of cross media advertising reiteration took firm hold.  Philanthropic 
advertising continued to act as a bulwark; its existence offered a convenient way to defend slide 
advertising as a valuable information service to the American public; for example, the American 
Humane Education Society circulated free slides for ‘Be Kind to Animals Week’ in 1921.196  The 
lantern slide – and its commercialized variant, the advertisement slide – had become an accepted 
adjunct to the film industry as a whole, and its progeny extend, though in increasingly 
circumscribed placement, all the way to the digital projectors of the present day.
197
 
 
Why Slide-vertising? 
 Lantern slides, as the most successful form of early in-cinema advertising, were generally 
described, by both slide makers and slide advocates, in broad rhetorical strokes.  Overstatement 
was common, regardless of whether the slide proponent was discussing audience psychology, 
financial viability, or the possible superiority of slides to other advertising media.  The Lee Lash 
Company called slide advertising the “Front Cover Medium,” likening it to getting one’s ad onto 
the front cover of the magazine, implicitly declaring slides to be both a continuation and a 
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perfection of print ads.
198
  This exceptionalist description – in which the slide was an 
unavoidable and spectacular perfection of the print model – is a microcosm for the type of 
overstatement rampant in slide rhetoric. 
 Central to slide advertising, as with all in-cinema advertising of the 1910s, was the notion 
of audience ‘captivity’ (see chapter two), which was asserted almost universally, by slide 
proponents, to be an accurate description of the cinema audience.  It is virtually impossible to 
find a single argument for the use of slides as an advertising medium which does not make some 
mention of slides being a ‘one-hundred per cent medium’ due to the assumption that “folks, in 
the darkened hall, must concentrate upon the screen.”199  As early as 1912, the Thornton 
Advertising Company claimed that slides were “[t]he only medium which guarantees a reading 
of the advertiser’s message.”200  Frank Farrington, the most vocal advocate of slide advertising in 
the first half of the 1910s, claimed that slides in cinemas had “no waste circulation” because 
“[e]very man, woman, and child there sees the advertisement, and if it is given fair display 
and…allowed to remain long enough to be read, every man, woman, and child will read it and 
know what is advertised.”201  The Motion Picture Advertising Company likewise asserted that 
every spectator “positively will see and read” your advertisement when thrown on the screen,202 
while the Neosho Slide Company asserted that “Ad Slides Compel Attention” and that, as a 
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medium, it had “[n]o waste circulation.”203  Standard Slide Corporation employee D.H. Harris 
even declared that audiences could “see nothing else, read nothing else, and think nothing else” 
while a slide advertisement was onscreen.
204
  This was, of course, no more true for slide 
advertising than any other form of advertising, but advocates of onscreen advertising preferred to 
ignore the fact that the room, even when dark, could not entirely compel. 
As the first and most widely used form of in-cinema advertising, the ‘active’ audience 
was almost never acknowledged by proponents of screen advertising.  Slide proponents were 
uniformly focused on creating and preserving the myth of the receptive cinema audience.  An 
unsigned article in the March 1921 issue of Moving Picture Age was as close as ad slide 
proponents would get, in the transitional era, to acknowledging viewer empowerment, as the 
author made the marginally more hesitant assertion that the slide “is in front of [the viewer] and 
he has to look at it or close his eyes.  With an attractively gotten up slide, preferably in color, he 
does not close his eyes.”205  As a unit, the advertising slide industry wanted advertisers to see the 
cinema theater as a site of audience passivity – where messages could be inserted into open eyes 
with no waste. 
 The correlated concept of the ‘receptive mood’ was likewise asserted almost universally 
in support of slides.  If spectators had no choice but to read your advertisement, one would hope 
that they would not do so with hatred in their hearts.  Thankfully, as far as slide makers and 
proponents were concerned, the motion picture theater was a zone of uniformly happy people.  
Farrington noted that “[n]o other form [of advertising]…is received in so favorable a frame of 
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mind.”206 Moving Picture Age asserted that the motion picture theater was a perfectly 
comfortable environment, in which “every body [was] relaxed to enjoy the exhibition” and 
“every mind [was] alert to receive impressions.”207  The Harold Ives Company assured the 
advertiser that “[t]he psychological moment to offer your sales arguments is when your listener 
is in an agreeable frame of mind” – a frame of mind only attainable by advertising during 
“pleasant, leisure hours.”208  The Levi Company even went so far as to assert that their slides 
were “Good for Sore Eyes” and were, therefore, “a distinct relief to the monotony of the film.”209  
A happy audience, doing a pleasant thing, greeted with a restful slide…no wonder slide 
advertising was so popular! 
 Of course, popularity and influence would have meant little if the people receiving the 
message could not be relied upon to actually spend money on the goods advertised.  As such, the 
notion of the motion picture theater as a site of potential consumers – stressing, regardless of 
class, their possession of and willingness to spend cash – was also common.  Farrington asserted 
that advertising in cinema theaters could “reach a class of people whom it is often hard to reach 
in other ways[, including…] the transient population…the lower middle classes…[and] the 
poorer class.  It reaches many people who do not read newspapers.  It takes in all 
nationalities.”210  The Thornton Advertising Company went so far as to assert that the slide 
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“gives you a circulation that reaches every class.”211  An unsigned article in The Furniture 
Worker, in 1920, also asserted that “the people who attend the moving pictures are the ones who 
are on the street and ready to spend money, and it pays any man with goods or services to sell to 
get his name before these crowds.”212  In fact, all writers except Ernest A. Dench – who, without 
any stated reason, declared that lower class theaters should be avoided
213
 – thought that the 
existence of a ticket price indicated that all cinemagoers, regardless of class, possessed spending 
money that advertisers should court.  This notion of motion pictures opening advertising up to 
lower class spending was important as it was, contrary to magazine advertising, described as a 
medium for the masses.  An aggregate of small purchases by film fans was openly part of its 
‘lower class’ oriented advertising philosophy, and those who adopted it were, therefore, acting 
on a theory of advertising that was mass rather than class oriented.
214
 
 Motion pictures weren’t simply attended by people willing and able to spend money, 
however.  They offered a type of audience selection that was rare in print media.  As opposed to 
newspapers – which generally targeted everyone in the city – and magazines – which targeted 
everyone in the country, limited only by magazine topic – the motion picture theater was 
‘sectional’ and represented a stable local audience.  Much like direct mail (which might be 
thrown out, unread) or billposting (which had the tendency to annoy), slide advertising reached a 
massive proportion of local inhabitants.
215
  This was especially true of neighborhood theaters – 
as opposed to the ‘scattered’ circulation of downtown theaters – and it was these neighborhood 
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theaters that were most likely to accept advertising.
216
  As such, the cinema theater was, it was 
argued, ideal for advertising because, in general, it had the broad class appeal – even attracting 
the illiterate – of newspapers, but the targeted appeal of a local clientele.  As such, one could 
advertise to very particular audiences, in ways impossible in the other media.  Farrington, for 
example, even suggested that one put on an advertisement in a foreign language at a theater that 
catered to a largely immigrant population – an action that would be implausible in all but the 
smallest circulation newspapers or magazines, as large circulation print materials did not give 
price breaks to advertising that was not geared to general readers.  Such immigrant targeted 
advertising in the city-wide or national press would have been phenomenally wasteful – nowhere 
near ‘100% circulation.’217  As such, though mass appeal was still the goal, cinema slide 
advertising allowed for local advertising as an element of mass campaigns. 
 One of the most interesting arguments about the cinema’s specific value as an advertising 
medium was Neosho Slide Company owner G.R. Lowe’s assertion that motion picture viewers – 
who were already out of their home and on the town – would see screen advertising at the same 
time of day that certain stores were open (in Lowe’s argument, it was drug stores).  As such, they 
could “go right from the show to the store” while the advertising compulsion was fresh.  Lowe 
encouraged druggists – and by extension any business with hours of operation similar to a theater 
– to use slide advertising on the grounds that it could be reasonable assumed to have the least lag 
time between seeing the ad and shopping.
218
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 Taking these last three elements together, the cinema had unique values as an advertising 
site beyond the notion of the ‘captive audience.’  Slide advertisers considered messages to have 
the greatest sales values when they: 1) spoke to the spectator as a member of a particular cultural 
community, 2) spoke to the under-class – the biggest purchasing group for cheap goods – rather 
than the upper class, and 3) spoke at the same time that the viewer was already out of the home 
and on the town.  In slide rhetoric, this provided slide advertising with benefits distinct from 
print, which was perused while in the home, and was, by necessity, not tethered to the flow of the 
day’s events.219 
 Though all of this was asserted on behalf of slides, the bulk of the foregoing theory is 
simply cinema specific, not slide specific.  Most of the arguments for the use of slide advertising 
specifically were connected to its cheapness (as opposed to the expense of producing an 
advertising film, or even the expense of a print campaign).  As Quality Slide and Photo Makers 
bluntly claimed, a slide “Reaches More People At a Smaller Cost Than Any Other Advertising 
Medium.”220  Though estimates of the cost of a motion picture were extremely variable, and 
determined as much by selection of production company as by length of the final product that 
one was after, by World War I a custom made glass slide would generally cost about a dollar – 
shipping included – and sometimes significantly less.  The Kansas City Slide Company was still 
charging seventy-five cents for stock slides as late as 1927.  Even custom slides were only $1.25 
at that late date, if the advertiser included their own artwork.
221
  In 1920, the Furniture Worker 
estimated a price of seventy-five cents to one dollar for a custom slide, given that the illustration 
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was provided by the advertiser, and not designed by the slide manufacturer’s staff.222  This was 
undeniably cheaper than all but the smallest print display advertisement. 
Additionally, the cost for running a slide in a given theater was typically low.  Although 
we must remember Dench’s assertion that “[t]here are really no standard rates” for exhibition, as 
“[e]ach exhibitor has his own ideas in regard to the value of the location and size of his 
theater,”223 we do have some indication of the range of prices at the time.  From the exhibitor’s 
perspective, the income – based on quantity of slides and the amount the house was able to 
charge – could be as high as four digits; the Bijou Theater of Mt. Clemens, Michigan, claimed to 
be making $800 per year on the date that they abandoned advertising slides (on principle) in 
1915.
224
  From an advertiser’s perspective, Farrington claimed that the absolute minimum cost 
was 25 cents per week for small houses where they ran films 3 nights a week.
225
  An upper 
estimate would have to be that of the two top-flight theaters in Louisville which were pulling 
down $10 per week, per slide, in 1915.
226
  The Keeshen Advertising Agency claimed, also in 
1915, to be able to guarantee a minimum of four showings, every day, in five first run Oklahoma 
City theaters for $80.00 per month – an average weekly screening cost of only four dollars per 
theater.
227
  Ernest Dench, despite being very hesitant about standards, offered a (very wide) 
estimate of five to ten dollars per theater, given a six-month contract.  The latest estimate, from 
1920, was “from fifty cents to two or three dollars, depending on the locality.”228  That said, 
some ‘public service’ advertisers, like libraries for example, were often capable of getting 
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theaters to screen their advertising slides gratis, as if they were a charitable organization.
229
  As 
such, although there was at least one assertion that a slide campaign would bear no fruit if it 
lasted less than three months,
230
 the total outlay for slide advertising was generally assumed to be 
much lower than any other form of mass advertising. 
 The cheapness of the medium was not simply a generalized positive.  Specific value 
arguments were made.  First, it was cheap enough to allow individual dealers to use it quickly to 
“couple up their name with products which are continually advertised in the magazines and 
newspapers.”231  Though an individual store may not have had much of a budget for advertising, 
the fact that they dealt in nationally recognized brands, especially if those national brands 
distributed glass slides for free as a selling ‘help,’ could allow the local store to piggy-back on 
widely recognized advertising campaigns.  As such, a very small outlay for a local store could 
effectively allow them to receive massive collateral advertising from newspapers, magazines, 
and billboards hawking national products.
232
  Additionally, with the commonness of exclusive 
advertising contracts, the appearance of having a monopoly on a national brand could make 
cinema advertising seem like very cheap advertising indeed, for a local merchant, compared to 
the benefits it offered. 
 Thirdly, cheap slide advertising allowed for rapid, even constant, change in copy with 
minimal cost.  A change of slides did not add any work for the exhibitor, and the easy 
availability of stock slides rendered the transition simple for the advertiser.  As such, one could 
change slides at will.  Additionally, the wide availability of extremely cheap home-typed or 
hand-written slides – purchased blank, in bulk, at an average rate of one penny per finished 
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slide
233
 – allowed one to slip in a quick update when desired, letting regular customers know of a 
sale or special event.  Provided one had been advertising regularly in the theater, and the sale 
announcement was seen as beneficial information, the audience would likely not take too 
unkindly to the general ugliness of a home-made slide.
234
 
 A final argument for slide advertising should not go unmentioned, as it was surprisingly 
common.  Despite lantern slides being a very old technology, and full motion film 
advertisements being made as early as 1910, slides were often sold as a hip, ‘now’ medium of 
advertising.  The North American Slide Company declared that “Up-to-date Manufacturers” 
were using them, while the Levi Company claimed that “[e]very up-to-date and progressive 
theater” was using their slides.235  The Harold Ives Company declared that “[y]ou can’t hold your 
trade by last year’s methods, [so] give [your dealers] selling helps that are this year’s styles.”236  
Correlated to this trendiness of the medium was a notion that ‘last year’s styles’ had worn out 
their welcome with the public, and that slides should be adopted because “[i]n many 
towns…[they] have not been overworked as yet.”237  These notions that in-cinema advertising 
via the glass slide was novel and trendy, were important elements in the rhetoric for its adoption.  
Novelty is, as Pamela Walker Laird has asserted, an important factor in the adoption of an 
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advertising medium.
238
  For a small number of years in the early 1910s, the lantern slide was the 
hot new novelty in advertising. 
 
Why Not? 
 As with most new concepts in advertising, supportive arguments from makers were 
partially balanced with counter arguments by viewers or media owners (in this case, exhibitors).  
None of these arguments carried enough weight to end the practice, but they raised sufficient 
concern that in-theater consumer-goods advertising struggled mightily between 1913 and 1918, 
and remained a marginal practice for decades.  As such, these arguments kept slide advertising 
from becoming as ubiquitous as magazine advertising and billboarding, but did not keep it from 
developing as a useful, minor practice in theaters. 
 The most common assumption about the non-viability of slide advertising was that 
“many patrons of motion picture theaters look[ed] upon advertising slides as an imposition upon 
their time.”  The Moving Picture World, probably the most implacable opponent of advertising 
on the theater screen, used this as its reasoning.  Regular columnist Epes Winthrop Sargent 
compared it to allowing a man in a sandwich board to walk across the stage during a live theater 
performance, and declared: 
The screen advertisement is not the same as the advertisement upon the wall.  It is 
thrust upon the patron.  He must read it whether he wishes to or not.  There is no 
alternative.  It is thrust into his face. […] There is no objection to a few house 
slides, but the foreign advertisement has no place on the screen.
239
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Indeed, slide opponents generally did not take issue with the assumption of compulsory attention 
at all.
240
  On the contrary, it reveled in it, arguing instead that the compulsory nature of the ads 
destroyed the ‘receptive mood’ of a theater audience.  Roy D. Mock argued in 1916 that unlike 
magazine advertising which, if read was read voluntarily, ads in the cinema were “forced to his 
attention” for as much as ten minutes while he was “kept in his seat.”  As such, it would not 
leave him in “a very satisfactory frame of mind,” and would instead result in a backfire, as rather 
than “being inclined towards the advertiser…[he would] become biased against him.”241  Often 
this destruction of the ‘receptive mood’ became an implicit argument for ‘active audiences.’  
George M. Rittelmeyer argued, in 1913, that 
[a] few nights ago…I looked around the house to see how many people were 
reading the slides that were being shown.  I counted probably a dozen people in 
an audience of about one hundred and fifty.  The balance of the crowd was 
passing the time away the best they could, waiting patiently for the ads to cease. 
 
The disinterest was so obvious that he professed to see life return to the “bored, tired” faces of 
the crowd when the first reel finally came on.
242
  Though this type of description was 
undoubtedly slanted by personal opinion, overstatement, and the happenstance of a ‘worst case 
scenario’ experience, it was common among opponents of slide advertising.243 
 Some writers bolstered the sense of audience irritation by reference to ticket cost, 
asserting that not only was the audience being annoyed, but they were being forced to pay for the 
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privilege.  Indeed, in 1909, a “good many picture theater managers…declare[d]…that the 
exhibitor ha[d] neither the right to expect continued patronage nor the right to collect admission 
fees” if showing ads.244   An unsigned article in 1915 voiced the still commonly heard opinion 
that advertising was incompatible with ticket costs, as “[p]assing a dime into the box office 
makes one the proprietor of the screen…and anything that is shown without contributing to the 
amusement of the audience…is going to be frowned upon.”  The result was bound to be “hisses 
on the part of a good many people in the theater.”245  As such, arguments about advertising as an 
unwelcome imposition carried significant weight with a particular crowd which considered not 
just entertainment, but paid entertainment as a zone where commercial exhortation should not 
intrude. 
 While it is probable that, as noted earlier, general opposition to advertising was based in a 
historical moment when the slides were particularly poorly made, other elements of the slide 
experience could have exacerbated and extended audience frustration.  Regardless of slide 
quality, and despite persistent comments about limiting advertising slides to a comfortably small 
number (probably twelve) in any given program, exhibitors could and did often engage in 
behavior that was actively destructive of viewer pleasure, and therefore of the value of slide 
advertising to the advertiser.  Rittelmeyer, likely with a bit of overstatement, declared that a 
theater not only ran slides in the middle of a two-reel film, but ran them “for five or ten 
minutes.”246  This clearly would have consisted of more than three ads, and would 
understandably have felt like overkill, as the slides would have been nearly equal in duration to 
the entertainment.  A collected list of humorous ‘advice’ for projectionists, published in early 
1916 – effectively a summary of poor exhibition practices at the time – included “[c]atch[ing] up 
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on your sleep” during the ad slides as one of its ‘suggestions,’ assuring the projectionist that the 
audience would “talk to the Lord about you for teaching them the gentle lesson of patience.”247 
 Even if duration was not the problem, quantity could still be a source of concern.  Ernest 
A. Dench mentions the persistence of the problem of the “slide dodge,” a term for when the 
exhibitor would run the slides for which he had contracted, up to thirty or more at any one time, 
all in a rapid burst at the end of the program, rather than scattering them throughout the program 
and leaving them onscreen for a reasonable reading time.
248
  The appeal of the ‘dodge’ to the 
exhibitor was undeniable.  Flipping through thirty slides in a minute could have allowed the 
exhibitor to keep the advertising dollars, and also keep the most valuable screen-time for 
coming-attraction slides and other announcements that were more directly beneficial to the 
theater. 
This latter possibility would, of course, have done as much to harm the advertiser as the 
spectator.  Exhibitors could also abuse the advertiser’s faith while leaving the spectators 
unaware.  They might elect to show the coming attractions slides before the advertising slides; 
the coming attractions generally indicated that the program was over, and would have largely 
cleared the theater of spectators before ads had run.
249
  Alternatively, the exhibitor might take the 
money and simply not show the slide at all.  As such, anyone booking a single slide for screening 
in a theater, without having developed a longstanding relationship with the exhibitor, had to 
double check that they were being screened, and screened properly – a difficult procedure 
considering the business model of a motion picture theater.  Unlike magazines, where you could 
pick up a single issue and find evidence that it had been printed in every issue, to completely 
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check up on slide projection required someone to be present all day, every day, at every 
theater.
250
 
 One further persistent counter argument deserves mention, despite its limited importance.  
A small collection of slide opponents – generally makers of advertising films – asserted that 
slides were not valuable because the cinema screen was a site where motion was expected.  This 
argument was only partially effective for two reasons.  First, slides were, as mentioned, 
significantly cheaper than full motion films; as such, the fact that they were on the screen for so 
much less expense may have been seen as a valid tradeoff.  Second, those who still saw motion 
as a necessity but didn’t want to spend the money on a film could choose from some of the 
technological slides discussed below.  As such, the ‘lack of motion’ critique was less dissuasive, 
at least prior to 1915, than it might otherwise have been. 
 
‘Slide Psychology’ 
 Most opposition to slide advertising was phrased in very unflattering generalities.  Even 
Ernest Dench’s 1916 book-length study of the subject asserted that “[t]he majority…are merely 
plain business notices that…remind one only too strongly of the early days of newspaper 
advertising, when every advertiser thought it sufficient to have a formal announcement, 
unchanging from year in to year out.”251  Despite the apparent commonality of simple slides, 
‘slide psychology’ was relatively well thought out by some – most notably by Dench himself, in 
articles he published in 1918.  In much the same way that magazine advertisers argued about the 
importance of images, the quantity of copy, and the placement of an ad on, say, the left or right 
side of the page, slide advertising was theorized in terms of its position in the program, and the 
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most productive use of image and copy.  Though, by this time, most theaters had integrated a 
second projector and abandoned the reel-change pause, the theoretical writings of Dench and 
others offer a tantalizing notion of how complex slide theory could have become, had feature 
films and multiple projectors not radically reduced the space. 
 Most commonly, notions of best practices in slide advertising were broad 
pronouncements, intended as advice for all advertising slides in all circumstances.  Ernest Dench 
once asserted that, if you were going to use humor in your slides, you would be best served by 
using a stock slide rather than writing your own humorous copy.  Dench’s logic was that stock 
slides, as they were designed to sell nationally, were “prepared especially to appeal to the 
universal sense of humor as distinct from that of the sectional brand.”252  As such, Dench 
downplayed the frequently local nature of slide advertising in the name of a more broadly 
accepted, national sense of humor.  Dench equally poo-pooed the use of “gloom” in slides, under 
the assertion that “[t]hey should strike an optimistic note at all times [because p]eople go to the 
movies to thrust aside their worries and responsibilities and not to be reminded of the dark and 
seamy side of life.”253  Frank Farrington held a similar opinion, claiming that “[a] lighter, 
brighter form of advertising can be used…in a place of amusement than…in the newspapers.  A 
little humor carefully handled is not out of place at such a time…though it would act as a 
boomerang in the printed medium.”254  As such, slides in general were expected to be light and 
fun – more so than any other medium. 
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 Other pieces of advice were intended to be rarely implemented and therefore be an added 
interesting feature which would help certain slides stand out from the crowd.  Dench proposed 
both the ‘poetic slide’ and the ‘serial slide’ to gain audience attention in the maelstrom of less 
creative advertising slides.  Poetic slides were simply slides in rhyme – like a jingle without the 
music – but with no other pretensions to literary merit.  The very existence of rhyme would set it 
apart from other slides which often said “stereotyped things in a stereotyped way.”255  Rhyme 
was an aid to both pleasure and memory, providing a hook to help lock the copy in the viewer’s 
memory.  Serial slides could add a bit of drama to a slide campaign by making the audience look 
forward to the next slide in the series, much like a film serial.  Engaging the audience’s interest 
for a period longer than the traditional duration of a slide’s projection would likewise improve 
attention and retention.  The problem with this serial concept was making sure that the bulk of 
your audience didn’t miss any slides in the series; as such, Dench proposed that the advertiser 
only use serial slides when piggy-backed on the presentation dates of a film serial, so that the 
appeal of the film serial would stabilize the audience for the advertiser’s own slides.  The serial 
slide was used frequently enough that slide manufacturers carried stock versions that could “be 
filled in to suit almost any business.”256  Turning advertising into a game by offering a prize to a 
viewer who could correctly spot several intentional spelling mistakes was another clever 
suggestion for encouraging attention to specific ads.
257
 
 Ernest Dench, the most thoughtful author of in-cinema advertising of any type in the 
1910s, even worked out a theory (that he termed ‘slide psychology’) in 1918 that linked slide 
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content to position in the program.
258
  Dench asserted that the state of mind of the audience after 
– or, in the case of the feature, during – any given part of the standard program should determine 
the type of copy on an advertising slide.  If one’s slide was run following the newsreel, the slide 
should contain copy in an informational or descriptive tone similar to the news: for example, 
telling, in a sober and professional tone, of a new shipment of goods or an imminent sale.  If your 
slide followed an educational film, it should display the inner workings of your business, piggy-
backing on the educational mood.  If it followed the comedy, the tone should be light and comic.  
Only the most beautiful, dramatic, and thought provoking slide should be run during or following 
the main feature, as a feature picture was the classiest form of film, and was often a very 
engaging drama.  In order to maintain variety in one’s advertising, Dench suggested the purchase 
of one slide of each type, allowing the tone and program position of one’s advertising to change 
from week to week. 
By January of the following year, Dench was also asserting that slide copy should be 
altered for special screenings, such as children’s matinees, encouraging not just tone and content 
that would appeal to children, but perhaps even offering the children a creative contest where the 
best advertisement created by one of the children would be rendered in slide form and thrown 
onscreen at the next matinee.
259
  One can imagine that Dench would offer similar advice for 
heavily ethnic theaters, or those defined by class or religious persuasion. 
 This notion that the best slide was not determined just by quality of copy, but by the 
context in which it was screened, allowed for a great deal of variety and complex thinking in the 
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creation and display of slides.  While it is undoubtedly true that the bulk of advertisers did not 
put nearly so much thought into their slides, there was nothing inherent in the medium which 
kept it from being used in a pleasantly complicated variety of ways.  Repetition and boredom in 
slide advertising was, therefore, a failure of individual thinking, not of the form itself. 
 
Technological Slides – Spectacle and Public Service 
 Typically, the response to fears of slides irritating the audience was not a turn to 
Denchian slide psychology.  Rather, an attempt to add clever nuances to the technology – 
preserving or improving on the novelty of cinema advertising – was the common approach.  Two 
ideas in particular deserve discussion at length, as their existence is emblematic of two particular 
philosophies of advertising active at the time: the drawing power of spectacle, and the 
reluctance-defusing power of ‘usefulness.’  Each was most productively used by a single 
company, though many parallel concepts can also be cited. 
 As film was often considered a spectacle in and of itself, the notion that greater eye 
appeal would necessarily result in a more productive advertisement was not uncommon.  For 
most, this was simply a reason for better or more creative visuals.  Any company, from the 
Novelty Slide Company, to the Kansas City Slide Company, to the Levi Company / Perfection 
Slide Company would make assertions to the greater drawing power of their imagery.  The Levi 
Company once asserted about its own product that “there is no other Slide made that grips the 
attention of the audience and holds it as ours do.  They are…dazzling in their variety, full of 
humor and surprises…[and] will be found to be a source of unqualified delight.”260  Such claims 
were common, and almost always referenced the superior creative powers of the company 
hawking their wares.  Several American companies – the Vitaslide Company of San Francisco 
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and the Perfection Slide Company of New York, most prominently – took the idea of ‘eye 
appeal’ farther than the others, into the realm of technology and motion, seemingly the purview 
of motion pictures, not the stodgy old lantern slide.
261
   
As early as January 1913 – the date of his first patent – Earl L. Gilmore, president of 
Vitaslide, had conceived of a fully functioning moving-picture slide, requiring no extra 
equipment from the exhibitor (though Gilmore had also designed automatic slide projectors with 
the Vitaslide in mind
262
).  Rather than simply having a photograph printed in between two pieces 
of glass, the Vitaslide contained a fluid filled chamber, in which a portion of the design was 
included on a moving piece.  When not in use, the slide was to be stored right side up, so that the 
moving piece would sink to the bottom.  During projection – which, due to the construction 
idiosyncrasies of lantern slide projectors, occurred with the slide positioned upside down – the 
moving part would appear to slowly rise in the image, as it began, in the projector itself, to sink 
to the ‘top’ end of the fluid chamber.  During projection, the presence of a fluid chamber was 
disguised by design, so that the appearance of motion had no clear cause.  The added fact that the 
apparent motion was upwards rather than down appended a level of mystery to how the motion 
was created. 
 The visible interaction between the stationary and moving parts of the image could create 
a variety of onscreen events, ranging from the very simple to the very complex.  Three were 
described in the patents.  The simplest included a diagonal trench, so that, for example, an image 
of a car could appear to drive uphill.  A more complicated design included a ‘Merry Christmas’ 
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message where the words were broken into two collections of apparently meaningless scratches; 
as the bottom half of the image rose to meet the top half, the scratches would align and render the 
message readable.  In the most complicated iteration of the method – a variation of the standard 
‘Ladies, Please Remove Your Hats’ announcement slide – the moving part rotated rather than 
moving upwards.  In this concept, the lady’s hat was attached to one end of a pivot; at the other 
end was an image of an usher connected to the hat by a line.  As the hat was made of heavier 
material, it would ‘sink’ upwards in the image during projection, making it appear as though the 
tiny usher had flipped it skywards by jumping on the other end of the shaft.  As if this weren’t 
complicated enough, this slide also used the message-forming scratches to spell out the 
announcement.
263
 
 With these various approaches possible – angled, straight, and rotating motion – Vitaslide 
could create eye-catching advertisements unlike any other slides on display in the theater.  Ads 
which not only were more interesting and therefore more memorable than the stationary ads, but 
also avoided the potential problem of a still slide being disruptive in an environment dedicated to 
moving pictures.  Vitaslide motion was so unexpected, when compared to other advertising 
slides, that they were reportedly able to “create the remarkable situation of a theater audience 
applauding an advertisement.”264  Indeed, they were so surprising, that moving slides capitalized 
not on blending in with the flow (moving pictures), but on doubling disruption (a moving ‘still’).  
By adding motion to a part of the program in which all other imagery was still, motion slides 
provided a triumphant return to motion imagery: a noticeable improvement over stills as well as 
a return to the established norm of moving pictures. 
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Despite the time it took to create working designs (their early announcement slides were 
released one per week beginning in April 1914
265
), frequent reports from 1914 to 1915 indicate 
that the company was effectively an overnight success.  The cross country sales trip of Bernard 
Wolf, from San Francisco to New York City (stopping at all major cities along the way) resulted 
in slides “being ordered extensively by business men for advertising purposes,” including a 
single order from New York City which accounted for 100 slides all by itself.
266
  Considering 
they sold for $3.00 each – approximately three times the cost of a regular slide – adoption 
represented a relatively large expense for advertisers. George Breck, Gilmore’s partner and 
manager of the Vitaslide Company, was circulating Vitaslides to such great success in mid-1915 
that the company was able to focus entirely on yearly contracts rather than single orders.  Even 
after increasing their productivity 50% by hiring more staff, they were “still behind on orders.”267  
As this was reported in the notoriously anti-slide-advertising journal Moving Picture World, it 
should be taken as quite a successful technology indeed.  And with good reason: if the slides 
were looked on as both pleasing and entertaining, they would have defused the common critique 
of viewer displeasure. 
The Perfection Slide Company patented a much more complicated design that would 
create a spiraling effect in the background of a slide.
268
  Perfection (in their days as the Levi 
Company) also contracted to be the exclusive producer of Spiegel Motion Slides – a complicated 
                                                          
265
 Half-Page Ad, Moving Picture World 11 April 1914: 273; Display Ad, Moving Picture World 18 April 1914: 
433; and Display Ad, Moving Picture World 9 May 1914: 896. 
266
 “Exhibitors News: San Francisco,” Moving Picture World 30 May 1914: 1280; and “Exhibitors News: San 
Francisco,” Moving Picture World 20 June 1914: 1711. 
267
 “Other San Francisco Notes,” Moving Picture World 23.1 (2 January 1915): 99; and “Other San Francisco 
Notes,” Moving Picture World 23.12 (20 March 1915): 1791.  It’s not clear from the wording of these articles, and 
the following self-advertisement, whether these yearly contracts were with advertisers or exhibitors.  Display Ad, 
Moving Picture World 13 June 1914: 1611. 
268
 F.A. Apfelbaum, “Stereopticon Slide Carrier,” U.S. Patent 1,116,201, filed 9 December 1913, and issued 3 
November 1914. 
142 
 
 
slide technology which, like their patented spiral technology, required a special projector.
269
  The 
Enterprise Optical Manufacturing Company, the Illinois Motion Picture Advertising 
Corporation, and the Genre Transparency Company also dealt in motion slides of one make or 
another.
270
  A non-motion variant was the Florida Photographic Concern’s “Color-Changing 
Chameleon Slide” which would fade “from green to reddish-brown,” presumably from the heat 
of the projector lamp.
271
  Though still decidedly less impressive than real film, these slides could 
likewise join more comfortably into the sequence of films, appealing to the same interest in 
motion pictures, while simultaneously standing out as something special as they were (hopefully) 
compared favorably to other slides, rather than being compared unfavorably to the films.  It 
elevated the slide via spectacular effects in an attempt to be the most likely slide remembered.
272
   
 In contrast to this, other slide makers added a technological element in order to attempt to 
make sure that their slides were not victims of the ‘slide dodge,’ or simple failure on the part of 
the exhibitor to screen the slide.  The concept became known under the shorthand of the ‘clock 
slide,’ and was created by at least five different companies at one time or another, though in fact 
the technology was patent controlled.  Originally filed for patent on 12 September 1911 by Hans 
A. Meinhardt and Thomas J. Urell of Pittsfield, MA, the clock slide featured no clock work and 
as such included no spectacular onscreen motion.  What it did possess, however, was manually 
adjustable hands which could be set by the projectionist so that an accurate time could be flashed 
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onscreen at intervals to the paying spectators.
273
  Clock slides purportedly cut through any 
reticence towards advertising slides by both exhibitor and audience members by providing a 
valuable public service – i.e. they would provide easy access to the time for women, who 
generally did not wear watches, and for men, who had trouble seeing their watches in the 
darkness of the theater.
274
  As Meinhardt’s original patent declared, the slide was designed so 
that “the attention of the audience is held in an agreeable manner.”275 
 The history of the clock slide is convoluted.  Meinhardt and Urell initially attempted to 
sell the invention themselves but, due to inexperience, failed to turn a profit on the invention.  
Their many missteps included not fighting patent infringement; indeed, they apparently did not 
realize such clone clock-slides were even being made.
276
  In their innocence and inexperience, 
they apparently failed to notice blatant national advertising by the Kansas City Slide Company, 
the American Slide & Poster Company, and the Novelty Slide Company for clock slides.  Kansas 
City Slide advertised their clone first, advertising its availability in February of 1912; the 
company even had the audacity to claim “patent applied for.”  Kansas City Slide offered stock 
versions for $1.25, but would append an advertising message to the bottom for twenty-five cents 
more.
277
  American Slide & Poster and Novelty Slide may have pilfered the idea slightly later, 
but their clones were likely the driving factor in Perfection’s purchase of the patent rights and 
attempt at legal reprisals.  American advertised the availability of clock slides in May of 1913, 
and Novelty in May of the same year.  American was asking 75 cents, while Novelty offered the 
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lowest price: 50 cents.
278
  Several other companies may also have been infringing the patent; if 
they were, however, they were not advertising in national trade presses.  The Best Slide 
Company of Kansas City, for example, included four clock slides in a catalog – offering them for 
75 cents if blank, one dollar if a merchant’s name was appended – though they never publicized 
these offerings in a national trade press.
279
 
By the 17
th
 of May, 1913, the Perfection Slide Company had not only purchased the 
patent rights from Meinhardt and Urell, but had proceeded to pursue legal redress from the 
infringing companies.  Perfection took out a display advertisement in the pages of Moving 
Picture World declaring that exhibitors displaying clock slides not made by the Perfection Slide 
Company would be “party to the infringement and, therefore, liable.”280  Such patent control was 
likely necessary to keep circulation of the product high, as illuminated clocks could take theaters 
permanently off the market; the city of Louisville, for example, claimed to be devoid of clock 
slides, as all theaters had illuminated clocks as early as 1913.
281
  Regardless of patent issues, the 
makers of clock slides were all trading on the value of passing information along to the audience 
as a means to defuse irritation. 
 Similar notions of adding elements of practical benefit to advertisement slides exist.  
Calumet Baking Powder offered to add standard announcements like “Another fine picture 
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coming up next” as the text portion of a slide otherwise dominated by an advertising image.282  
The Fisk Rubber Company likewise made a “Good Night” announcement slide (to be shown at 
the end of the last show of the night), that contained the company logo and the witticism “Time 
to Re-Tire,” alongside a picture of a tired child holding a Fisk Tire.283  Book stores were 
especially well suited to this form of ‘announcement’ advertising, as any film adapted from a 
book could mention a bookstore right on the ‘coming attraction’ slide.284  Neosho’s G.R. Lowe 
likewise suggested that doctors might get free advertising by asking the exhibitor to ‘call’ them 
to the telephone or the lobby in an emergency via the use of a slide which displayed their name 
to patrons.  Such a slide could be shown free as it was a service to the exhibitor (no need to stop 
the show to call the doctor), and it would get across the doctor’s name more clearly that an 
announcement while also implying that he was in demand.
285
 
These two types of technological slides were both a means to diffuse the irritation caused 
by compulsory attention – motion slides through pleasurable spectacle, and clock slides through 
practical use value.  In any of these examples, however, the advertising was rendered palatable 
by its seemingly secondary status.  As a precursor of the later notion of sponsorship, the 
advertisers seemed to be providing a service or a form of entertainment, and merely declaring 
their philanthropy openly.  As such, these types of slides are indicative of the struggles of the 
slide industry to fully integrate with motion pictures.  Direct advertising needed a little boost in 
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order to ‘get over the footlights,’ as it were.  The impending advertising trailer revolution (see 
chapter four) was, from a certain angle, simply another technological step in this process. 
 
Conclusion 
 From their plausible inception in motion picture theaters in 1908, to their incomplete 
1920s integration, advertising slides developed a stable, profitable, largely unquestioned, but 
decidedly marginal presence in motion picture theaters.  This presence set the tone for the other 
advertising concepts that would arise and develop over roughly the same time period, as lantern 
slides were the first to encounter and negotiate the thorny problems of exhibitor and spectator 
reluctance.  Through experimentation with various business models, slide manufacturers taught 
the advertising industry that film goers would accept the ‘intrusion’ of commercial messages into 
entertainment for which they had paid under the express conditions that it be presented in a form 
that was not cut-rate and in a quantity that did not dominate the proceedings.  If the slides could 
include elements of entertainment (preferably humor or inventive motion) or some element of 
public service (such as a clock or other informative announcement), so much the better. 
The perceived failings of slides either added weight to the adoption, or directly inspired 
the creation of other models of in-cinema advertising.  The sense that direct sales exhortations 
resulted in viewer antipathy led some to push forward with industrial films and product 
placement.  The notion that antipathy was related to the compulsory entertainment pause led 
others to move slide techniques off the screen and onto the walls.  The sense that viewers were 
simply displeased by the outdated, motionless technique spawned the advertising trailer. 
 With the lantern slide, then, the typical motion picture theater opened its doors – 
hesitantly – to consumer goods advertising.  Though longstanding assumptions about audience 
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displeasure would cause direct sales messages to slowly decrease in favor of sneakier advertising 
like product placement, the cinema theater would never again be entirely devoid of advertising.  
Slide advertising successfully navigated its early troubles, maintaining not just a place for itself 
in cinema theaters, but tacitly supporting further investigation of the venue.  Slides proved the 
logic that the ‘captive audience’ of the theater – though perhaps more psychologically complex 
than hoped – was in truth a profitable and desirable community.  Their flaws only encouraged 
national advertisers to further experimentation with the best way to profitably draw this 
community’s attention.
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CHAPTER 4.  “SCREEN SUGAR PILLS”: THE COMMERCIAL TRAILER AND THE 
MARGINALIZATION OF ONSCREEN ADVERTISING 
 
It was felt by advertisers that the lantern slide had had its run. 
People yawned at the still picture on the screen.  Some method 
of knocking them down and dragging them out had to be devised. 
The little ad-plays turned the trick. 
- Jonas Howard (December 1919)
1
 
 
 In the first quarter of 1938, the J. Walter Thompson Company’s Fred Fidler encouraged 
the company to experiment with motion picture advertising, primarily on the grounds that it 
would “provide invaluable preparatory experience against the time when commercial public 
television arrive[d] and demonstration share[d] description’s importance as an advertising 
technique.”2  After 40 years of “agency apathy” towards cinema advertising,3 and more than a 
decade as a major player in radio, J. Walter Thompson finally gave serious consideration to the 
moving picture.
4
  Historically, there are two very important elements to Thompson’s change of 
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heart.  First, they asserted that cinema advertising had been a qualified success, despite early 
exhibitor and spectator reluctance, due largely to persistence.  By carrying on, advertising film 
makers had “developed an appreciative tolerance on the part of the audience,” neutralizing 
complaints by simply refusing to leave.
5
  Second, they claimed that “[s]ome of the finest film 
work that has been done from an advertising standpoint has gone into the making of trailers that 
would have real ‘punch’ so they would be used right along.”6  Trailers were short, generally one 
minute, film strips designed to advertise consumer goods, complete with a merchant’s ‘video 
business card’ as the culminating image.  It is therefore telling that a mainstream ad agency, on 
the cusp of the development of television’s ‘participating sponsorship’ model, was interested in 
the cinema trailer as a parallel to the radio ‘spot’ (then still largely restricted to daytime 
programming).
7
  The analysis throws into sharp relief two important elements of cinema 
advertising history: that the threat of published complaints about onscreen advertising was 
parried by advertiser persistence; and that the motion picture advertising trailer is directly related 
to the televisual development of the 60-second broadcast ‘spot.’  
The commercial ‘trailer’ rose to prominence shortly after the advertising slide, and would 
slowly usurp, over the course of two decades, the much of the positioning of its technologically 
simplistic sibling in motion picture theaters.   Indeed, commentators of the time saw the trailer as 
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a direct replacement for the outdated lantern slide, which “had had its run.”8  The perceived 
value of motion to the power of image-based advertising (see chapter two), combined with a 
growing sense that the cinema audience was frustrated with slides, drove cinema advertising 
producers to develop the advertising trailer to capture and captivate an audience which, it 
seemed, had not been properly approached via slides.  Some of the more prominent slide 
producers concurred with that thinking, and attempted to shift production to the trailer model 
over the course of the 1910s and 1920s.  One example was the Kansas City Slide Company; 
company President A.V. Cauger, as part of his shift in focus from slides to films, trained his 
young artists Walt Disney and Ubbe Iwerks – originally hired in 1920 to produce “Cartoon and 
Wash Drawings” for advertising slides – to produce advertising trailers.  Disney, who was to 
make himself a household name, thus discovered cartooning largely due to cinema advertising 
trends, as the slide lost ground to the commercial trailer.
9
  Most early participants in the trailer 
field, however, were new companies which saw themselves as directly competing with the 
struggling slide makers. 
Trailers, like slides before them, were designed to be inserted into an entertainment 
sequence in the ‘gaps’ in the program, perpetuating the ‘single voice’ model, but without the 
disruption of breaking up full-motion images with stills.  Paradoxically, however, the increasing 
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technological suitability of the form to the cinema correlated to a historical moment when pauses 
for advertising were diminishing in programs rather than growing.  Trailers, despite their 
suitability for use at the end of each reel, commonly wound up strung together on their own reel 
and used as a form of ‘intermission’ between turns of the program.  It is in the marginalization of 
the trailer where the cinema found its stable form – unbroken feature films (and, to a decreasing 
degree, shorts) surrounded, in lower-end theaters, by an intermission buffer zone of advertising 
clips.  The notion that paid admissions were ‘naturally’ incompatible with intermittent 
advertising breaks normalized in the public consciousness through an accidental confluence of 
events. 
 This chapter shall chart a course very similar to chapter three.  Opening with a clear 
description of the trailer form, and the production methods employed in their creation and 
screening, the bulk of the chapter will recount a history of trailer development as a commercial 
adjunct to cinema culture.  Following this historical breakdown, public rhetoric both positive and 
negative about the trailer form (spoiler alert: it’s almost all positive) will reveal the ways in 
which trailers were ‘sold’ to both the film and business community as a viable advertising 
medium.  The chapter will conclude with a case study of the early years of the Alexander Film 
Company – the predominant trailer manufacturer from the early 1920s to the advent of 
commercial television and beyond. 
 
What Was a ‘Trailer’? 
 Referred to variously as ‘minute movies,’ ‘photoplaylets,’ and ‘Visual Publicity 
Telegrams,’10 trailers were very short advertising film strips which played out like temporally, 
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rather than spatially, organized slides.  Most often they were made, like lantern slides, to 
promote generic products, with a dealer identified in the concluding moments of the film.  
Trailers could, and did, promote national brands, but even then would almost invariably have had 
a local dealer name and address eating up the final seconds.
11
  Commonly the running length of 
an individual trailer advertisement was roughly 45 feet for the ‘story’ and 15 feet for the name 
and address of a local business where the product could be purchased.  Due to the variability of 
projection speeds in the silent era, the actual viewing of an advertising trailer may have taken 
much less than the commonly presumed one-minute running time of 60 feet of film.  Roughly 
one-minute was, however, the standard estimate, if not the standard experience. 
At their inception in the early 1910s, trailers, as the name would imply, were intended to 
be appended to the ends of entertainment reels that ran a bit shorter than the typical 1000 feet, 
and were thus circulated individually.  Research by the J. Walter Thompson ad agency, in 1929, 
asserts that mainstream films of this era could run “as short as 650-700 feet,” causing exhibitors 
to look with a good deal of favor on film novelties running about 50-250 feet…which could be 
patched onto the ends of short reels when it was desirable to lengthen the program, or left off 
when it was preferable.”12  Custom trailers were usually made-to-order and purchased outright, 
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with circulation decisions often left up to the advertiser him or herself.  The typical cost for a 
custom trailer was between fifty cents and one-dollar per foot, or about thirty to sixty dollars per 
trailer.
13
  Although custom trailers persisted throughout the life of the form, the growth of space-
brokering by trailer producers (signing contracts with exhibitors which allowed the trailer 
producer to re-sell a certain number of minutes per program) led to the growth of an alternate 
model of distribution in which the trailer producers would send a reel of multiple trailers.  
Predominantly of the ‘stock’ or ‘syndicate’ variety – generic trailers selected from a catalog for 
merchants in particular lines of business
14
 – such collections of trailers were designed to be run 
in sequence as a standalone reel somewhere in the program.  Stock trailers had wide variation in 
cost – ranging from four to twelve dollars – depending on whether they were rented or purchased 
outright.
15
  By 1916, both models were possible, and operated simultaneously; any given 
company offered both custom and stock trailers.
16
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Despite the vast differences in cost and production style inherent between custom and 
stock trailers, form and content (what the cinemagoer actually saw onscreen) had little variation.  
Custom production was a means to more completely integrate the brand, not a way to create an 
ad of higher formal quality.  Although they could be made in live-action,
17
 the typical advertising 
trailer was animated.
18
  (See the history section below for detail on the appeal of animation in the 
mid-1910s.)  Designed to be both short (to defuse exhibitor reluctance and keep costs low for the 
advertiser) and direct (making them memorable to the viewer, unlike subtle product placement 
and sponsored educational shorts), trailers were like full-motion slides, offering a clear sales-
pitch for a given product as briefly and pleasurably as possible. 
The ‘copy’ style was thus generally humorous, relying more on ‘soft sell’ strategies than 
slides,
19
 used a limited number of words (so as not to waste running time), and was – as was 
typical for 1910s advertising – an either explicit or implicit comparison of life with and without 
the product.
20
  Jonas Howard described this narrative structure of playlets as providing “[a] sort 
of object lesson, negative or positive,” in order to persuade the viewer of “the necessity for new 
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While humor was not unknown in the realm of slides, trailer makers were the first cinema advertisers to broadly 
embrace the notion that audience pleasure and direct advertising could work in tandem.   The persistent use of not 
only comic scripts, but animation, by trailer makers is evidence of the ethos of pleasure which they adopted. 
20
 Lynne Kirby mentions the prevalence of this comparative structure as well, in “Gender and Advertising in 
American Silent Film: From Early Cinema to the Crowd,” Discourse 13.2 (Spring/Summer 1991): 3. 
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shoes or a safety razor.”21  These ‘object lessons’ could be either rational or emotional appeals – 
either ‘reason why’ or ‘impressionistic’ copy.  Howard described the rational argumentative 
copy of a corset film, in which the near indestructibility of a corset was personified in the actions 
of two rambunctious children who used a corset to play tug of war before soaking it in a tub.  
The quality of the corset was assured by a narrative assertion that it would neither tear nor rust 
easily, implying superiority to a life with a lower-quality corset.  An example of ‘rational’ copy 
from the time with more overt comparative structure is a cement film which juxtaposed a thin, 
grumpy hog whose food kept sinking in the mire, to a fat and happy hog dining off of a concrete 
floor.
22
  Howard likewise provided an example of more emotional, impressionistic comparative; 
a shoe advertisement linked the quality of a man’s shoes to his romantic appeal, having an 
onscreen love interest refuse to marry the romantic lead until after he had purchased a new pair 
of shoes.  Such binaristic arguments – the simplest means of integrating salesmanship into 
narrative structure – are the structuring motif of virtually every published example of the form.23 
Most variation in style was, thus, not copy related but confined to minor aesthetic 
differences.  A multitude of aesthetic possibilities, largely determined by the technology 
developed by a given company, were available.  Trailers could be made in live-action, hand-
drawn animation, or cut-out puppetry (the most common method).
24
  The ‘Rowntree Process’ of 
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 Jonas Howard, “Sodas or Shaves,” Photoplay 17.1 (December 1919): 112. 
22
 “Little Schoolmaster’s Classroom,” Printers’ Ink 102.10 (7 March 1918): 142. 
23
 For other clear examples, see H.A. Shaw’s monthly column “A Few of Last Month’s Productions,” in the house 
organ, the Alexander Cooperator, in which he described the plots of trailers produced in the previous month.   
Alexander Cooperator, Box 8, Folder 1, Alexander Industries Records (MSS 0056), Special Collections in the 1905 
Carnegie Library, Pikes Peak Library District, Colorado Springs.  Other plot descriptions are scattered throughout 
the trade press of the time; see for example: “Publicity for Plumbers,” Domestic Engineering 73.11 (11 December 
1915): 337-338; “Kansas City Trade,” Black Diamond 58.5 (3 February 1917): 101; Francis T. Kimball, “The Film 
Trailer and What It Will Do,” Moving Picture Age February 1921: 11; and “Used-Car Sales Promotion Work,” 
Automobile Topics 8 October 1921: 639.  The only films which do not at least implicitly assert the trait of a product 
are non-narrative, abstract ads in which company names were simply revealed through magical play with letters.  
See, for example, the previously discussed Scenic Film Company ad for Nunnally’s Chocolates. 
24
 This propensity for cut-out puppetry is likely a key reason for the persistent marginalization of advertising 
cartoons in historical studies of animation.  There is no clear parallel in successful American entertainment 
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the Scenic Film Company was designed to backlight cardboard “figures...cut out in the fashion 
of paper dolls.”25  The Kansas City Slide Company used a similar method; Walt Disney once 
described his work there as the manipulation of “little puppet things” with joints.26  The Federal 
Development Company, as revealed in a self-advertisement, used hand drawn animation highly 
reminiscent, due to color inversion (black marks registering white onscreen), of the ‘chalkboard’ 
style of Emile Cohl’s famous film Fantasmagorie (1908).27  The Rothacker Film Manufacturing 
Company preferred to deal in live-action, and expressed a, probably not uncommon, weakness 
for “pretty girls.”28 
Unlike lantern slides which, for several reasons (see chapter three), developed a 
propensity for black backgrounds extremely early, trailer animators commonly operated in both 
white-on-black and black-on-white styles.  The Scenic Film Company, which openly described 
its animation as consisting of “silhouette and manikin effects,” and which reproduced several 
black silhouette images in a 1916 article in a local newspaper, appears to have been comfortable 
with black-figures on a white background.
29
  Sample images in the display ads for the Dra-Ko 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
animation, and as such no simple way to show direct aesthetic influence from the advertising industry to the 
entertainment animators.  The cut-out model is, however, part of a secondary strand of puppet animation practice, 
much more obvious in non-United States history, extending all the way back to ancient Asian shadow plays, and 
informing at least two Weimar German films – Schatten: Eine nächtliche Halluzination (Warning Shadows, 1923) 
and Die Abenteuer des Prinzen Achmed (Adventures of Prince Achmed, 1926) – and even little known American 
shorts like Inbad the Sailor (1916) and The First Circus (1921). 
25
 Britt Craig, “What Makes the Animated Movie Ads Move?: How the ‘Go-Fans’ Go on a Picture Screen,” Atlanta 
Constitution 2 April 1916: D3. 
26
 In later reminiscence, Disney claims to have personally experimented with hand-drawn animation but failed to 
convince Slide Company president A.V. Cauger to adopt it.  Timothy S. Susanin, Walt Before Mickey: Disney’s 
Early Years, 1919-1928 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 11, 15-16. 
27
 Federal Development Company: Display Ad, Simmons’ Spice Mill 40.1 (January 1917): 78. 
28
 Jonas Howard, “Sodas or Shaves,” Photoplay 17.1 (December 1919): 112.  By mid-century, the Alexander Film 
Company claimed to frequently use “‘kiddie’ talent” and “animal pets” which, along with “pretty girls,” form the 
holy-trinity of emotional advertising appeals.  “Alexander Film Co.: Behind the Scenes” pamphlet, unpaginated [6], 
Special Collections in the 1905 Carnegie Library, Pikes Peak Library District, Colorado Springs. 
29
 Full-Page Display Ad, Refrigeration 17.6 (January 1916): 54.  Britt Craig, “What Makes the Animated Movie Ads 
Move?: How the ‘Go-Fans’ Go on a Picture Screen,” Atlanta Constitution 2 April 1916: D3.  See, however, the 
extant 1921 short The First Circus for an example of the ways in which black figure, puppet animation could keep 
white backgrounds to a minimum.  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OltruL2_e0k> 
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Film Company also reveal black-figure production.
30
  B.F. Goodrich appears to have circulated 
animated trailers in black-figure as well.
31
  However, Artfilm Studios’ Reginald V. Stambaugh 
not only made white-figure animation, but strongly asserted that a white background “contrasts 
uncomfortably with the usual background of motion picture plays…[by] produc[ing] a high light 
that is out of place.”32  The previously cited Federal Development Company image was also 
white-figure production.
33
  It is possible that the decision was technologically or financially 
determined; certain methods may have simply produced better or cheaper product in one or the 
other form.  It is also probable that black backgrounds were more common with those who 
continued the hand-coloring practices of slide production; black backgrounds allowed for easier 
‘slopping’ of color across a space, as the background would hide the color which fell outside the 
lines. Of course, it is also plausible that American entertainment animation from Winsor McCay 
and Bray Productions, as black-figure productions, may have convinced most trailer animators 
that the whole subject was unimportant.  In any case, it appears that white backgrounds were 
common in trailer production – far more so than in slide production. 
Aesthetic variation was also partially the result of textual concerns.  Some stock trailers 
makers, in an attempt to construct trailers which left written copy in the hands of the advertiser 
as much as possible, concocted numerous methods for integrating text throughout trailers. While 
the Alexander Film Company was content to limit dealer copy to the last fifteen seconds, and the 
Rothacker Film Manufacturing Company kept copy open to change by integrating it via 
intertitles (as was typical for live-action film), Reginald V. Stambaugh performed technological 
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 Display Ad, Moving Picture World 27.12 (25 March 1916): 2078.  
31
 Francis T. Kimball, “The Film Trailer and What It Will Do,” Moving Picture Age February 1921: 11. 
32
 Reginald V. Stambaugh, “Process of Making Moving Picture Films,” U.S. Patent 1,226,135, filed 26 May 1916, 
and issued 15 May 1917. 
33
 Federal Development Company: Display Ad, Simmons’ Spice Mill 40.1 (January 1917): 78.  B-D-F Films’ 
wartime propaganda trailer, known as W.S.S. Thriftettes (1918), was also white-figure.  It is readily available online 
from the Library of Congress, and via YouTube.  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9nPwXSqZXBk>. 
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gymnastics to try to put stock animation and custom copy on the same frame of the trailer.  
Stambaugh left open spaces in his animation designed to accommodate custom dialogue and then 
developed a complicated dual-threading process in which two pieces of film (a shooting negative 
and a completed animation positive) would run through the camera simultaneously.
34
  The 
location and specificity of copy could, therefore, vary widely depending on the trailer producer.
35
 
In terms of exhibition, trailers were a national, but limited, phenomenon – they skewed 
towards rural and suburban areas.  As the growth of the form coincided with the rise of the urban 
picture palace, which commonly rejected commercial advertising intrusions across-the-board, the 
advertising trailer found a home in mid-range and low-end theaters and, effectively, wound up as 
one of the myriad ways in which first-run, downtown, palatial theaters were differentiated from 
other theaters in the silent era.
36
  The exhibitor was almost always paid for the screening time – 
either by the merchant who had paid for the film (directly, if placing the film himself, or 
indirectly, if he hired a space-broker to produce the trailer), or by the consumer-goods 
manufacturer (if it was a national campaign).  Any given film was guaranteed, as far as possible, 
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 Stambaugh’s patent is an intriguing read, as he takes time to lay out the many ways in which the concept could be 
botched before finally revealing his own technique.  As such, he gives considerable data on the variations in 
advertising animation practice at this early date.  His own process involves the filming of text with the negative 
resting directly against the stock animation film strip.  As such, the animation prints directly to the finished film at 
the same time that the lettering comes through the lens.  Reginald V. Stambaugh, “Process of Making Moving 
Picture Films,” U.S. Patent 1,226,135, filed 26 May 1916, and issued 15 May 1917. 
35
 This was probably the most important difference between silent and sound era production.  Provided animation 
remained a prominent practice, sound re-recording could easily integrate brand specificity into generic animation 
with only minor impact on ‘lip-sync.’  As such, Stambaugh’s attempt at creating stock ads with textual variability 
was a dead-end for silent era production but prefigured production choices from more than a decade later. 
36
 ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel asserted that this split had developed as early as 1916, in the wake of emergence of the picture 
palace.  By 1921, Francis T. Kimball asserted that “[o]f course, ‘first-run’ theatres in a few of the larger cities will 
not put even the most sugar-coated trailer on their screens”; his article directly asserted that it was a mode of 
advertising for “the thousands of cities and towns and hamlets of the United States which are not among the leading 
few.”  In 1956, research by the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency reveals that the split remained entrenched, as 
urban theaters would not screen advertising films.  S.L. Rothapfel, “First Aid to Theater Men,” Motography 16.2 (8 
July 1916): 78; Francis T. Kimball, “The Film Trailer and What it Will Do,” Moving Picture Age February 1921: 
11; and Fred Fidler and Wallace Boren, “Commercial Movies,” 1 February 1938, p. 9, Box 7, Folder “1937 Nov. 9 – 
1938 Oct. 25,” J. Walter Thompson Company, Staff Meeting Minutes, 1927-1938, David M. Rubinstein Rare Book 
& Manuscript Library, Duke University.  For further information on differentiating rural and urban viewing during 
the 1910s, see: Kathryn H. Fuller, At the Picture Show: Small-Town Audiences and the Creation of Movie Fan 
Culture (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996). 
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to be screened according to contract, either by sending a man to ‘check-up’ on the exhibitor, or 
by developing longstanding, mutually-respectful relationships with exhibitors through space-
brokering. As such, commercial advertising trailers – though not as common as lantern slides in 
the years between 1910 and 1913 – would have been seen by the bulk of film patrons as a normal 
piece of the program.  If a viewer saw one advertising trailer – hawking either a national product 
like Coca Cola, or a local one like “Jones’ Toys” – it was unlikely to be a one-off experience, but 
a part of a larger pattern witnessed every time they went to their favorite theater. 
 
A Brief History of the Advertising Trailer, 1914-1922 
 It is difficult to discuss the history of the advertising trailer without a little pre-history, as 
filmed advertisements are nearly as old as film itself.  As early as 1896, a film featuring Sunlight 
Soap, called Washing Day in Switzerland, was screened at Keith’s Union Square Theater in New 
York.
37
  The Edison Company’s paid filming of passenger rail was in full swing in their early 
short productions by 1897.
38
  By 1898, there were advertising films screened in New York (and 
possibly elsewhere) for products like Dewar’s Scotch Whiskey, Maillard’s Chocolates, Columbia 
Bicycles, Piel’s beer, and Hunter’s Rye Whiskey.  Future animation pioneer J. Stuart Blackton, 
along with his partner Albert E. Smith, made commercial films, along with slides, for their 
Commercial Advertising Bureau – projecting them from rooftops onto canvases hung at busy 
intersections.
39
  There is even evidence that the use of humor as a salve for advertising content is 
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 Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon, and Susan Chang, “The Hidden History of Product Placement,” Journal of 
Broadcasting & Electronic Media 50.4 (December 2006): 579-580. 
38
 Newell, Salmon, and Chang assert that, of the 52 films Edison made involving trains, only twice was the onscreen 
train a freight train; almost invariably the trains were for passenger transport.  Jay Newell, Charles T. Salmon, and 
Susan Chang, “The Hidden History of Product Placement,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 50.4 
(December 2006): 580, 590. 
39
 Charles Musser is the best source of information on this movement, specifically indicating that there was a site at 
Herald Square in New York, and giving concrete dates for certain productions.  Kerry Segrave, provides the list of 
advertisers, but otherwise offers less detailed information.  Charles Musser, “American Vitagraph: 1897-1901,” 
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an early innovation.  When Sears and Roebuck catalogs began to offer projectors and films in 
1898, they added to the available product by selling films, for only three dollars (40% less than 
non-advertising films), which subtly advertised the Sears name – displaying subjects like 
employees leaving Sears for lunch.  In order to counter the undoubted reluctance of some to 
purchase advertising footage, even at a cut rate, some of films were graced with the description 
“very funny.”40  The extant 1897 commercial film Admiral Cigarettes relies likewise on humor, 
through its ridiculous imagery of a ‘cigarette fairy.’  Though it is important not to oversell the 
comparison, all of these early advertisements were, in effect, proto-trailers, as the jokes and last-
second slogans were integrated into a (then common) running length of roughly one minute. 
 As film expanded, however – both in terms of celluloid running length and national 
audience – between 1900 and 1914, advertising films expanded apace, relegating the extremely 
brief advertising film to the rubbish bin as an outdated form.  Large film producers continued to 
make commissioned films stylistically parallel to their entertainment fare.  Charles Musser, in 
the most detailed study of advertising in the pre-nickelodeon era, asserts that American Biograph 
was so heavily engaged in producing commissioned advertising and public announcement films 
that “[o]f the 653 films [they] made from 1 May 1903 to 1 May 1904, more than 120 were 
sponsored by large corporations or the United States government,” including films for “Shredded 
Wheat Biscuits, Mellin’s Baby Food, and the Gold Dust Twins.”41  Vitagraph – Blackton and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Cinema Journal 22.3 (Spring 1983): 10-11; Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 
1907 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1990), 169, 253; and Kerry Segrave, Product Placement in Hollywood 
Films: A History (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland & Co, 2004), 5. 
40
 Kathryn H. Fuller, At the Picture Show: Small-Town Audiences and the Creation of Movie Fan Culture 
(Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 80-81. 
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 Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1990), 359-369.  Kathryn H. Fuller additionally points to Vitagraph, Selig, Essanay, and the aforementioned Edison 
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Smith’s second film venture – experimented with product placement and was able to extract 
fabulous sums from advertisers for the service; they were eventually sued for commissions on 
these contracts, which included $25,000 from American Tobacco for a hanging sign during the 
Johnson-Jeffries fight, and $15,000 from Wrigley for a close-up of a girl unwrapping a piece of 
gum.
42
  The National Cash Register Company was also using film at the St. Louis Expo in 
1904.
43
  As such, advertising – via one-reel shorts and product placement – was everywhere.  It 
was likely to be screened in every plausible American venue prior to the establishment of the 
nickelodeon, from Edison’s kinetoscope parlors, to vaudeville performances, to general public 
celebrations of modern technology at fairs and expositions. 
With the stabilization of exhibition practices in nickelodeon theaters, however, 
advertising motion pictures began losing ground.  As the industrial advertising short and tourism-
boosting travelogue fought for integration into cinema programs between 1908 and 1913, the 
roughly 15 minute duration of a standard reel became a problem.  Once film had lost its status as 
inherently spectacular, advertising annoyed patrons at the length of a full-reel.  More and more 
advertising in motion pictures was camouflaged with a veil of ‘human interest’ or educational 
content, and reduced to an indirect, ‘soft-sell’ integration of trademarks.44  As the advertising 
component of a reel became less and less noticeable, the fantastic costs of making such films – 
                                                          
42
 Julius Legett, the man who claimed to have negotiated the contracts, was seeking $26,000 in commissions, 
strongly implying that there were several very large contracts with Vitagraph prior to the Patents Company banning 
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and “The Newest Kind of Store Publicity,” Clothier and Furnisher 89.2 (September 1916): 99. 
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reaching as high as $5000 apiece – became less and less attractive.45  Slides, on the other hand, 
could be picked from a catalog, ordered for a dollar, and taken to every local motion picture 
theater in turn until some exhibitor agreed to run them.  The cost of failure was dramatically 
different.  With the success of advertising slides prior to 1910, numerous articles dreaming of a 
future for the advertising film were published,
46
 but attempts at full-reel production simply 
weren’t working.  By 1913 – after significant efforts from industrial film producers like 
Watterson Rothacker, Arthur N. Smallwood, and the industrial division of Essanay – the 
advertising film appeared to be destined for a life on the non-theatrical circuit.
47
  The expensive 
indirect approach found few adherents when forced to compete with direct advertising via cheap 
slides. 
By this same date, however, even the ‘direct’ advertising slide was struggling through a 
wave of negative publicity.  Ugly slides made by cut-rate slide manufacturers had markedly 
increased public resentment of the form, as unpleasant (and often broken) slides would be 
screened for months on end.  By 1913, exhibitor elimination of advertising slides was in full 
swing (see chapter three).  The American advertising industry was, however, going through 
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significant expansion in this period; Quentin J. Schultze points to the era between 1910 and 1915 
as a period of “rapid growth” in national advertising in the United States.48  As such, the mass 
rebellion against industrial reels and advertising slides, in an era when the desire to advertise was 
expanding rather than contracting, opened a clear space for advertising films in cinema 
programs…provided the films were short enough to fit into the same gaps.  Enter the trailer film, 
appended to the ends of film reels or distributed as a short reel of one-minute long 
advertisements, which began its rise in 1914. 
Over the course of the following two years, it was common, among trailer producers and 
advocates, to openly describe the trailer as the logical replacement for the faltering lantern 
slide.
49
  The earliest known trailer producer – Houston’s Southern Film Service – directly 
declared, in its 1914 self-advertising, that their films were “not to be compared with the ordinary 
slides.”50  The Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Company justified its use of trailer 
footage that same year on the grounds that it involved neither the pause nor the resentment 
inherent in slides.
51
  Atlanta’s Scenic Film Company used simple derisive metaphors to critique 
the impertinence of using still slides in moving picture theaters.  For example, their claim that 
“[e]ven a piece of paper, blown by the breeze across a screen, will attract attention and would be 
watched by anyone, when something still may stand unnoticed for a long time.”52  Harvey F. 
Morris, advertising manager for the Hickey-Freeman clothing company, concurred, saying that 
slides represented “a decided drop from the pictures between which they were shown” and “were 
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not successful in interesting the audience.”53  By the end of 1916, advertising journalist Ernest A. 
Dench reduced the critique to the simple assertion that lack of motion was “a serious defect” in 
slides which could be remedied through the adoption of trailer advertising.
54
  As such, the 
rhetoric of the trailer as an improved form of the slide both adopted and advanced the public 
sentiment that motion pictures were a form of communication which bypassed critical faculties.  
Culminating in the mid-decade ‘psychic infection’ film theories of Hugo Münsterberg and the 
Mutual Decision (see chapter two), advocacy of trailers at the expense of slides implied not just 
an improvement in technology, but a strengthening of advertising power. 
Although slide usage continued (and continues) in American motion picture theaters, the 
1913 backlash against slides was, therefore, a necessary pre-requisite for the boom in advertising 
film.  It not only inspired the creation of short, cheap, and direct advertising film (rather than the 
subtle camouflaging tactics of product placement and ‘educational’ reels), but also opened up a 
simple rhetorical argument for adoption: ‘upgrade your slides’ with the more captivating and 
pleasurable moving advertisement.  In short, the trailer industry was a parasite on the slide 
industry, pushing condemnation of still advertising in favor of its own full-motion product.
55
 
The trailer method appears to have arisen independently in at least three places: Houston, 
Atlanta, and New England.
56
  In Houston, the Southern Film Service, Inc., began offering 
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“Mysterious Writing” advertising films, designed “[t]o be attached to your daily film.”  Using 
the slogan “An unseen hand in letters white on a darkened screen appears to write,” it is clear 
that their ads were nothing more than stop-motion writing, projected in negative to achieve a 
white-figure effect.
57
  Atlanta cameraman Carl B. Rowntree, of the Scenic Film Company, 
produced a more complicated practice of full scale puppet animation, claiming to have invented 
his process for producing short animated ads in the middle of 1914.
58
  By early 1915, he had 
filed his animation technique with the United States patent office, was regularly soliciting the 
business of Atlanta merchants and manufacturers, and openly declared that his cartoon films 
were, likewise, to be used “by attaching them to the end of regular moving picture reels.”59  New 
England’s National Advertising Motion Picture Weekly, Inc., also in the latter half of 1914, 
contracted with sixteen nearby theaters to run a weekly five-minute reel containing five distinct 
advertising films.
60
  In short, both business models – the ‘appended trailer’ and the ‘reel of 
trailers’ – were in use in the United States by the end of 1914.  The idea would spread 
remarkably quickly, with at least seven further companies adopting the form by the end of 
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1915.
61
  A total of at least thirty-one trailer producers were, or had been, in operation by 1921 – 
including Tilford & Tilford, a Chicago company which made trailers exclusively for black 
theaters.
62
  The form was so successful that, by World War I, the mainstream film industry 
would adapt the method to replace ‘coming attraction’ slides.63 
While it is not entirely clear where the idea came from, there are several plausible origins 
for the thinking.  The term ‘trailer’ was in use no later than 1910, as the inverse of the term 
‘leader,’ to describe the short strips of informational film at the end of a reel: company logos, 
‘The End’ tags, and censor board approvals.  At times the production of such material was even 
outsourced to a company that specialized in the form.
64
  It would not have been a great leap for 
such a company to branch out into sales messages, as they were effectively acting as film 
branding agents already.  A secondary influence may have been ‘split-reel’ and newsreel 
releases.  In split reels, two films – neither of which was a full reel in length – were released 
together as a single product.  By 1914, one half-reel film, Fireproofing Children, was said to be 
                                                          
61
 Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Company: “Advertising Tailpieces,” Motography 12.15 (10 October 
1914): 498.  Triograph Film Manufacturing Company: Display Ad, Atlanta Constitution 20 June 1915: 11.  
Effankay Film Company: Display Ad, Moving Picture World 25.4 (24 July 1915): 745.  Raymond Anderson 
Company: “Comic Advertising Films,” Moving Picture World 25.5 (31 July 1915): 850.  Real Publicity Company: 
“Local Film Ad Men Meet,” Moving Picture World 26.4 (23 October 1915): 649.  Pacific Coast Film Advertising 
Company: “New Concern Enters Field,” Moving Picture World 26.8 (13 November 1915): 1345.  Ray: Classified 
Ad, Moving Picture World 26.9 (20 November 1915): 1563. 
62
 “A New Enterprise,” Chicago Defender14 February 1920: 19.  While I cannot corroborate the assertion that 
Tilford & Tilford were “the first” to make such films exclusively for black theaters, the description of their work as 
“a wonderful improvement on the time-worn slides” indicates that they were definitely working in the medium of 
the ‘minute movie.’ 
63
 The Indiana Curtain Advertising Company pioneered coming attractions trailers with simple ten foot footage of 
stars and titles, made by commission for theaters, in 1915.  This same year, serials began to use edited footage as 
teasers for the next episode.  By late 1916, the Moving Picture World was still able to assert that Triangle had a ‘new 
idea’ when the company began to attach an advance trailer for next week’s feature to the end of every feature film 
the company released.  In 1917, an article in Moving Picture World declared that the coming attraction trailer had 
“come into use extensively of late” clearly indicating that the vogue of film trailers arose after the rise of the 
consumer goods advertising trailer.  “Chicago Film Brevities,” Moving Picture World 25.9 (28 August 1915): 1464;  
Margaret I. MacDonald, “‘Exploits of Elaine,’ Episode 14,” Moving Picture World 24.2 (10 April 1915): 246; “New 
Advertising Idea,” Motography 16.18 (28 October 1916): 970;  “Selznick Has Clever Trailer,” Moving Picture 
World 33.4 (28 July 1917), 663; and “Trailer for ‘Parentage,’” Motography 18.7 (18 August 1917), 357. 
64
 Gunby Bros: Display Ad, Moving Picture World 7.9 (27 August 1910): 489.  General data: “Just a Moment 
Please,” Motography 10.11 (29 November 1913): 384. 
167 
 
 
“released as a trailer,” seeming to indicate that the line between a ‘split-reel’ film and a ‘trailer’ 
was breaking down.
65
  Newsreels were similar to split reels, in that they strung together largely 
unrelated footage, which could be shuffled or dropped at will, on a single reel.
66
  The fact that 
advertisers continually attempted to get brief footage into newsreels – culminating in the Ford 
Motor Company producing newsreels of its own from 1914 to 1921 - indicates early interest in 
the placement of short advertising strips onto larger reels of unrelated material.
67
  Newsreels, 
split reels, and informational ‘trailer’ footage were all, therefore, common practices in 
entertainment cinema which, in hindsight, were logical precursors to the advertising trailer 
concept. 
As likely as these entertainment concepts are as stimuli, however, it is perhaps more 
likely that the commercial advertising film industry was inspiring itself.  Attempts at getting 
advertising into newsreels were but one piece of a much larger interest in the powers of very-
short advertising footage.  A January 1913 article reveals that advertising films intended for 
theatrical release and those intended for use by salesmen were being distinguished by referring to 
the former as “regulation lengths” and the latter as “short lengths.”68  It is possible, then, that the 
creation of full-reel (approximately 15 minute) advertising films was always seen as a formal 
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imposition and an unnecessary expense.  If salesmen could make do with less, why couldn’t the 
consuming public?  The same article also provides a practical example of a one-reel advertising 
film in which the most popular and influential piece was a quasi-trailer magic trick at the end of 
the film.  A film for Waterman Pens called The Story of the Fountain Pen (presumably 1912) 
was believed to be successful largely for its animated ending in which pieces of rubber and gold 
assembled themselves into a pen and then drew pictures which were made to “come to life.”  
Audiences loved this part of the film, which was described as “about a minute” in duration.69  At 
a time in which ‘impressionistic copy’ was already making inroads into mainstream advertising, 
it is not implausible that the Waterman company, along with other business men, would have 
begun to wonder if the roughly nine-hundred feet of film prior to this novelty animated section 
was entirely superfluous. 
Even if this particular film had no direct bearing on trailer development, it serves as 
perfect transitional moment, due not only to the duration and placement of the sequence, but also 
its reliance on animated effects.  Sharply highlighting just how much the margins of the 
advertising industry could differ in opinion from the agencies, early trailer producers embraced 
entertainment and pleasure, and made their advertisements almost exclusively as humorous 
animated cartoons.
70
  Ernest A. Dench was almost misleading when he asserted that animation 
was simply “[t]he most popular” form of trailer up to 1916.71  Between 1914 and 1916, nearly all 
film production companies known to have been experimenting with trailers were dealing 
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primarily, if not exclusively, in animation.
72
  The only known live-action footage in these early 
years were one-time uses: the Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Company’s 
electrification footage in late 1914, and the trailer advertising the Portland Rose Festival in 
1915.
73
  Animation wasn’t simply popular; it was so predominant as to render non-animated 
trailers a decided anomaly. 
Popular animation was in a very early stage of development at this point: Bray 
Productions, the largest early animation house, did not release its first cartoon (The Artist’s 
Dream) until 12 June 1913 and was still seeking a wide audience for its work, and Winsor 
McCay did not begin screening his highly influential third animated short, Gertie the Dinosaur, 
until 8 February 1914.
74
  As such, from mid-1914 to mid-1916, we can comfortably assert that 
animation did not just dominate the trailer business, but that the trailer business also dominated 
animation.  The Moving Picture World reported that, by mid-1916 ‘animated ads’ had “to a very 
large extent” replaced slides entirely in New Orleans.75  Three months earlier, the Atlanta 
Constitution strongly implied that any viewing of animation in a cinema theater was an animated 
ad, saying “[y]ou have seen it – if you’re a picture play-goer – queer little cartoon-like characters 
that perform all manner of intricate antics…in exploitation of the merits of this trade shop or 
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that.”76  The trailers of the Hickey-Freeman Company help to roughly pinpoint the moment that 
live-action trailers became more common; the company made animated trailers in Fall 1915 and 
Spring 1916 before making their first live-action trailer for the Fall of 1916.
77
  In short, the rise 
of the trailer was inextricably linked to the rise of animation. 
In the short run, the focus on animation had two practical benefits, one which helped 
convince advertisers that the form had value, and one which helped defuse exhibitor reluctance 
to screen the films.  For advertisers, the need to produce recognizable sales copy (i.e. written 
persuasive claims) in a medium of motion virtually required that letters be kinetic.  Early trailer 
producers almost universally promoted ‘moving or mysteriously appearing letters’ as their 
primary asset.
78
  Although advertising animators believed that minimizing written content 
produced better ads,
79
 all advertising films had to include a small amount of written copy – at the 
very least providing a dealer’s name and address.  One could use stop-action and animation to do 
this with flair in many ways: letters which appeared in a place previously occupied by another 
object, which flew around the screen and formed words, or which seemed to write themselves 
without a visible hand, to name just three examples.  Simple stop-motion tricks could render the 
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onscreen reproduction of words a dynamic experience.
80
  Likely emerging from pre-narrative 
trailer practice, in which an abstract visual was made to reveal a product or merchant name – like 
the Scenic Film Company’s ad for Nunnally’s chocolates, in which the letters appeared out of an 
exploding heart – the persistent need to include written advertising copy kept animated letters at 
the forefront of trailer practice in the early years.
81
  Animation was, therefore, a means to inject 
spectacle not just into the action of the film, but into even the most mundane of content. 
Animation also had a direct appeal to exhibitors and audiences.  It was a form with 
inherent spectacle and novelty.  Early commentators remarked on the “unusual interest” which 
the audience expressed in animated trailers, and proposed that this may have been a result of the 
novelty of animation, as the audience was “try[ing] to figure out how that [was] done.”82  Add in 
the fact that trailer producers also oriented their scripts towards pleasure – the Dra-Ko Film 
Company went so far as to hire Frank A. Nankivell, famous for his work in the humor magazine 
Puck, to head their art department
83
 – and the animated trailer had distinct appeals across-the- 
board: directness and cheapness for advertisers, brevity and humor for audiences, and cash for 
exhibitors.  (For more regarding the appeals of animation to advertisers and exhibitors, see the 
following section on positive rhetoric.) 
Although brevity was intentional, the thirty to ninety second running time was likely not 
a technological or exhibitor mandated maximum, but a choice.  Over the course of roughly a 
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year, the typical running time slowly but perceptibly increased in published accounts from thirty 
seconds to one-minute.  In mid-1915, the Raymond Anderson Company was producing trailers 
with a uniform running length of thirty-five feet.
84
  A general article on the form from the end of 
1915 declared that one could succeed with a cartoon trailer using “not more than twenty or thirty 
feet of film.”85  The Scenic Film Company, in early 1916, though offering durations ranging 
anywhere from twenty-five feet to multiple reels, asserted that thirty-five to fifty feet was the 
norm.
86
  By September of 1916, Harvey F. Morris, advertising manager for the Hickey-Freeman 
Company, claimed that sixty to seventy feet was the norm for a trailer film.
87
  By 1919, however, 
there had been no further change, as two of the most prominent trailer producing companies – 
the Rothacker Manufacturing Company and the Alexander Film Company – were continuing the 
practice of one to one-and-a-half minute long advertising trailers.  This duration would remain 
constant throughout the 1920s.
88
  It appears, then, that the roughly one-minute running time 
developed as a standard, between 1914 and 1916, partly as a compromise: it was long enough to 
integrate rudimentary narrative, but short enough to fit onto a film reel which was only slightly 
below full. 
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Of course, cost-control likely also had some impact on running time. Ernest Dench, in 
1916, declared that the average price per foot for a trailer film was fifty cents, resulting in a cost 
of $30 for a one-minute trailer – a drastic increase over the typical $1 cost of a lantern slide.89  
The Scenic Film Company quoted the same price that year, though the price would double to $1 
per foot if the advertiser wanted to handle the bookings himself.
90
  Even at durations under one 
minute, trailers were a financial burden to merchants with small advertising budgets.  This 
pricing issue rapidly led to the development of the ‘syndicate’ or stock catalog trailer to cut costs 
further.  The Dench article cited above actually used the cost estimates for custom animation as a 
contrast to the newly developed stock trailer, which was priced at the more affordable rate of $4 
to $5.  Copying the idea of a stock slide – selected from a catalog with a specific dealer name 
appended – eventually shifted the trailer business from a purchase to a rental structure, resolving 
at least two cost problems.
91
  First, it distributed first copy costs across unrelated businesses.  
Second, as with entertainment fiction before them, it allowed trailers to “be made in a central 
location and on a predictable basis,” reducing idle labor and travel expenses.92  It also added to 
the profitability of the form, as exceptionally popular copy could produce nearly unlimited 
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profits.  The Alexander Film Company worked exclusively on a rental system for its stock 
trailers, as revealed in its 1921 sales manual.  As such, keeping the duration to roughly one-
minute kept the trailer as affordable as possible, while allowing sufficient time for rudimentary 
narrative. 
The developmental period of trailer advertising, then, was a two-year-long attempt to find 
a compromise between quality and cost.  The result was experimentation with three modes of 
production – custom, stock, and ‘partially-stock’ (in which only the imagery was pre-made, with 
gaps left in the image to add onscreen dialogue later).  Each had its strengths and weaknesses.  
Custom copy, of course, was the most controllable – allowing the advertiser to have input on the 
style, copy, and duration.  Unfortunately, it was also the most expensive – a problem which 
compounded if the advertiser failed to drum up enough exhibitors willing to screen the film.
93
  
Stock product inverted the strengths and weaknesses.  Although the cost was minimal, especially 
under the rental system, almost all decision making was taken out of the hands of the advertiser.  
Indeed, not only were advertisers forced to select pre-conceived films, they would choose them 
from an illustrated catalog, not after a personal screening of the available options.  Much of the 
suitability of the trailer, therefore, had to be taken on faith.  The ‘partially stock’ model 
attempted to split the difference, allowing for cutting costs in animation, as the character work 
was all done in advance, while gaps remained for the advertiser to integrate his or her own copy 
throughout.  The problems were increased cost (including a return of the problem of drumming 
up screenings – one couldn’t rent custom copy), technical difficulty (getting both action and 
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copy to match up without ‘wobbling’ was challenging),94 and narrative weakness (as the ‘plot’ of 
the animation portion needed to be vague enough to integrate variations in copy). 
 As one can readily see from this breakdown, the fully stock model – which would 
eventually become the dominant model – was not necessarily superior, nor can we presume that 
its users believed it to be.  The American advertising film industry intentionally sacrificed 
elements of message delivery, like specificity and advertiser-written copy, to cost considerations.  
In the absence of an easy way to fund and nationally circulate trailer cartoons for specific brands, 
trailer producers targeted merchants by producing the cheapest possible variant.
95
  As such, the 
other two modes of production (custom and partial-stock) shifted into the background due 
entirely to cost and circulation problems, not technological inefficiency or aesthetic dislike.  
Trailer producers therefore integrated copy writing services at a very early date out of necessity; 
production was generally too expensive if the producer allowed advertiser input. 
During the two-years of experimentation, adoption of the format increased steadily.  
Perhaps the best evidence for the growing popularity of the animated trailer prior to the war is 
that it spawned fraudulent behavior.  ‘Salesmen’ promising the delivery of commercial cartoon 
trailers would abscond with down payments from merchants.  One (individual or group) ravaged 
Bainbridge, Georgia in late 1916 offering twenty-five foot cartoon ads from a non-existent 
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Nebraska company.
96
  In mid-1917, a similar film fraud was perpetrated in Kansas.  Five 
merchants in the town of Ellis “were induced to make a preliminary payment of $5” on a 
contract for thirty-two weekly film ads, “eighty feet in length.”  Again, the offer was made in the 
name of a company quite distant – the ‘National Film Company’ of New York – and the 
merchants were promised circulation over an entire circuit of theaters.
97
  The low-cost combined 
with the superiority of the trailer to slides rapidly rendered trailer advertising so popular that 
businessmen of all sizes were willing to part with a few dollars in down payment on very little 
evidence.  The trailer had become the model to beat in cinema advertising. 
Despite the marked difference in public approval (slides largely derided while trailers 
were on the rise), the years 1916 to 1918 provided nearly identical problems and benefits for 
trailers as they had for slides.  The exhibition industry legitimized and stabilized the form by 
adopting it for self-advertising, while the wartime work of the Creel Committee (among other, 
private patriotic gestures) gave minor sanction to the intrusion of non-cinema related advertising 
in theaters.  The war and the film industry combined to culturally entrench the form, while also 
usurping much of the space.
98
 
Cinema self-defense and self-advertising via trailers entered a phase of large-scale 
growth in 1916, as the ‘announcement’ and the ‘coming attraction’ trailers – experimented with 
by outsiders in the preceding year – were both adopted by the studios.  Industry defense 
announcements were common in this era of expanding film censorship – Balboa, for example, 
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was circulating an anti-censorship trailer in the first quarter of 1916.
99
  In short order, however, 
the most prominent way in which the studios adopted the trailer format was in the production of 
‘coming attraction’ snippets.  In the transition of the motion picture industry from the early 
decade dominance of the patents company, to the vertically integrated independent studios, 
competition for viewership increased.  In an effort to guarantee profitability in an environment of 
increased competition and increased expense (due to the production of features, which the 
industry believed required individual marketing), film promotion by the studios increased.
100
  By 
September of 1916, Famous Players “issue[d] an advance strip” to promote the upcoming film 
The Quest of Life.
101
  The following month, the Triangle Film Corporation – with the assertion 
that “the screen…is a most powerful advertising medium…that was not being taken full 
advantage of” – began circulating ‘coming attraction’ trailers for their own products.102  By July 
of 1917, Moving Picture World declared that such trailers had “come into use extensively of 
late,” while reporting Selznick’s new concept of using behind the scenes footage to announce 
coming attractions.
103
  Rather than closing off the open spaces in the program, then, exhibitors 
and entertainment producers began to compete for usage of the space through self-serving 
‘trailers’ of their own. 
What space was not being maintained for film industry self-promotion was being adapted 
for wartime use.  As early as 1914, Universal (always the quickest to interact with cinema 
advertising theory) had already adopted the direct advertising trailer model for philanthropic 
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exhortation, when the company attached a 30 foot strip to each film as a ‘leader,’ encouraging 
spectators to “Buy a bale of cotton” – a response to the overstock of cotton caused by the closing 
of European markets during the early hostilities of World War I.
104
  By 1917, both the U.S. 
government, through the propaganda campaign of the Creel Committee, and the public, through 
growing patriotic sentiment, pressured exhibitors to integrate political advertising into their 
programs.  While the trailer form was adopted frequently for war work,
105
 the Liberty Loan was 
again the watershed.  The Creel Committee, of course, circulated official Liberty Loan trailers, 
including some in the animated format.
106
  The movement was bolstered by a few motion picture 
studios – like Kalem and Selig-Polyscope – who, eager to display their patriotism, produced 
Liberty Loan trailers of their own.
107
  Other wartime patriotic trailers were circulated as well, 
most notably the American Bioscope Company’s “Your Flag and Mine” trailer, which was 
advertised heavily in the pages of Moving Picture World during the war.
108
  By March of 1918 
patriotic messages were so ingrained in American exhibition culture that Moving Picture World 
columnist Walter K. Hill even proposed that all features have a leader or trailer in which “the star 
of the piece be posed…holding a sign” extolling the virtues of purchasing war stamps.109  The 
proliferation of patriotic appeals on the screen solidified the presence of advertising copy in even 
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the highest class theaters, and likely helped to develop an “appreciative tolerance” for direct 
appeals in between film reels. 
With the adoption of the form for both film industry self-advertising and the delivery of 
political messages, the first two years of trailer development were followed by roughly three 
years of transitioning business models.  Major studio and government interest in trailers 
decreased the available space.  As the circulation of ‘coming attraction’ trailers increased, 
exhibitors were faced with the decision of devoting a larger percentage of the program to trailers, 
decreasing their use of commercial trailers, or declining to use the (free) self-advertising sent out 
by the studios.  With the increasing dominance, even ownership, of exhibition sites by 
production companies, the exhibitor’s ability to decline decreased; exhibition was becoming a 
national business, not a local one.  Trailer producers attempted to survive the competition, and 
the war, by escalating the scale of their operations as well.  Most trailer makers abandoned their 
piecemeal production – abandoning also their reliance on advertisers being confident of finding 
circulation – and went through a phase of increased professionalization.  In an echo of the slide 
industry’s turn to ‘full service’ production and distribution, which had occurred over the previous 
few years (see chapter three), trailer producers predominantly adopted space-brokering as a 
business model, and shifted their focus to national advertisers.  A number of trailer producers 
even banded together in a professional association in an attempt to stabilize and grow the field, 
even at the risk of sharing trade secrets with competitors.  The increasing scale of contracts – 
both with exhibitors and advertisers – added a patina of proficiency and efficiency to trailer 
production.
110
  All of these changes occurred between late 1916 and 1918. 
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While the development of the advertising trailer appear to have repaired the major failing 
of slides, and could logically have resulted in a form of commercially subsidized cinema 
exhibition in which an advertising trailer was appended to the end of each reel, this television-
esque form of exhibition did not arise.  The advent of the trailer coincided with a shifting 
emphasis from reel change pauses to a single intermission as a buffer between turns of the 
program.  The greatest boon to slide advertising was the fact that most early theaters had only 
one projector, necessitating a pause at the end of each reel as the projectionist swapped out the 
completed reel for the next one in the program.  As even lower-end theaters shifted to a two-
projector model, in which the reel-change could occur without onscreen interruption, the need 
for a distinct pause was eliminated.  Debate over the best way to structure a ‘balanced program’ 
(leading the viewer comfortably through the tonal transitions of a multitude of genres) likely kept 
hope alive for pauses between reels, as some exhibitors – most notably ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel – 
preferred pauses for non-filmic entertainment.
111
  The industry-wide transition to feature films, 
however, finally and irreversibly shifted the focus from buffering successive shorts, to creating 
an intermission between turns of the program, stressing beginnings and endings rather than an 
endless loop of shorts for ‘transient spectators.’112  The purveyors of onscreen advertising – both 
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slides and trailers – did not hold enough sway over exhibition culture to militate against feature 
culture, or persuade studios and exhibitors to break up such films with commercial pauses. 
As such, the trailer, like the slide, drifted rapidly into placement in a single intermission 
somewhere in the program.  Jonas Howard’s article on Rothacker photoplaylets, published in late 
1919, declared that good films must be able to “hold the attention of the audience between Mary 
Pickford and the news weekly.”113  In 1921, the Alexander Film Company openly asserted that 
their contracted films were screened “between the comedy and the feature” in most theaters.114  
While it is difficult, if not impossible to determine an actual location in the program from 
assertions such as this, it is clear that the typical screening model had shifted away from 
appending the films to short reels, and towards the screening of a reel of successive 
advertisements.
115
  Rather than encouraging exhibitors to split the films apart, then, complex fade 
in and fade out transitions were included, and the reel was intended to be run as a standalone 
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component of the program in a space contracted for by the trailer maker.
116
  In practice, the shift 
of the trailer into an intermission was part and parcel with the film industry’s slow transition 
away from the ‘transient spectator’ (who would arrive and leave anywhere in the program) to a 
scheduled entertainment with a distinct beginning and end point. 
Paradoxically, then, the running of all advertisements in a lump at the end of the program 
– derided as the ‘slide dodge’ by Ernest Dench as late as 1916 – became the typical practice, as 
advertising in most theaters became a form of ‘chaser’ which would help identify when the 
program had completed a turn and was about to restart.  Whether or not trailer makers were 
responding to this shift in screening theory, or were simply adding weight to the transition is 
unclear.  It is a near certainty that space-brokering arose as a way for trailer producers to 
regularize profit by normalizing and guaranteeing circulation.  What is not clear is whether the 
shift to circulating a reel of trailers was simply expedient, or if it was a response to the dwindling 
‘gaps’ in the program caused by the rise of the feature film.  If it was the former, then the shift 
away from ‘commercial breaks’ was largely a serendipitous historical accident, as the open 
spaces were on the verge of disappearance.  In any case, by 1916 space-brokering, which had 
appeared haphazardly in slide industry display ads over the previous few years, began to 
dominate the business of trailer distribution.  Building on the 1914 example of the National 
Advertising Motion Picture Weekly, Inc., companies began circulating reels rather than 
individual trailers, contracting for a specific amount of space in the program – generally at the 
rate of about $100 per month.
117
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Space-brokering, like trailer production itself, was a local practice before it became a 
national one.  At times the practice could be remarkably small.  The Real Publicity Company had 
contracted with only two Kansas City theater by mid-1915 – the Benton and the Royal – to 
which they delivered weekly reels containing 12 ads each.
118
  Typically trailer producers would, 
at the very least, attempt to control all theaters in their cities of activity.  The Scenic Film 
Company controlled seventeen theaters in Atlanta as early as May 1916.
119
  Nelson Motion 
Picture Studios claimed sixty theaters across Detroit in 1918.
120
  Screen Press, Inc. dominated 
Minneapolis and St. Paul by 1919.
121
  James P. Simpson developed a stranglehold on the state of 
Texas by 1920.
122
  Over 1916 and 1917, a trend is apparent towards multi-state focus in space-
brokering.  The Scenic Film Company attempted to expand into Boston and Philadelphia in 
1916, in an effort to become an east coast power.
123
  More notable, however, was Screen 
Advertising, Inc., and its chain of contracts with “1000 Better Class Neighborhood Theatres” 
east of the Mississippi River.  Organized in 1917, and contracting for 200 feet of advertising per 
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program in each of their theaters, Screen Advertising Inc. not only offered the selection of pre-
certified theaters, but also a ‘service department’ to help national advertisers contact dealers and 
inform them of upcoming ad screenings (thereby presumably eliminating the need to append 
dealer information to the trailer itself).  On July 5
th
, Screen Advertising, Inc., claimed the 
enormous vote of confidence of the Marcus Loew theaters of New York, which signed on for 
their service.
124
  By 1921, the Alexander Film Company had transitioned from a west coast 
company to a national business, and was contracting theaters across the United States for a reel 
of between five and ten ad trailers. 
In transitioning to space-brokering, then, trailer producers developed a model nearly 
identical to early magazine advertising – placing large swaths of pre-contracted advertising in a 
bookend position (the closest to an ‘optional’ position that the screen could offer), and stressing 
audience selection as the form’s greatest strength.  Screen Advertising, Inc., for example, used 
detailed knowledge about the clientele of particular theaters to offer advertisers a selection of 
audiences.  While Screen Advertising, Inc., described all of its theaters as middle class, they 
offered to rent space by neighborhood, city, or ‘zone,’ so that the advertiser could feel confident 
of reaching his target audience without overpaying for valueless screenings.
125
  Signing contracts 
in advance with the theaters guaranteed placement, allowing advertising film manufacturers to 
approach advertisers armed with their list of theaters and allow the advertisers to decide for him 
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or herself how many and of what type to use.  Exhibitor reluctance was cut off before the film 
was even produced, opening up the field to advertisers who had previously avoided film as a 
questionable investment which might simply “repose peacefully in [its] can” after it was made.126 
The contracting of multiple theaters to a single trailer producing company was likely, 
therefore, undertaken in order to make the medium viable for national advertisers – a change 
vital for the growth and stability of trailer production.  This targeting of national advertisers 
allowed for the integration of trailer advertising with the intensifying intermediality of ‘dealer 
helps.’  Across the advertising industry, an early theory of convergence was arising in which 
advertisers began to believe, or were encouraged to believe, that the most productive advertising 
was not to tailor the message to the medium, but to distribute a single recognizable advertisement 
through as many media as possible, providing pre-constructed, recognizable advertising, for 
dealer’s to circulate in their home towns.  By late 1917, Manhattan Slide and Film even turned 
the connection into a selling slogan, declaring that “Animated Trailer Films” were “The New 
Dealer’s Help,” pushing the novelty of the form in an attempt to maintain profitability in an 
economy where the slide appeared to be falling out of favor.
127
  As such, the new national focus 
– tied directly to space-brokering contracts – was driving the trailer industry. 
The trailer industry’s adoption of the ‘uniformity’ approach is directly traceable to the 
advent of the Advertising Film Producers’ Association in June of 1916.  Formed during a 
meeting of seven producers at the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World convention in 
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Philadelphia – with trailer company representatives elected to all four offices128 – the 
Association resulted in a homogeneity of sales rhetoric among trailer producers.  W.A. Harris, 
president of the Association and head of the Federal Development Company, became the 
spokesman for the entire industry, publishing multiple articles on the history and promise of 
trailer advertising.  In these articles, he asserted that, not only had production quality seen 
“marvelous” improvement through the association of producers, but the united front of trailer 
makers had resulted in positive streamlining of the business model.  For example, the AFPA 
claimed responsibility for making film “admissible through the United States mails,” allowing 
for the shipment of film “in three days by parcel post,” as opposed to the need for special transit 
arrangements.
129
  The exchange of information among multiple businesses allowed Harris 
additionally to make broad cost claims in print, as he could provide a general cost of trailer usage 
(seven dollars per film) and a range of costs for weekly screenings (a minimum of one dollar and 
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a maximum of five).
130
  The late-decade predominance of stock film production may also trace to 
this association, as trailer producers learned tricks of the trade from their competitors. 
The notion that advertising was not medium-specific but required a confluence of 
multiple media – the Association’s most important rhetorical move – arose in their first year.  
For the AFPA, the idea may have originated with the Scenic Film Company’s Carl B. Rowntree.  
In March of 1916, Rowntree, during a presentation at an ice makers’ convention, asked: “how 
much greater would be the results if your regular ads were also at the movies”?131  Rowntree was 
a prominent early member of the AFPA – acting as their secretary at their inception in June of 
1916, and carrying on in the post throughout their first year.  By the September 1916 publication 
of Advertising by Motion Pictures, Ernest Dench likewise asserted that no medium could go it 
alone; each had weaknesses which it needed the others to counter.
132
  While it is unclear whether 
Dench and Rowntree were in communication, were both responding to a wider ad industry shift, 
or had independently concocted the same notion of advertising as necessarily intermedial, the 
fact remains that the idea was growing, and AFPA members – unlike the reluctant print agencies 
– were about to adopt the concept as uniform rhetoric for the adoption of trailer advertising. 
By early 1917, the push to unite all advertising mediums into an array of united 
advertising was central to W.A. Harris’ public declarations about the value of trailer ads.  He 
declared that 
it has become necessary to take the advertisement as used in magazines and 
newspapers…and blend these advertisements into real action so that, when they 
are thrown on the screen of the moving picture shows of this country…[they] 
strengthen the general publicity campaign of the advertiser.
133
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Describing this as “a higher calling to the advertising film industry than ever was anticipated,” 
Harris went on to describe an example: the animation of the Dayton Spice Mills (Coffee) 
Company’s trademark of a pipe-smoking, fur hat-wearing Dutchman.  For Harris and the AFPA, 
one of the most important qualities of the trailer was that its running time was perfectly suited to 
rendering print advertisements and brand logos, such as the Dutchman, in motion, thereby 
integrating cinema into this widening sense of a complete campaign.
134
 
Further evidence for the Association as the source of the rhetorical move comes from the 
public statements of Chicago’s industrial film wunderkind Watterson Rothacker.  Although his 
company dabbled in trailer production – and he even claimed to have been the first company to 
make them
135
 – at this date his interests were in industrial films.  It does not seem to be 
coincidental that Rothacker, who became a member of the AFPA at some point during its first 
year, suddenly began to espouse copy-uniformity as well by the middle of 1917.  Indeed, his 
presentation at the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World convention was centered on the 
ways in which film advertising could cooperate with print: “[i]n order to successfully engineer a 
moving-picture advertising campaign it should be co-ordinated with the general advertising and 
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selling campaign.”136  Despite the fact that industrial films were significantly longer and required 
far less direct advertising than trailers, even Rothacker began to assert the theory of copy-unity. 
By the time of World War I, then, AFPA members were targeting national advertisers 
with the argument that a campaign without a film recapitulation was missing a central pillar.
137
  
In the wake of wartime advertising – so successful in spreading Creel Committee messages 
across multiple media – this early notion of intermedial advertising practice became industry 
maxim.  With the rise and rampant abuse of the ‘excess profits tax’ (a wartime tax which 
compelled goods manufacturers to spend money on advertising rather than lose it to taxes), 
media diversification became central to advertising industry practice. 
In the shift to reels of trailer-length films, circulated regularly to contracted theaters, and 
sometimes containing national advertising messages, the model had largely completed its 
development.  The years after the war (in this study, 1918 to the early 1922) witnessed little 
change to the form other than growth and stabilization, as exhibitors continued to decrease their 
use of slides.  Former slide manufacturers – like the Manhattan Slide and Film Company (in 
1917) and the Brite-Lite Film Advertising Company (in 1918), both from New York – joined the 
transition and began to offer animated trailers as a second line of business.
138
  Leaping into the 
fray, auto manufacturer Dodge shifted to the ‘minute movie’ model, also in 1921, producing 
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three cartoons which they rented to dealers at the rate of $15 for the three.
139
  In the years after 
the war, the trade presses for various industries clearly indicate the widening adoption of a 
relatively stable form. 
The point of debate after the war was not the viability of the trailer format, but the mode 
of trailer production most suited to advertising.  After inaugurating the form with a spectacular 
flourish, animation came under direct attack from producers of live action trailers, as they 
attempted to elevate trailer advertising to the level of sober, dignified discourse preferred by the 
mainstream advertising industry.  In an implicit echo of the J. Walter Thompson company’s 1903 
claim “[w]e don’t believe in funny advertising” as “the expenditure of money is entirely too 
serious…to be made the subject of a joke,”140 H.H. Dewey, of the Rothacker company declared 
that “[t]he animated cartoon…would get a laugh at the expense of dignity.”  Though he claimed 
that cartoon trailers, even “the better grades of them[,]…failed to place the [quality and beauty 
of] the merchant’s goods…upon the counter of the silver screen,” Dewey’s examples of his own 
work otherwise varied in no noticeable way from the work of others.  A short comedy about a 
girl turning down a suitor because her current boyfriend buys her ice-cream, and a nostalgic story 
about a husband and wife remaining in lifelong bliss through the aid of boxes of chocolates, can, 
at best, be said to be more ‘dignified’ than the work of others by stressing romance.141  While 
nothing really came of the critique – the dominant company of the 1920s was an animation 
house, the Alexander Film Company – such industry infighting indicates that the form itself was 
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no longer a bone of serious contention.  It had achieved a level of stable integration with 
exhibition culture.  
By the early 1920s, trailer advertising was common enough that the Alexander Film 
Company was reporting bewilderingly high commission rates for salesmen.  A “Mr. Morris” 
earned $23,757.54 in one year.
142
  (This would translate to a $275,000 salary in 2012.)  Two 
other employees, extrapolating from strong sales rates in brief windows (less than a year) of 
time, were earning ‘at the rate’ of $10,000 and $40,000 per year in 1920 and 1921 
respectively.
143
  W.A. Rice made $1,117.60 in June of 1924; Jack Woltz make $1,098.35 in his 
first 22 days.
144
  Generally promising commissions as high as 35%, Alexander was clearly 
turning a large profit even in its earliest years, and offered a profit-split to its salesmen which 
kept the best men interested in selling Alexander trailers.
145
  In fact, Alexander became so used 
to paying massive commissions to traveling salesmen that, by 1925, they began to manufacture 
and sell light aircraft to salesmen in order to reduce the costs of their frequent travel.
146
  The 
trailer was so stable throughout the 1920s as a form that Alexander had at least one client – a 
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“ladies’ and children’s shop in Green River, Wyo.” – which used Alexander trailer films 
unceasingly for eleven years (from 1923-1933).
147
 
The history of cinema advertising after 1920, then, is largely one of entrenchment of the 
trailer model – as product placement and industrials were comparatively minor in theatrical 
advertising until the 1982 ‘star turn’ of Reese’s Pieces in E.T.: The Extra Terrestrial.  By 1922, 
then, the commercial trailer was the predominant mode of cinematic advertising, but had – 
through a confluence of events – been relegated to a position reminiscent of very early magazine 
advertising.  For the cinema, the ‘magazine format,’ consisted of multiple small advertisements, 
created and placed by a space-broker, and restricted to an advertising section at either the 
beginning or the end of the content (depending on if one arrived early or left late, or both).  As 
such, the cinema had developed a spatially influenced structure in a temporal program, with the 
advertising placed in the only position where patrons could regularly ignore it: in a bookend after 
the completion of the program. 
 
Why Trailer Advertising? 
 As with all cinema advertising rhetoric, audience captivity and the ‘receptive mood’ 
undergird all arguments for the adoption of trailers.  However, arising as it did from early claims 
about the “defect” of slides (their lack of motion), trailer advertising proponents were forced to 
walk a middle line between passive and active audience rhetoric, as trailer makers wanted to 
stress both the ‘inherent’ nature of their product and the ‘inherent’ failings of their competitors.  
As the goal was profitability, of course, also prominent were the various ways in which trailer 
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usage could decrease advertising costs, or make appropriations more efficient.
148
  Detailed 
analyses of each of these broad argumentative motifs will be provided in turn in this section. 
 Clear references to the captivity of the audience, and the exclusivity of attention were, of 
course, always the starting point.  For most, this required little more than a regurgitation of the 
assertion that trailers, like all onscreen cinema advertising, were a “100% medium” – a claim 
made by W.A. Harris, Screen Advertising, Inc., and many others.
149
  The less complex 
arguments simply stressed a lack of anything else to view, often tied to exclusivity of advertising 
rights, as dual rationalizations for faith in ‘100%’ success.  In the words of the trade journal 
Clothier and Furnisher, “[c]an you imagine how more ideal conditions could possibly be devised 
than to assemble your audience in a darkened theatre, all waiting to see what’s next – and then 
flash your story on the screen before their eyes?”150  Proposals for the adoption of screen 
advertising almost uniformly described it in this way: one shot, right between the eyes.  
Additionally, if the standard screening contract included, as it did with slides, a guarantee that no 
competing products would be advertised during the same week, then a guarantee of audience 
attention to your product had a corresponding guarantee of inattention to your competitor’s 
product.
151
  This basic argument about screen attention prompted the Alexander Film Company 
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to describe trailers as the equivalent of buying “the whole front page” of a magazine – the same 
metaphor that the Lee Lash Company had used for lantern slides a decade earlier.
152
  As such, 
every argument for the adoption of trailer advertising included the familiar rhetorical claim that 
cinema patrons could not help but see your advertisement, exclusive not only of the surrounding 
environs but also the competitive market. 
 Unlike slides, however, which could only claim ‘captivation’ on the simplistic grounds 
that slides were lighted images in a darkened spaces, trailers were sold to advertisers, by 
producers and proponents, under the theory that onscreen motion was almost mesmeric, 
possessing an appeal unknown anywhere else.  Take, for example, the argument for animated 
trailers offered by the Scenic Film Company’s Irvin A. Burdette in 1916: 
Actions speak louder than words. […] Animated Films are 100% action.  The 
public is moved by Curiosity; all are wondering what the actions will develop into 
next.  The minds are receptive and accept your point of view through the ‘art of 
suggestion.’  Animated Ads are ‘Direct,’ ‘Main Point’ Evangels of Trade. […]  
Cartoon ads create a feeling of personal interest and confidence in you and your 
product which must exist between the Buying Public and Successful Sellers.  The 
same subconscious ‘Good Will’ which the public have in the players.153 
 
Burdette clearly presumes the superiority of the animated trailer because of the ‘magic’ of 
animation.  The fabricated motion links directly to suggestion, for Burdette, through an almost 
involuntary “Curiosity” – of “wondering what the actions will develop into next.”  The notion 
that all of this was somehow occurring “subconscious[ly]” clearly prefigures trailer proponent 
Francis T. Kimball’s 1921 assertion that cinema audiences were “absorbent.”154  AFPA President 
W.A. Harris likewise asserted that “action compels attention.”155  (Indeed, note that in all of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Industries Records (MSS 0056), Special Collections in the 1905 Carnegie Library, Pikes Peak Library District, 
Colorado Springs. 
152
 “Sales Manual,” p. 35, 62, Box 5, Alexander Industries Records (MSS 0056), Special Collections in the 1905 
Carnegie Library, Pikes Peak Library District, Colorado Springs. 
153
 Display Ad, The Atlanta Constitution 27 August 1916: E3. 
154
 Francis T. Kimball, “The Film Trailer and What It Will Do,” Moving Picture Age February 1921: 18. 
155
 [W.A. Harris], “Movie Film Becoming Big Car Sales Feature,” Motor World 17 January 1917: 65. 
195 
 
 
these phrasings, but especially that of Scenic, one can read a connotative slippage between 
cinematic ‘action’ and consumer ‘action’ – between a moving [in motion] picture and a moving 
[persuasive] one.)  The Alexander Film Company persisted in this argumentation over the course 
of the 1920s by asserting that human beings were predisposed to attend to motion out of self-
defense: variously using metaphors of predators in the bushes, snakes in boxes, and thieves 
throwing bricks through windows.
156
 
Even more compelling is Burdette’s notion that what animation was subconsciously 
providing was “Good Will.”  It seems that Burdette was referencing, here, the other side of the 
appeal coin posited by trailer proponents – not only did they produce quasi-involuntary attention, 
they also provided pleasure in an environment where pleasure was expected.  What little of the 
‘receptive mood’ was not attributed to viewer ‘captivation’ was credited – in a move which 
likely alienated trailer makers from mainstream admen – to the appeal of ‘fun.’  Trailer 
producers were caught in a rhetorical middle ground, critiquing a form (the lantern slide) via 
assertions that the audience was actively voicing its displeasure, while trying to retain the notion 
that the audience was happy and receptive.  The Rothacker Company’s 1920 claim about the 
undignified comic cartoon notwithstanding, trailer producers commonly asserted that pleasurable 
delivery went hand in hand with receptivity to an advertising message.  Indeed, a second Scenic 
Film Company self-advertisement proudly proclaimed that their animated trailers would work 
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“whether [the audience was] in a receptive mood or not”157 – expressing an almost gleeful 
disinterest in the entire theory of picture psychology on the grounds that it was true of animation 
in any case.  The predominance of comedy in trailer advertising was part of a concrete theory of 
audience receptivity, in which the stoic, critical viewer’s defenses were broken down with the 
pleasures of laughter.  Openly referencing the ‘hissing’ and irritation which could accompany the 
slide, trailer producers attempted to both integrate and abandon ‘active audiences,’ by asserting 
that the failure of slides had been rectified; slides were unpleasant, and trailers were fun. 
As such, perhaps the most common argument in trailer rhetoric was a sense that humor 
was the ultimate panacea.  The Dra-Ko Film Company declared that animated cartoon trailers 
were a form of advertising in which “[f]un predominates.”158  The Alexander Film Company 
offered trailers with “Punch and Ginger and usually humor.”159  Trade presses interested in the 
form repeatedly asserted that amusement was the way in which one kept the audience docile.
160
  
This attempt to promote fun as a counter to active audiences could result in descriptions 
uncomfortably close to outright manipulation; for example, Jonas Howard, in typical fashion, 
asserted that Rothacker Company photoplays were “snappy” and had “laugh and a punch,” but 
concluded that the style was “calculated to draw the unwary movie goer into a spending 
mood.”161  The power of ‘fun’ was even at times promoted by admen who had previously held 
the deeply entrenched position that humor and business were best kept separate.  Printers’ Ink’s 
unidentified ‘Little Schoolmaster’ was forced to declare, in early 1918, that his “poor opinion of 
the short, comic moving-picture” ad was incorrect, as “the right kind of a comic goes big, even 
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with very sedate business men.”162  By 1921, the ethos of pleasure was so ingrained in trailer 
theory that Francis T. Kimball described the typical trailer via the euphemism “screen sugar-
pill,” and included two entire paragraphs likening the pleasure of trailers to the sweet-taste that 
convinces children to take medicine.
163
  The pleasures of comedy, therefore, were central to 
arguments about the appeal of trailers which opted not to trade on theories of universal 
captivation. 
 By the end of the period under study, the two arguments – captivation and ‘screen sugar’ 
– had become a united front, as trailer advertisements, through the aid of humor, were described 
like an injection or photographing of information directly onto the brain.  The aforementioned 
Francis T. Kimball used both metaphors in the space of only two sentences, in 1921, asserting 
both that fun resulted in messages being “subtly and…irrevocably injected into the receptivity of 
little Willie Audience,” and that trailers resulted in “[t]he dealer’s advertisement get[ting]… 
‘fixed’ as surely in the mind of the spectator as it is in the emulsion of the film.”164  The 
Monache Theatre Company, Inc., in a 1923 testimonial letter on behalf of the Alexander Film 
Company called film advertising “a sort of photographic process registered permanently in the 
brain cells of the prospective customer.”165  Even when integrating the critique of slides 
(“hissing” for example) into their rhetoric, then, trailer advertisers persisted in describing cinema 
viewers’ minds as blank photographic plates which would register whatever message the 
advertiser could compel them to see. 
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 As the potential users of trailer advertising were businessmen, of course, many arguments 
were also made around the decidedly more down-to-earth notion of finances, and the ways in 
which trailer usage was monetarily sensible.  Oddly, it was rare to assert, through concrete data, 
that trailer advertising boosted sales.  Even vague claims of this nature have only arisen once in 
my research – an article on a particular Goodrich Tire ad included a smattering of dealers 
declaring that the trailer had “increased my sales at least ten percent” or resulted in the need to 
“put on another man” to handle the business boost.166  Again, plausibly indicating that trailer 
rhetoric was primarily focused on competition with slides, the bulk of financial argumentation in 
the early years was organized around assertions of cheapness, not added sales. 
 Often, in trade press descriptions, cost-efficiency was simply asserted.  Sometimes such 
assertions were vague – like Manhattan Slide and Film’s description of trailers being of 
“reasonable cost,” or the National Builders’ Bureau’s assertion that cost was “nominal.”167  
Other times direct dollar amounts were cited – such as Dench’s claim that trailers were $4 to $5, 
or Rothacker’s $12 price – along with a declaration that such a cost was ‘cheap enough for 
merchants.’168  Sometimes the same argument was attempted through an inversion.  Despite the 
500% (or more) increase in cost over slides, trailers were even described as cheaper than slides 
in some cases by asserting that one may be able to get theaters to run trailers for less than they’d 
charge for slides; as trailers were asserted to provide entertainment exhibitors, it was claimed, 
would gladly run them free, as they’d otherwise have to pay for such entertaining parts of the 
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program.
169
  Such attempts were clearly geared towards minimizing the difference between the 
cost of slide and trailer adoption. 
Towards the early 1920s, as the competition from slides became less pressing, financial 
arguments began to focus on print.  Detailed numerical claims attempted to show that the cost 
per prospect of trailer advertising was actually superior to magazine and newspaper advertising.  
Francis T. Kimball laid out a plain numerical comparison, confirming that 
the cost of one page in one issue is about three-tenths of a cent a possible 
prospect.  And the ‘possible’ is used advisedly, because it is far from certain that 
every individual in the total circulation is going to get the message.  
[…Meanwhile] the trailer costs the manufacturer about six-one-hundredths of a 
cent a prospect – and here the ‘possible’ is advisedly omitted, since in a motion 
picture theater there is but one attention focus!
170
 
 
Even if one removed the familiar ‘100% attention’ rhetoric Kimball used to heighten the 
comparison, the comparison of ‘circulation’ figures clearly gave motion pictures the edge.  In 
1921, the Alexander Film Company explicitly compared their yearly contracts to full page ads in 
magazines; while the latter cost $75 and only ran once, an advertiser could receive six months of 
bi-weekly service on theater screens for only slightly more ($86).
171
  By 1924, Alexander had 
adopted Kimball’s method and declared that film’s cost-per-prospect was “one-tenth to one-fifth 
of a cent” – much higher than Kimball’s figure, but still superior to the cost of print 
advertising.
172
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 Often, such financial argumentation was given additional weight through attacks on print 
as an outdated form of communication.  Anti-reading rhetoric was presaged in a late 1916 article 
on trailers in the Clothier and Furnisher, in which the following (probably apocryphal) 
conversation between advertising men was reported: 
Why does not advertising in the magazines bring the results it used to?”  Various 
answers were suggested…until finally one man summed it up in a way which left 
nothing further to be said.  This man’s explanation was in effect as follows: “In 
former times the whole family used to sit around the library table in the Winter 
time or out on the porch in the Summer and read magazines from cover to cover. 
[…] Nowadays, in all stations of life, it’s ‘Let’s go to the movies.’  I tell you we 
advertising men have got to go to the movies, too.  We’ve got to advertise where 
the people are!”173 
 
Fears that the birth of the film medium had resulted in a shift in the advertising values of old 
media were encouraged widely by film advertising producers.  In 1921, both the National 
Builders Bureau (“Break Away from Old-Time Methods”174) and Francis T. Kimball (“the 
majority…never read much of anything at all”175) voiced variants of the death knell of reading as 
a reason to transition at least a percentage of one’s advertising budget to trailer advertising.  As 
late as 1927, the Alexander Film Company was still asserting that print was inferior to film as the 
former required “the effort of reading” – described as an unreasonable requirement as “[t]he 
mind is naturally lazy.”176 
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 Not surprisingly, these arguments for the cost efficiency of trailers, in between 
disparagements of other mediums, also included positive assertions about the quality of the 
‘prospects’ in cinema audiences.  As mentioned above, Screen Advertising Inc., in an attempt to 
elevate the ad industry’s perception of the class reached by its trailer service (and downplay the 
fact that the larger urban palaces were still off-limits to advertisers), offered to its customers the 
ability to select the theaters from its already selective collection of ‘high class theaters’: which 
included “no nickel shows” and therefore reached only “the great middle class – the buying class 
– the class that is most responsive to good advertising.”177  Others asserted that film, with its 
broad audience base, reached the “representative families” of a community without any further 
selective effort on the part of the advertiser or the space-broker: among the typical cinema 
crowds were “a splendidly high percentage of just the people Mr. Dealer wants to be known to 
and patronized by.”178  The Alexander Film Company went even further.  Explicitly attacking 
notions that even a minor amount of the film audience was ‘waste circulation,’ Alexander, like 
slide makers before them, defended film as a means to reach the lower classes.  Attacking the 
typical American ad agency’s focus on the affluent, Alexander asserted that, even though a 
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person may be the type “that spend[s] nearly all they make,” that did not mean they wouldn’t 
“spend some with you” if enticed.179 
As such, trailer proponents did some remarkable rhetorical gymnastics, including anti-
cinema arguments only to minimize them as a problem solely for slides.  The passive audience 
did not naturally exist, but trailers could produce it.  Film was admittedly expensive, but was 
cheaper per prospect than any other form.  The cinema contained a large number of poor 
spectators, but cumulatively they were a lucrative market.  As such, the trailer proponent’s take 
on screen advertising seemed to agree with everything an advertiser had ever heard and yet 
produced a positive assertion of value despite the criticism.  In short, they made themselves seem 
forthright and honest – gracefully accepting critique and then turning it into an advantage. 
 
Why Not? 
 Unlike slides (chapter three) and offscreen technologies (chapter five), which were both 
directly and heavily criticized, one of the most problematic aspects inherent in researching the 
rhetoric surrounding advertising trailers is the nearly complete lack of direct critique in the 
historical record.  Indeed, as was implied above, the bulk of critical argumentation appeared in 
historical documents which ultimately supported trailers.  Comparatively speaking, there were 
very few overt declarations that an advertiser should not adopt trailers as a medium.  In fact, 
among my research data, it occurred only once: an extremely early (July 1915) tirade against 
cartoon trailers by a Chippewa Falls newspaperman whose advertising revenue was slipping.  
Admittedly, his two-fold argument was relatively compelling: first he criticized their emptiness 
of content, declaring animated letters to be an inconsequential “little frill”; second, and even 
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more damning, he argued that trailers would generally be seen at “night when your business is 
closed,” rendering memorability an overwhelming (and possibly unanswerable) concern.180  The 
latter was a deceptively powerful critique of developing notions of the importance of making an 
advertisement ‘sticky’ in a temporally fleeting medium.181  While print may have been an ‘opt 
in’ form of advertising, where the reader could choose whether or not to give his attention, it was 
also mobile and permanent.  Print was a possession, not an experience.  As print-centric agencies 
continued to dominate the industry, advertisers undoubtedly had (and were encouraged to have) 
doubts about the ‘fleeting impression’ given by a medium which the reader could not take 
home.
182
  Unfortunately, while such claims were likely repeated often in verbal exchanges and 
may have been a major factor in advertiser reluctance to use the form, they almost never reached 
the stage of published argument.  Anti-advertising film arguments in the trade press were so 
obsessed with industrial films and product placement that trailers barely received a word of 
direct condemnation.  Whether this lack of open discussion was intentional (snubbing of trailers 
by the film trades) or accidental (the focus of trade press reporters was elsewhere – the war, 
features, the post-war boom in industrials and non-theatrical screenings, etc.), the result, for the 
historical researcher, is the same: any attempt to lay out cultural opposition to trailer advertising 
must come from more general concerns over the ‘hijacking’ of the screen. 
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Much reticence regarding the use of trailer advertising was likely a holdover from 
exhibitor-centered arguments.  Regardless of whether or not exhibition culture openly admitted – 
via self-promotion and wartime advertising – that the screen was indeed an excellent means of 
reaching the public, the perception that exhibition culture remained hesitant about commercial 
intrusion into theaters would have kept a rein on advertiser excitement.  Remember that as early 
as 1909, Moving Picture World was already asserting that slide advertising “tend[ed] to lower 
the dignity of the moving picture theater.”183  This assertion remained prominent in film 
advertising discussions beyond slides.  The Motion Picture Patents Company went so far as to 
ban the circulation of advertising films in their theaters, on the grounds that their inclusion 
“would inevitably and rapidly degrade the business” by chasing away patrons.184  As late as 
1931, an advertiser with film experience still asserted “[t]he screen…is dedicated to the duty of 
entertaining those who pay their admission at the box office.  Therefore it can offer nothing but 
entertainment if it is to keep faith with the public.”185  Even when the exhibitor was not criticized 
for the ‘hijacking’ of the screen, per se, the notion of quantity could become a problem, as it had 
been with slides.  New Orleans film journalist George M. Cheney was scathing in his indictment 
of New Orleans theaters, in mid-1916, for simply transferring bad slide practices into the realm 
of animated advertising films.  Cheney asserted that “there are exhibitors who are running it into 
the ground as they did the still slides” by running such ads for “ten to twenty minutes” – the 
length of a full reel – and using films for consecutive days, rendering them repetitious and 
“exceedingly boresome to an audience used to a daily change.”186  The notion that screen 
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advertising, either by its nature or by excessive quantity, was an act of ‘bad faith’ clearly 
remained a primary factor in exhibitor thinking throughout the silent era, even in the realm of the 
tiny trailer advertisement. 
 However, one cannot forget that this critique was discordant.  At the very same time that 
exhibitors were told to steer clear of advertising, and often even in the very same breath, they 
were being told to make sure that advertising was paid.  Almost any critique included in 
implication that the ‘defenders of the public’ were for sale – that there was a price for their 
complicity.  In banning advertising films from its theaters, the Patents Company did not just call 
them degrading; they also asserted that exhibitors should have been earning royalties rather than 
paying for the films.
187
  Complaints about product placement criticized the practice largely on 
the grounds that “[i]t is not fair…to try to force the exhibitors to run advertising films free.”188  
As such, the rhetoric against exhibition was as much an argument for profit as it was against 
advertising, and it is understandable, therefore, that both exhibitors and advertisers would have 
held inconsistent and even confused views on the subject.  In such a milieu, trailers would have 
been the easiest form to ‘sell’; they were brief (like slides), openly offered to pay (unlike product 
placement), and yet provided motion (unlike slides) and even entertainment value (unlike most 
industrial films).  The trailer, then, was likely the least susceptible to struggle from entrenched 
exhibitor reluctance. 
  With such weak opposition, it may seem like a wonder that trailer advertising didn’t 
instantly lurch into ubiquity in all theaters nationwide.  Perhaps the single largest problem for 
trailers was not the content of such critiques but the response to them by trailer salesmen.  At 
least one company – the Alexander Film Company – recommended, in their training manual for 
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salesmen, a delicate response to criticism in which the salesman was never to disagree with a 
critique of the screen as a site.  Instead of disagreement, the salesman was to overwhelm the 
critique with a large number of unrelated positive claims.  See, for example, the following 
sample response: if the prospect says ‘onscreen ads make people angry,’ the salesman should 
respond “[t]hat is good evidence…that they see the ad, otherwise it would not make them 
mad.”189  While this massaging of the advertiser’s ego was likely a very successful approach to 
sales, it encouraged erroneous preconceptions about film advertising in the name of boosting 
Alexander’s bottom line.  In this particular exchange the salesman was to avoid the very 
persuasive rhetoric about the powers of both animation and comedy, and admit that onscreen 
advertising angered patrons.  (No advice was offered for the obvious follow up question: what 
keeps an angry audience from forming ‘ill will’ rather than ‘good will’ towards the product?190)  
In the same training manual, Alexander also encouraged salesmen to “stay as far away from 
advertising agencies as possible.”191  While there are numerous likely reasons for this 
encouragement, in the short run it closed the door to perhaps the greatest avenue for growth.  
Agencies were the most powerful pro-advertising community in the country; to win their favor, 
though it would have been difficult, could only have been an asset for the trailer industry at 
large.  
Alexander, then, not only held back from defending trailers, the company even implicitly 
attacked its own medium in the name of ascending to the top of the industry.  The limited 
critiques of the form in public discourse were, therefore, likely exacerbated by the sales behavior 
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of trailer makers. As such, the greatest strength of trailer rhetoric was also its greatest weakness.  
The ‘honesty’ of admitting to criticisms did not just defuse them, but kept the criticisms in the 
public consciousness; it kept discussion positive, but growth slow. 
 
Case Study - The Alexander Film Company and the ‘High Class’ Trailer 
 Opened for business by brothers J. Don and Don M. Alexander, in Spokane, Washington, 
in January 1919, the Alexander Film Company – which moved to Colorado for a “more 
geographically central location” in 1923192 – represents the culmination of the cinematic trailer 
advertisement.  Its growth between 1919 and 1923 was meteoric.
193
  According to internal 
figures, business increased roughly 1000% over these first five years.
194
  By 1923, the company 
was already circulating trailers regularly in forty-two states, and had approximately 150 
employees.
195
  By the end of the 1920s, they were circulating trailers to 2,400 theaters and were 
receiving over 60% of the trailer business in the United States.
196
  By the middle of the 20
th
 
century, Alexander’s circulation had swelled to include 16,000 theaters.197 
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Alexander was not just a dominant company, however.  It aided in the growth of the form 
by taking a leading role in the development of national standards in the trailer community – the 
very role the AFPA had hoped to serve in 1916.  By the end of the 1920s, the national reach of 
agency created radio advertising had thrown into sharp relief the major problem with cinema 
trailer circulation: there was no simple way to show a single trailer in all available theaters.  Such 
a screening plan would have required days of contractual negotiations with a multitude of trailer 
companies.  Alexander helped to restructure the trailer producing community to meet the 
demands of national advertisers.  In 1929, in negotiating a contract for national advertising with 
Chevrolet, Alexander was instrumental in creating the National Film Advertising Bureau: 
allowing simultaneous access to the space-brokering contracts of multiple companies.  The 
Bureau made it easy for national advertisers to place advertising, with one purchase, in over 
5000 theaters across the country – a uniformity of distribution which had been lacking in cinema 
advertising since the beginning.  As Alexander was by far the dominant partner (controlling over 
half the available theaters), this effectively opened up even non-Alexander theaters to Alexander 
service.
198
  By 1938, ad industry powerhouse the J. Walter Thompson Company singled out 
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Alexander’s “library service” of stock trailers as the paragon of the form.199  The work of the 
Alexander Film Company represents the perfection of the stock animated trailer. 
 In many ways, Alexander looked like any other trailer producer.  Their theory of cinema 
spectatorship invoked the common ‘captive audience’ and ‘receptive mood’ concepts, and 
described the effects of film advertising as both “a photographic process registered permanently 
in the brain cells” and, likened advertising to the chiseling of cavemen “carv[ing] creases in the 
memories of…prospects with pictures.”200  The form of Alexander trailers was also in-line with 
previous standards: running roughly one minute, stressing humor, with the final 25% of the 
running time devoted to the dealer name, which maintained interest through motion and font 
choice.
201
  Alexander, then, is indicative of the standards that had developed in the field before 
the company was born. 
 What stands out about Alexander is the ways in which they streamlined their product and 
their business model in order to achieve dominance both in local and national advertising.  
Alexander’s strengths were two-fold.  First, it provided extremely polished trailers, focusing 
more on subtle pleasurable effects than early animators’ focus on spectacularity.  Second, as a 
business, the company operated, simply and efficiently, almost everywhere in the country 
simultaneously, using complex information systems, modern transportation, and wide-ranging 
contracts to please both locally and nationally focused advertisers. 
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 At the risk of implying that business success is a meritocracy, any discussion of 
Alexander’s success must begin with a discussion of the polish which the company brought to its 
trailer work.  General high quality production elements are apparent, including filming in 
negative (in order to retain “half tones and fine details”) and repairing or retiring prints before 
damage became visible in projection.
202
  These choices indicate a company concerned with a 
high-class image – both for its clients and itself.  More important, however, was the company’s 
desire to stress leisure and pleasure even in the high-pressure style of direct advertising.  
Focusing on viewer pleasure as much as copy ‘punch,’ Alexander developed a more leisurely 
pace for the merchant’s ‘business card’ at the end of the trailer, a highly restricted notion of word 
use, fade transitions for consecutive advertisements, and a mood-based theory of color usage.  
Each idea was clearly laid out as business policy in the company’s November 1921 handbook for 
its traveling salesmen. 
 Their sense of written content was perhaps the most obvious difference between an 
Alexander ad and a trailer from another company.  While they followed the standard industry 
maxim of 3/4 of a foot per word as a reading pace, Alexander mandated fifteen feet for a ten 
word dealer strip, with an extra foot per word thereafter.  As the bulk of trailer producers allowed 
only ten feet for the dealer strip, Alexander was allowing for significantly more leisurely reading 
even at maximum word counts.
203
  The company went further, however.  By early 1925, Don M. 
Alexander penned an article for the company’s house organ, the Alexander Cooperator, in which 
he asserted that four words should be the target, as short copy was “dignified” and brevity was 
not only “the soul of wit…[but] the soul of advertising.”  Offering three examples (“Chesterfield 
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Cigarettes – They Satisfy”; “Ivory Soap – It Floats”; and Alexander’s own “J.B. Gilmore – The 
Jeweler”), Don M. asserted in the strongest possible terms that limited copy was the best copy in 
the medium of trailer advertising.
204
  Stress-free reading at a leisurely pace was, therefore, one of 
the primary ways in which the Alexander Film Company conceived of trailer advertising. 
 As the literal ‘trailer’ had, prior to 1919, given way to a reel of consecutively-screened 
‘trailer-length’ advertisements, Alexander also took pains (and running time) to keep transitions 
from jarring the spectator during the projection of the advertising reel.  As their contracted 
theaters would run “[f]rom 5 to 10” trailers in a row, Alexander made sure that the exhortations 
had room to breathe.  They not only used fade-ins and fade-outs to comfortably ease the 
spectators into and out of an advertisement, they added “a couple of seconds” of solid black 
footage in between, extending any given reel by ten to twenty seconds rather than fostering 
irritation through abrasive jumps from trailer to trailer. 
 Their use of color overtly combined this sense of viewer comfort with theories of 
impressionistic copy.  Declaring that green was a good color for a picnic “not only to show that 
the grass is green but to utilize the restful effect of green as a color,” Alexander was deeply 
concerned with the control of the spectator’s mood.  Simple color-wheel concepts – like red for 
excitement and blue for cold – were foundational for Alexander productions.  In addition, 
however, the company would use color tinting to polish and perfect the display of products.  In 
one telling example, sepia toning was proposed for bread advertising, as it would give the crust a 
pleasing and realistic brown color while leaving the loaf “a little more white and pure than any 
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loaf of bread could ever be.”205  As such, Alexander’s conception of not-irritating the spectator 
with an avalanche of words or a jarring transition, and their use of color for both pleasure and 
product-gloss, were all designed to create a subtle and overwhelming minute of advertising – an 
advertising environment in which every element of the trailer registered the dignity, comfort, and 
perfection of the product for sale, regardless of whether the copy was humorous or serious.
206
 
 The willingness of the Alexander Film Company to spare no expense to get the mood 
correct was apparent in their inauguration of weekly screen tests for new work.  Before any 
trailer would be shipped out for theatrical usage, it needed to receive a positive verdict from the 
“super-critical audience” of Alexander employees who would meet in the company screening 
room, every Wednesday, at the end of the working day.  If a positive response could not be 
attained through editing out or replacing elements of the footage, an entire film would be 
“throw[n]…in the junk pile.”207  Although the notion of a preview screening was not new in the 
film industry by this time – the Motion Picture Patents Company and the Mutual Film 
Corporation had experimented with it as early as 1909 and 1914 respectively
208
 – the existence 
of the practice at Alexander is another mark of the care which they took in sending out only that 
work of which they were quite proud. 
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 The consistently high-quality of production was designed to appeal to any potential 
client, no matter how large their advertising appropriation.  For Alexander, the goal was always 
to produce the highest quality trailers on the market.  This allowed the company to produce a 
form which was priced for local merchants and yet appealed to national advertisers.  Contracting 
with theater chains and national brands as often as possible, demanding six-month or one-year 
contracts in any case, maintaining detailed records for trailer circulation, and even pioneering the 
use of private aircraft for its sales force, Alexander created a business model which was 
amenable to both the largest and the smallest possible contracts, allowing for both windfall 
profits and the steady accumulation of small sales. 
 In contracting with theaters, the company allowed for the exhibitor’s own sense of worth 
to dictate the value of the space.  Although their generic sales pitch was to suggest that theaters 
“may average $100.00 or more per month” from screen advertising, significantly larger contracts 
were signed.  Two theaters in Billings, Montant (the Regent and the Strand) were charging $20 
per month per advertiser, in 1920, and were offering to carry between seven and ten ads at any 
one time.
209
  A ‘full’ contract at either theater could have resulted in twice the ‘average’ profit.  
In 1921, large west coast theaters were receiving “as much as $150 per month from each 
advertiser or about $20,000 per year for a full screen.”210  This represents a rate approximately 
fifteen times greater than the standard $100 per month offer.  While these theaters were certainly 
outliers – especially the west coast contract – they are indicative of the fact that Alexander, as a 
space broker, was willing and able to pay fantastically high rates for desirable theaters.  The goal 
was always to increase the available space, regardless of price variation.  California’s T&D 
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circuit, various state exhibitor associations, and even the Fox theaters across the Midwest all 
signed contracts for Alexander service at one point.
211
  For the most part, the theaters needed do 
no more than screen and return the reels and cash checks; Alexander would solicit all business, 
negotiate all contracts, and send the pre-constructed reels each week.  Aside from the potential 
continuation of audience disapproval, it is obvious why exhibitors would have appreciated the 
Alexander model; it was effectively an agreement to listen to a small number of patron 
complaints in exchange for $1000 or more per year. 
 Contracts with advertisers were equally open to negotiation.  In exchange for the 
guarantee of several months’ worth of income, Alexander gave their salesmen the right to haggle 
over the cost of service.  The sales manual only listed “Minimum Prices of Playlet Service” 
under which there would be no profit for the company; anything above the minimum was up to 
the skill of the salesman.
212
  For example, the minimum cost for a year of bi-weekly service was 
$10 per week with $20 for the dealer strip.
213
  However, an archived contract from 1923 
indicates that the salesman, while contracting service at the minimum rate of $10 per month, 
talked the advertiser into paying $50 for the dealer strip.
214
  The target for salesmen was, 
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therefore, not a dollar amount, but the signing of one contract per day at whatever rate they could 
achieve.
215
  (Perhaps this hazy pricing structure is the reason why Alexander discouraged its 
salesmen from dealing with advertising agencies; larger average profits were likely when each 
individual contract was negotiated with no knowledge of what others were paying for the same 
service.)  In their six-months or one-year contracts, merchants would select their preferred 
advertisements by looking through a catalog and choosing the numbered ads which appealed to 
them.  Alexander data tracking would double check that none of these trailers had screened in 
that particular town before, as the company had a standing rule that “the same animation [would] 
not appear twice in the same town.”216  The advertiser would also select whether they wanted a 
weekly or bi-weekly change, so that any given advertisement would not get stale.  In all other 
ways, Alexander operated like any trailer advertising company, offering exclusivity (no ads for 
competing products in the same program) and regular screening checkup. 
 Thus able to suck up as many dollars as local merchants were willing to pay to get on 
their local screens, Alexander provided itself with a business model which could turn a profit on 
an aggregate of extremely small contracts.  Large contracts, in contrast, would provide 
occasional massive boosts to the cash flow.  In 1920, for example, Alexander signed a contract to 
produce a custom series of thirteen films (the equivalent of six-months of bi-weekly service) for 
the National Builder’s Bureau.  Alexander contracted for 100 prints – which the National 
Builders Bureau was responsible for circulating to dealers – at a price of between three and four 
thousand dollars.  By January of 1921, 89 dealers had signed on, plausibly guaranteeing 
Alexander additional profit from the creation of dealer strips to match the 100 prints for each 
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trailer advertisement.
217
  While such national campaigns were undoubtedly a minority of 
Alexander’s product, they were actively sought. 
 The result of the business model was a bewilderingly large output.  While data does not 
exist for the years before 1924, and an average likely skews the number upwards in early years, 
Alexander produced 8,771 different trailer advertisements between 1924 and 1931 – an average 
of just over 90 per month.
218
  That is not the number of rentals – it represents only the number of 
newly produced playlets which could then start generating a profit through years of national 
circulation.  As such, Alexander’s business model was clearly resulting in massive cash flow.  
Substantial quantities of trailers were produced regularly over the course of a dozen years, and 
the company would remain in business deep into the television era. 
 Perhaps the most important element of Alexander’s business model – certainly the most 
intriguing – is the fact that, in 1925, they began manufacturing and selling airplanes to their 
salesmen.  As  “[b]ad roads and poor train schedules used up lots of time” in non-productive 
travel, in the early 20
th
 century, Alexander gambled that its best salesmen would leap at the 
chance to cheaply purchase an airplane to simultaneously expand their zone of influence while 
reducing the cost of travel to established areas.
219
  Selling what they named the ‘Eaglerock,’ a 
two-seat plane, for $2475 to salesmen (who were making roughly $10,000 per year in 
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commissions),
220
 provided Alexander with a second revenue stream and allowed them to profit 
further from the greater reach of their best salesmen.  Thirty salesmen had ordered planes before 
a single aircraft left the assembly line.
221
  Alexander’s already broad national reach expanded 
even further. 
In this assembly of a national distribution and sales system for a fundamentally local 
advertising medium, the Alexander Film Company became (and remained) the largest company 
in the field.  Using economies of scale to simultaneously increase quality and minimize costs, 
Alexander perfected the stock trailer, opened itself up to income from custom trailers, and 
maintained strong working relationships with all involved parties: from small town toy stores to 
major goods manufacturers; from mom-and-pop theaters in small Midwestern towns, to multi-
state chains in the densely populated coasts.  The Alexander Film Company nationalized the 
stable but stagnant trailer industry, and dominated output for the next several decades. 
 
Conclusion 
 The introduction and standardization of trailer advertising, over the latter half of the 
1910s, is emblematic of the rapidly codifying theory of advertising in moving media.  The form 
was a specifically cinematic one in its aesthetics and tone, as pleasurable and humorous content 
was used to create direct advertising without overtly rational argumentation.  Tied to the national 
shift away from ‘reason why’ advertising and towards modern electric hyperactivity, trailer ads 
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were emotional more often than cerebral, mobile rather than stable, and so pleasing as to be a 
form of entertainment in themselves.  As such, the sense that advertising must not only occur 
onscreen, but be made as a motion picture, normalized, as the notion of the passive audience (or 
pacified audience, as animation proponents would have it) led advertisers to obsess over 
onscreen placement of advertising, to the exclusion of the rest of the venue.  A ‘captive 
audience’ receiving pleasurable commercial stimulation led to the perfection of the slide in the 
trailer form.  As an industry grew around this form of production, it developed cost effective 
methods for producing spectacularly brief and kinetic images of dancing products and jumbling 
copy, producing the model for broadcasting and the online video spot of the future. 
 However, the nearly simultaneous increase in film length, and the corresponding decrease 
in ‘gaps’ in the program, forced this impressive form into a minor role at the intermission 
between turns of the program.  Cultural discomfort with integrating advertising into the first 
‘temporal’ entertainment medium, pushed the advertising into the closest approximation possible 
of print advertising’s ‘spatial’ organization: the pre-/post-program buffer zone.  As such, the 
commercial ‘spot’ – effectively a form of ‘participating sponsorship’ funding local exhibitors 
rather than national entertainment producers – was born and streamlined predominantly in 
motion picture theaters of the latter half of the 1910s.  In their eventual onscreen but marginal 
position (in the intermission), the cinema ‘playlet’ helped to define the motion picture experience 
– including the establishment of a time-based entry model, and reifying the idea that 
commercialism was an outsider to the cinema, to be inserted only in clearly labeled and 
unobtrusive areas.  Early experiments in commercial broadcasting kept this ‘playlet’ form at the 
margins for decades.  With early broadcasting’s focus on the big network programs, and 
broadcast historians’ traditional (and justifiable) focus on the same, the long but marginal history 
219 
 
 
of the pre-broadcasting ‘spot’ has remained on the sidelines.222  By the time the ‘minute movie’ 
attained a place of prominence in 1950s television, its origin in the cinema went largely 
unremarked.
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CHAPTER 5.  WATCH THIS SPACE: PERIPHERAL ADVERTISING THROUGH 
TECHNOLOGIES 
 
You Must Invest Thousands to Make the Front of the Chair a Profit 
Producer; You Need Invest a Few Hundred to Make the Back of the 
Chair Bring you in as Great, if Not Greater Profits. 
- Inter-state Vending Company (1914)
1
 
 
 
 In August of 1915, regular Moving Picture World columnist Epes Winthrop Sargent – 
resident expert on publicity for exhibitors – felt moved to disagree with a letter from an exhibitor 
defending the practice of onscreen advertising.  Sargent’s response was largely identical in 
theory to the bulk of published opposition to screen advertising – citing the difference between 
the optionality of most advertising and that which is forced upon the patron through inclusion on 
the cinema screen.  His choice of counter example, however, was unique and raises the specter of 
an obvious alternative to onscreen advertising which has, as yet, gone unmentioned in the body 
of this study.  Opting to compare the cinema not to magazines but to the stage theater, Sargent 
declared that 
[t]he screen advertisement is not the same as the advertisement on the wall.  It is 
thrust upon the patron.  He must read it whether he wishes to or not. […] He 
comes in to see pictures and not the advertisement of Smith’s skin cure or Jones’ 
grape juice.  He resents being compelled to read the stuff and he resents the 
interruption to the performance. […] A manager, if he wishes, may plaster his 
walls with advertisements and fill up his program with them until it becomes 
valueless to himself or anyone else, but the screen is his stage.  He should not 
permit the advertising slide any more than a dramatic theater should permit a 
sandwich man to walk on and spoil the realism of a performance.
2
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For Sargent to compare the advertising slide to a sandwich board on a theater stage is in and of 
itself interesting for multiple reasons – not least of which is the conundrum of whether this 
would be ‘compulsory’ or more like product placement, and why exactly sandwich men 
advertising real world products did not qualify, in Sargent’s mind, as ‘realism.’  More important 
for the present discussion, however, is his telling revelation of the specific spatial relations of the 
theater.  The screen was, indeed, not the same as the wall…but they did reach the same crowd. 
 Sargent’s response, though it gives no space to actual examples of such practices, is an 
indicator of the fault lines in consumer goods advertising in silent era theaters.  Debate over the 
ways and means of in-cinema consumer goods advertising did not restrict themselves to the 
screen.  As such, the slide crisis of roughly 1913 (see chapter three) added impetus to not one but 
two forms of counter-theorizing.  The more common response to slides was that they irritated the 
audience by being disjunctive, resulting in the invention of the consumer goods trailer to 
approximate a ‘moving’ slide (see chapter four).   A minority of advertising proponents and 
exhibitors, however, stressed not the lack of motion in slides, but their unavoidable hijacking of 
the screen.  In order to retain the profit from sales of advertising, but move advertising slides off 
the screen, a proliferation of technology patents appeared, designed to create alternative 
advertising sites somewhere within the cinema venue. 
Abandoning the ‘psychic infection’ theory of cinema spectatorship altogether (see 
chapter two), peripheral advertising proponents reconceived the theater as a site of active 
audiences.  This contingent of advertising thinkers was operating in line with previous, venue 
based types of advertising (like billposting and magazines), in which the advertisements were 
included alongside the entertainment, to be perused or ignored at the viewer’s discretion.  These 
advertising proponents argued for a stress on optionality rather than temporality – using the 
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cinema’s status as not just medium but venue – as a way around the problem of irritation from 
compulsory attention.  In theatrical performance, this mode of advertising was not without 
precedent.  Although advertising on the drop curtain between the acts was the most common 
form of stage advertising, border drapes often included advertising signs as well, visible 
throughout the performance.
3
  Even in motion picture venues, the idea had a track record.  
Airdomes – open air ‘theaters’ designed to provide a less stifling experience in summers, in 
which a vacant lot with a screen at one end was enclosed with a fence – were often funded 
through the selling of space on the fences, both outside and inside the ‘theater,’ for advertising 
purposes.
4
  Even the printing of advertising matter on handbills could be seen as a precursor of 
this peripheral advertising practice, in which optional viewing theoretically defused audience 
irritation. 
Acting on the notion that advertising worked best when it was “visible at all times 
without interfering in the least with the…motion picture,”5 cinema oriented tinkerers devised a 
mass of offscreen technologies designed, between 1912 and 1927, to include advertising 
somewhere other than the main screen of a movie theater.  Designed specifically to blend into 
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modern American cinema spaces, the bulk of patents were created with electricity and drew the 
eye towards lighted objects in a darkened space.  Much like William Leach’s description of the 
rise of modern department store displays featuring glass, light, and spectacle to link consumption 
and the technological future,
6
 theater tech was a flashy window onto a world of consumption, 
bringing consumer-goods into the theater much as display windows brought them onto the 
streets.  These concepts ranged from stacks of glowing advertisements flanking the screen, to 
seat back advertising, to complex advertising clocks.
7
 
 As this chapter synthesizes the similarities between disparate ‘media,’ it will be 
structured somewhat differently from previous chapters.  There will be no clear historical 
progression section, as there is none to be told; many of these technologies were, at best, adopted 
sporadically, and as such there is little evidence for a coherent developmental pattern for an 
‘offscreen advertising’ industry.  Instead, the primary material will be separated into three blocs 
– ‘frame’ technologies, ‘public service’ technologies, and advertising clocks (a line-crossing 
technology blending frame and public service elements).  Each block will contain its own 
rhetorical analysis, leading into a synthesizing analysis at the end of the chapter. 
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Rethinking the Theater and Its Relationship to Advertising 
 By the mid-1910s, though filmed advertising was still developing, the positives and 
negatives of lantern slide advertising seemed relatively clear to most film men.  They provided a 
small amount of income which could be inflated further by trading in monopoly contracts and 
keeping the total number of ads small, but they annoyed patrons and, if inserted into the program 
in larger quantities, cut the amount of time that could be devoted to running films.  From the 
advertisers’ perspective, onscreen advertising was also problematically impermanent – or, as it 
would be termed in later critiques of radio, ‘fleeting’8 – and required extremely memorable copy 
in order to make a lasting impression in the few seconds that the audience could see it.  For those 
exhibitors who did not mind the intrusion of advertising into their theater, but wanted to avoid 
the issues of impermanence and irritation that came with placement onscreen, several inventors 
concocted technologies which allowed an entire collection of advertisements to crowd around the 
theater without landing on the screen itself.  Allowing for most slide conditions to persist – 
roughly a dozen ads, contracted space, ease and cheapness of replacement – but moving the ads 
off of the screen was a possibility requiring only a reevaluation of the motion picture theater as a 
venue. 
 In this light, the theater was reconsidered not as a single ‘window’ through which one 
viewed an unceasing flow of images, but as a venue capable of a multiplicity of entertainments 
and distractions.  As such, the theater, for these men, was more like travel down a busy street or 
like a precursor of broadcasting’s multiple channels.  Road travel, either on foot or by car, was 
coming more and more to be defined by an atmosphere of multiplicity.  Billboards were 
springing up with greater and greater frequency as distractions breaking into a journey to which 
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they were otherwise unrelated.  In the commercial districts, more and more eye catching window 
displays disrupted a stroll down the sidewalk in an attempt to draw attention away from the 
perceived goal of the walker.  Reconceiving the cinema experience as a metaphor for travel, the 
advertising literally became theatrical billboards – marginalia littering the environment in an 
attempt to turn one’s thoughts from the goal to a sales pitch. 
 
Frames 
The simplest means of retaining all cinema advertising theory and practice, but 
repackaging it as a form of ‘billboard,’ was a concept which I would term the advertising 
‘frame’: a collection of inventions which shared a single goal – the creation of an array of lighted 
advertising signs placed around the central film image.  The concept of the frame arose, like all 
of these technologies, as a direct response to the slide crisis and the audience’s growing desire to 
get slides off the screen.  Indeed, in the middle of 1912, as the slide industry was suffering 
through the low ebb of its public image, the operator of the New Isis Theater in Denver first 
proposed the frame concept.  The man, unnamed in the publication of his letter, declared his 
desire to use a slide projector – presumably showing a single slide with a large blank space in the 
middle for the motion picture – to create “a border around the picture, announcing the big 
features.”  While he was proposing ‘coming attractions’ content rather than consumer goods 
advertising, this Denver man produced the first clear historical example of the concept of 
framing the film screen with advertising matter.  The response by Moving Picture World 
exhibition specialist F.H. Richardson was, in keeping with his loathing of all forms of in-cinema 
advertising, “I do not believe I would like that very well.”9  This ‘call and response’ between a 
technologically inflected advertising concept and Richardson’s dislike of ‘distracting’ 
                                                          
9
 F.H. Richardson, “Projection Department: From Denver,” Moving Picture World 13.4 (27 July 1912): 348. 
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advertising matter in the vicinity of the screen, would be the hallmark of frame technology 
throughout the 1910s, as new technologies were patented, built and used…and irritated 
Richardson to no end whenever he encountered them. 
 At least four versions of the frame concept were filed for patent in the United States 
between 1915 and 1920, although it is probable that many other versions were sold and installed 
without patent protection.  New Yorker Frank C. Thomas was, to my knowledge, first on the 
scene with a patented design specifically for this purpose, filing his ‘light diffusing’ array for 
patent in 1915 – a patent which he then “assigned” to the United Exhibitors’ Advertising 
Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware, for production and sale.  Diffusion of light is 
technological shorthand for completely shielding a light source from view and reflecting it back 
into the room off of a surface, resulting in a ‘softer’ form of light.  Thomas used the notion of 
diffusion to create what he considered to be unobtrusive advertising, as it provided “a sufficient 
but not a brilliant” lighting of advertising signs to make them visible without making them a 
distraction.  He suggested, in his patent, the placement of a stack of light diffusers on each side 
of the screen which would produce two towers, with a quantity of slots “adjusted to the needs of 
the advertisers” interested in the theater – in the patent, the presumed standard number of slots 
was eight per side.
10
 
 Harry Verran and Alfred R. Groetz, of Minneapolis, patented a concept effectively 
identical to Thomas’ in 1919, with the same strengths and weaknesses.  Using light box 
technology rather than diffusion – in which a light bulb was placed directly behind a sign, with 
the light passing through cut out letters – Verran and Groetz attempted to streamline the 
                                                          
10
 Frank C. Thomas, “Display Apparatus,” U.S. Patent 1,252,629, filed 1 November 1915, and issued 8 January 
1918.  Filed again, with better technical descriptions, as: Frank C. Thomas, “Method of Combining Advertising with 
Amusement or Instruction,” U.S. Patent 1,200,399, filed 15 June 1916, and issued 3 October 1916.  In deference to 
the first patent as both foundational and less ‘techy’ in its mode of address, I draw all quotes and descriptions from 
it; however, all ideas are restated, though often rewritten, in the latter patent. 
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rhetorical appeal of the concept by directly linking it to the slide model of advertising.  They 
adopted the term ‘slide’ for their own light box slots, on the grounds that these too were ad 
images held between two plates of glass.  Though Verran & Groetz proposed ten slots per side of 
the screen as their standard size, inexplicably calling this size ‘preferabl[e],’ their system, like 
Thomas’, also allowed for variation to meet the needs of a given theater.  Although the cost of 
materials would have been greater, in all important respects the design of Verran & Groetz 
differed in no way from Thomas’.  It was a cheap (the advertiser could simply “cut [letters] out 
of a sheet of opaque paper”) means to retain advertising while moving it off the screen.11 
 Silent era director T. Hayes Hunter – working in Hollywood by the date of his invention 
– filed for patent a third variation on the theme.  In Hunter’s patent, which was geared 
(predictably) towards production companies rather than exhibitors, he proposed a new means of 
printing films which would mask part of the image and create a space for advertising on the 
edges of the screen.  Designed to produce a permanent iris, Hunter’s concept was to print the 
film with an oval mask which would have kept the four corners of the negative from registering 
on the positive print.  Running the film through the printer a second time, one could then append 
“a still picture or scene in the border or corner of the motion picture, which w[ould] persist 
unchanged in the vision of the spectators…without breaking into the thread of the drama,” as in 
product placement or in unrelated advertising slides between the reels.  The result would have 
been an oval shaped entertainment film with from one to four advertising messages perpetually 
hanging from the corners.  Hunter effectively created the earliest version of what we now know 
as the television advertising ‘bug’ (with his direct mention of “still picture[s]” implying that 
                                                          
11
 Harry Verran and Alfred R. Groetz, “Advertising Device,” U.S. Patent 1,321,863, filed 10 March 1919, and 
issued 18 November 1919.  The only practical difference between this proposal and Thomas’, that I can detect, was 
that the bulb – given adoption of the ‘cut out letters’ model – would have been incompletely shielded from view.  It 
stands to reason that Verran & Groetz’s tech would have irritated viewers slightly more than Thomas’ as the light 
would shine directly into the eyes of many viewers. 
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moving corner ads were a plausible variant).  Hunter had the much broader intention of not only 
replacing slides as an advertising medium, but also amplifying the quality of sponsorship 
advertising (by producing “a much more lasting impression” than a brief opening title 
announcement), and improving product placement (by removing the need for direct connection 
to the narrative).
12
  Its problems were two fold, however.  Firstly, it was a producer oriented 
technique; as film prints circulated to multiple theaters, it was the producer, not the exhibitor, 
who would have been signing advertising contracts and (presumably) retaining the dollars.  
Hunter’s technique, therefore, did nothing to defuse exhibitor hostility toward advertising on 
their screens for which they were not being paid.  Secondly, the advertisements were permanent; 
once an ad was printed into the corners of the film, that print could never be changed.  As such, it 
was likely a much more expensive form of advertising, as the national advertiser would have 
either had to pay for each individual screening of a print, or simply buy the copy outright.  In 
each case, the popularity of the film (as yet unknown and difficult to estimate in advance) would 
have become a major factor in advertiser interest.  Hunter’s concept was, therefore, probably 
unworkable for traditional Hollywood releases, and was unlikely to have been adopted by film 
production companies for use with entertainment films.  However, had the American film 
industry been less hostile to advertising, popular older films could have been re-released with 
significant advertiser funding (as a form of sponsorship) – allowing them to circulate cheaply to 
low-end theaters for a break in ticket price, or to free-admission venues.  In either case, the mode 
was a frame technology, with “the advertising matter…[not] covering any portion of the film 
necessary to show the action of the story.” 
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 T. Hayes Hunter, “Advertising Film and Method of Producing the Same,” U.S. Patent 1,426,567, filed 6 
November 1919, and issued 22 August 1922. 
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 Evansville, Indiana’s Henry Miedreich patented a projector based concept in 1920, which 
evaded many of the problems of the Hunter patent.  In Miedreich’s patent, the ad boxes would 
have been created by an independent device, allowing them to be altered at will, and allowing the 
exhibitor to draw the revenue.  Miedreich’s invention was, effectively, a modified magic lantern 
– designed to project the image of eighteen to twenty ads simultaneously (the two drawings in 
the patent were not made in the same scale).  In the center was a gap for the film to unspool 
unmolested – like the proposed frame from the operator in Denver discussed above.  When in 
operation, Miedreich’s stereopticon would have had an appearance between Hunter’s iris and 
Thomas’ diffusers.  The film would be crowded by advertisements sharing the screen, but the ads 
would have been unrelated squares, rather than an oval shadow obscuring part of the frame.
13
  
Like Verran & Groetz, Miedreich directly played to slide advertisers, using ‘slide’ as the term for 
each individual ad in his projector.  However, his technology was also the most problematic.  
Advertisers would have needed a different copy style for slides projected at a smaller size, and 
audiences would have had to deal with the potential problems caused by the overlapping of two 
beams of light in roughly the same space. 
The patents – the only real source of pro-frame rhetoric available – put forth a compelling 
argument for the use of wall space as a way to preserve association with the screen without 
forcing a pause in the entertainment.  The most boisterous advocate was Frank C. Thomas; this is 
not entirely surprising, as he was the inventor the first technology known to be placed on the 
market for sale, and the originator of a concept is always faced with a higher level of inherent 
doubt than his imitators.  Thomas asserted that onscreen advertising was a natural irritant which 
would cause “[a]ttendance…to fall off rapidly…[so that] the pecuniary return for the advertising 
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 Henry A. Miedreich, “Advertising Stereopticon,” U.S. Patent 1,362,274, filed 15 April 1920, and issued 7 
December 1920. 
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d[id] not compensate for lost patrons,” Thomas asserted that his invention was the solution to 
this “most complicated” problem.  In attempting to pull advertising dollars away from the 
faltering slide industry, Thomas was bald faced about his invention’s appeal to advertisers more 
than spectators, as he asserted that the goal of the technology was that “the display of advertising 
[would be] so associated with the main screen that…the illuminated display [could not] fail to 
attract the eye” at some point during the show.14  The technology allowed for the placement of 
sixteen or so contracted advertisements (conspicuously an ‘improvement’ to the typical number 
of lantern slide ads: twelve per program), while simultaneously bowing to the desires of the 
audience not to be “tricked into reading advertising matter when expecting other things.”  
Inventing a site which was used exclusively for advertising, yet was still very near the focal point 
of attention, allowed Thomas to seemingly have the strengths of all concepts: (almost) certain 
attention, perpetual visibility, and a supposed absence of ‘trickery.’  Verran & Groetz, two years 
after Thomas, made nearly identical claims about onscreen compulsion versus marginality, and 
the value of permanent visibility, asserting that the value of the device was the ability avoid “the 
unfavorable impression…produced by having the advertisements forced upon them to the 
exclusion of the pictures.”  They likewise asserted that the audience could thus attend to the 
advertising at a time of their choosing, whether it be during a reel change, after they had seen the 
entire program, while taking a pause to relieve eye ‘fatigue,’ or even at a moment when a 
“particular portion of the picture exhibition does not prove of interest.”15  Miedreich also 
suggested that his technology allowed the advertising to occur “without interfering in the least 
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 Frank C. Thomas, “Display Apparatus,” U.S. Patent 1,252,629, filed 1 November 1915, and issued 8 January 
1918. 
15
 Harry Verran and Alfred R. Groetz, “Advertising Device,” U.S. Patent 1,321,863, filed 10 March 1919, and 
issued 18 November 1919. 
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with the moving picture.”16  Though Hunter’s phrasing has few parallels, his obsession with 
permanence as an avenue to ‘subconscious’ impact differs little from the rhetoric of permanent 
visibility expounded by others.
17
  In short, the bulk of these inventors implied that a bad film was 
like an onscreen advertisement: a compulsory experience to be assiduously avoided.  Openly 
engaging in a parasitical relationship, the inventors offered a means to prey on moments of 
frustration, boredom, and eye strain through the offer of alternative material. 
 In short, there is an admission, across the patents, of both the strengths and weaknesses of 
cinema theater advertising: it was desirable enough as a medium that exhibitors were being 
encouraged to see major expenses and changes to their venue layout as plausible ways to retain 
it; however the audience was reluctant enough to the notion of temporal force (showing nothing 
but an ad at a given point in the program) that pulling the ads out of the flow of the program was 
also seen as central to advertising’s cinematic future.  Frank C. Thomas openly declared that the 
integration of a commercial marketing message into a stream of entertainment required such a 
jarring change of mindset that it would “caus[e] one naturally to resent the drawing of one’s 
attention so abruptly to advertising matter.”  For Thomas, resentment was practically 
biological.
18
  There was also a nearly unanimous interest in cheapness of production, implying 
that advertisers needed to be lured to in-cinema experimentation by a comparatively low cost per 
thousand. 
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 Henry A. Miedreich, “Advertising Stereopticon,” U.S. Patent 1,362,274, filed 15 April 1920, and issued 7 
December 1920. 
17
 T. Hayes Hunter, “Advertising Film and Method of Producing the Same,” U.S. Patent 1,426,567, filed 6 
November 1919, and issued 22 August 1922. 
18
 Compare this to Hugo Münsterberg’s nearly simultaneous public comments about the interleaving advertising 
with magazine content.  For Münsterberg, entertainment and advertising required two different mental states, and 
the mixing of the two thus created a “feeling of irritation.”  Therefore, integrating advertising onto pages with 
content did a disservice to both the advertiser and the reader.  Hugo Münsterberg, “Social Sins in Advertising,” 
Psychology and Social Sanity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1914), 243-244. 
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 Regardless of the success of any given application of the concept, it is clear that the idea 
was persuasive for at least a brief time, as variants of the frame model became quite common in 
some locations between 1915 and 1917.  As this timeframe corresponds to the years when self-
advertising, philanthropy, and war were combining to push slide and trailer advertising into the 
margins of the program, it is possible that the frame concept was less a response to the slide 
crisis, that to the problem of continuing to integrate, and profit from advertising after the 
encroachment of film studios and politics on the intermissions.  (Indeed, it is telling that T. 
Hayes Hunter used “Buy War Saving Stamps” as the sample image in his patent, directly 
connecting his studio-oriented technology to the patriotic advertising which the industry had 
recently been pushing.
19
)  Whatever the reasons, the Moving Picture World uncovered multiple 
uses of advertising signage near the screen in 1917.  Indeed, no less a person than ‘Roxy’ 
Rothapfel even proposed, in 1916, that exhibitors deal with spectator irritation at onscreen 
advertising by “establishing a regular billboard” around the screen.20 
 However, the bulk of the information comes from F.H. Richardson – the World’s expert 
on projection – who was sent on a tour of American cinemas in 1917…and who manifestly 
despised the practice.  Richardson, without fail, asserted or implied that positioning of lighted 
advertising matter near the screen was tactless and distracting.  In an April 1917 issue of the 
Moving Picture World, he heavily criticized Nashville’s Strand theater for placing alongside the 
screen “an advertising announcement board with…five or six lines of letters in white lights” 
(along with a clock and two exit signs, both also lit).  The habitually cranky author called the 
scene damaging to the eyes and “distracting immensely.”21  The very next week, he found the 
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 T. Hayes Hunter, “Advertising Film and Method of Producing the Same,” U.S. Patent 1,426,567, filed 6 
November 1919, and issued 22 August 1922. 
20
 S.L. Rothapfel, “First Aid to Theater Men,” Motography 16.2 (8 July 1916): 77-78. 
21
 “Richardson Lets Out a Link,” Moving Picture World 21 April 1917: 415. 
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same problem at Pearce’s Tudor theater in New Orleans, which also had “an announcement 
board containing…six lines of illuminated white letters.”  Noting also the presence of a lighted 
clock (with advertising), and six other inexplicable red lights, he walked out of the theater 
complaining of their attempt to “murder the picture.”22  In July, he discovered that “most of the 
houses” in Topeka, Kansas were running an advertising stereopticon (magic lantern) “[b]eside 
the screen,” rotating the slide every thirty seconds.  An extraordinarily simplistic version of the 
frame concept, Richardson called it “very, very bad…from the projection point of view.”23  Later 
that month, he mentioned the “‘shadow box’ of light colored advertising cards” surrounding the 
screen at the Orpheum in Centerville, Iowa.  Although he offered no direct condemnation, it is 
very clear, from his subsequent description of the Majestic as a “fine little house,” that he 
disapproved of the Orpheum’s practice.24  By early 1918, the ‘frame’ at the Crystal Theater in 
Chicago – in which “several bright lettered illuminated signs advertis[ed] future programs…on 
the wall not far from the screen” – received a simple condemnation as “not good practice,” 
despite the lack of any obvious light leakage.
25
  By this point, Richardson was so fed up with the 
concept that its very existence was deemed a problem in need of correction.  Richardson, though 
accepting of variations in practice from house to house, was not willing to give an inch to 
advertising that had even a highly circumscribed impact on the projection of the program.  If it 
impacted the viewing of the film in any way, it was a poor practice.  With one of the foremost 
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 “Richardson Going Strong,” Moving Picture World 28 April 1917: 596-597.  The parallel descriptions and 
geographical nearness of these two examples leads me to believe that the advertising board described is the 
previously unknown product of a fifth inventor / company in the ‘frame advertising’ field.  The description would 
largely fit the Verran & Groetz tech (not filed for patent until 1919), but the date and the description of it as an 
‘announcement board’ appear incorrect. 
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 [F.H. Richardson], “Richardson Riding Eastward,” Moving Picture World 33.2 (14 July 1917): 246. 
24 [F.H. Richardson], “Richardson Reaches Old Home Town,” Moving Picture World 33.4 (28 July 1917): 650. 
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 [F.H. Richardson], “Richardson Visits Chicago and St. Louis,” Moving Picture World 36.8 (25 May 1918): 1147. 
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projection experts in the country vehemently critiquing the practice, it is no wonder that even 
lower-end theaters abandoned the practice before long.
26
 
 Despite the number of examples Richardson discovered on his tour, the dearth of any 
national advertising of technologies like this in the trade presses implies that adoption was never 
great.  The failure of the technology to catch on can be explained in a number of ways.  First and 
foremost was the opposition of Richardson.  Both technological failures leading to light 
pollution, and the threat of annoying one’s audience with the distraction, were likely to keep 
many exhibitors from taking the plunge (especially in the wake of Richardson’s perpetual public 
condemnation of the practice).  A further issue was apparent, however: for exhibitors, there was 
an inherent cost barrier.  All of the technologies would have required a significant start-up cost 
for use despite the dearth of any positive testimonials.  While any company selling such a device 
may have had testimonials which they shared in private, there were no publically known 
examples of the concept working as promised.  Indeed, only ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel spoke publically 
of the concept without complete derision.  Though the wording of Frank C. Thomas’ second 
patent implied that he had personally operated a theater in which this technology had given 
favorable results,
27
 it seems unlikely that many theaters would want to go to all the installation 
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 Two moments of advertising on the walls (farther from the main screen than was generally deemed necessary) did 
occur in at least two theaters.  In 1915, a theater called the Empire (city unknown, but it was “on Bank Street”) put 
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the pictures stopped: “[t]he flashing into sight will attract attention where the constantly lighted sign soon becomes a 
part of the surroundings.” In neither case was a frame tech implied, but in neither case did the shift to the side walls 
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Exhibitors: Lighted Announcements,” Moving Picture World 29.4 (22 July 1916): 629. 
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 Of the significant additional material in the second patent, two particular sentences contain revealing wording.  
Rather than talking about the invention in the abstract, Thomas at one point declares that it “has resulted in…greatly 
improved results.”  Later, his description of the invention is shifted from dry information to an active voice in which 
he uses phrases like “I project” and “I display.”  Presumably, the later patent was written after some practical 
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expense for a technique that was not proven to reduce spectator irritation at advertisements.  
Verran & Groetz technology would have been even more expensive, as it would have required 
not just lighting and ad-card holders, but the multiple panes of glass and the cost of materials to 
construct closed boxes so as not to lead to the common problem of light ‘smears’ across the 
screening space.  Meidreich’s tech required the exhibitor to purchase an entirely new projection 
device.  Even Hunter’s patent – which would have been adopted by studios not exhibitors – 
would have required an additional stage of printing, adding significantly to the cost of any 
negative.  In no case would it have been easy to try-out these technologies without potentially 
putting the user in financial danger, should the tech fail immediately.  
  
‘Public Service’ Tech 
 The most pronounced issue with frame technologies was their encroachment on the 
screen without added anything of value to the film experience aside from moving the advertising 
off the screen.  For those viewers and exhibitors opposed to advertising on grounds larger than 
opposition to a compulsory pause, practices both less encroaching and more justifiable were 
required.  Other technologies, therefore, were invented in the same era which covered their 
advertising nature with a patina of practical use value.  An old concept – tied to the same logic as 
using advertising slides for political information, and describing industrial films as ‘educational’ 
– providing either valuable information or some other supposed convenience was assumed to 
weaken audience resistance to advertising.  In the case of these technologies, it was intended that 
the audience be convinced that advertising was necessary to fund an experiential improvement.
28
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
experience with the product in a real theatrical setting.  Frank C. Thomas, “Method of Combining Advertising with 
Amusement or Instruction,” U.S. Patent 1,200,399, filed 15 June 1916, and issued 3 October 1916. 
28
 The concept persists as one of the most common ways to advertise or market without seeming pushy.  See, for 
example, the online ‘long tail’ concept, currently in use by Amazon.com, among others, in which each product page 
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Slide, film, and ‘frame’ advertising rhetoric may have achieved a notion of utility from the 
exhibitor’s perspective – as the income could offset cost of operation – but the audience was 
unlikely to recognize the added benefit of a mountain of advertising signs shining directly at 
them.  The advertising content would likely have seemed disproportional to the financial value, 
especially if they did not see either a sharp rise in show quality or, more likely, an even sharper 
break in ticket prices.  Many diverse products and technologies were designed in the silent era 
with this problem in mind, and which therefore attempted to foreground the use value of the 
object, while appending advertising only as a side feature.  These marginally located items were 
intended to act as an object of interest not only if the viewer became bored with the current film, 
but if they wished to investigate or appreciate the other elements of the theater in which they 
were sitting.  These technologies, in order to downplay the advertising content and seem to stress 
the wishes of the audience first-and-foremost, tended to be placed farther from the screen and 
blatantly stressed their own utility. 
 Perhaps the simplest example of ‘public service’ technology was the ad-branded trash 
can.  Though I have as yet found no patents specifically encouraging their use in motion picture 
theaters, such items had been patented for years in the United States (and would continue to 
be).
29
  Though most were designed for outdoor use, at least two patents openly stressed 
placement “in stores.”  In 1914, Eugene B. Cooke and Chauncey O. Lewis, of New Philadelphia, 
Ohio, created a waste-basket enclosure offering advertising card holders on multiple sides, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
includes a list of links of products ‘also of interest.’  Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is 
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 George J. Richardson was, for example, a one-man avalanche of trash can patents.  See, for example, patent 
1,364,209 (filed 3 September 1919) among many others.  One of the many values of Google to historical research is 
apparent in this Richardson patent, as the information page links to eighteen future patents which cited and built 
upon his design.  The Cooke & Lewis patent (below) was also heavily cited by future inventors. 
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allowing for quick and cheap replacement of advertising signs.
30
  Samuel Leveen, of Anderson, 
Indiana, had a similar product filed for patent almost exactly a decade earlier, which not only 
offered space on the sides for advertising but which also included lighting to illuminate the signs; 
Leveen’s design could, therefore, easily have been adapted by the earliest permanent theaters in 
ways distinctly similar to the frame technologies.
31
  By the 1910s, with the rise of the motion 
picture theater as a venue where such items might be profitably used, it is implausible to presume 
that they were not intentionally experimented with as a form of cinema advertising. 
 As with all other forms of peripheral cinema advertising technology, however, most 
‘public service’ technology was electric; in a cinema, objects of attention were objects of light.  
Tacoma, Washington’s Gloss H. Fowler, owner of the Fowler Sign Company, concocted the 
earliest known concept along these lines – a ‘light diffusing’ wall unit.  Filed for patent in 1912 – 
and therefore predating Frank C. Thomas’ remarkably similar ‘frame’ patent32 – Fowler’s 
technology was designed to provide the soft and “more restful” ambient light required in a silent 
era motion picture theater.  At this time, it was believed (according to Fowler) that turning off 
the theater lights completely, even during projection, was said to make the theater “uninviting for 
the timid, particularly women and children.”  Designing his device around a commonly felt 
audience need, Fowler used advertising as a means solely to reduce operating costs.  In order “to 
suitably light a motion picture theater…with the least interference with the exhibition on the 
screen…and with the greatest comfort to the audience,” Fowler proposed placing his diffusers 
along the walls of the theater, at intervals.  Almost as an afterthought, Fowler contended that, 
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 Eugene B. Cooke and Chauncey O. Lewis, “Advertising Waste Paper Box,” U.S. Patent 1,108,066, filed 5 March 
1914, and issued 18 August 1914. 
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rather than diffusing light by reflecting it off unadorned wall space, advertising signs would do 
the job equally well and provide a little extra income for the theater.  An added benefit was that 
the signs, requiring no more expensive printing than a standard poster, could be changed at will 
with little expense to either the advertiser or the exhibitor.
33
  As such, the advertising – requiring 
more effort to see than the light – would hopefully have come across as unobtrusive and 
acceptable, while also allowing inexpensive change of copy which would have pleased 
advertisers.  
A similar lighting patent was the glowing seat-back advertisements of Francis T. Hayes 
from Richmond Hill, New York.  Comparatively late – not filed for patent until 1927 – Hayes’ 
patent was an adaptation of old fashioned seat-back signs, a concept which predates motion 
picture theaters.
34
  In Hayes’ patent, the signs were created with luminous “radium paint,” 
allowing them to glow without the need for electricity.  It is evident that Hayes had a more 
complex notion of theatrical lighting needs than Fowler.  The signs were designed to add to the 
theater in two ways.  First, they were an added “artistic and attractive lighting” element for the 
house, designed to “brea[k] the monotony of a darkened theater.”  They were, in short, an 
attraction in their own right.  Secondly, they were a cost-saving device.  The seat-backs, rather 
than simply providing general ambient light, were intended as a replacement for ushers.  
Working from the notion that it was difficult for spectators to find a seat in a darkened theater, 
Hayes’ glowing seat backs were designed as a simple way to reveal empty seats; the 
phosphorous paint would have been visible to a standing patron, if there had been no spectator in 
the seat to block the light.  The seats at the edge of the aisles would also have provided a lighted 
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path for entrance and exit, as they would have been visible regardless of seat occupancy, due to 
the patron’s position to the side.  As such, glowing signs, according to Hayes, would have 
“eliminat[ed] the present overhead expense necessary in darkened theaters in the employment of 
ushers with flashlights” to lead patrons safely into and out of the theater, even in the event of a 
loss of electrical power.
35
  The seat-backs therefore provided a middle ground between the 
‘frame’ advertisements and Fowler’s wall units: the advertising still seemed to serve a practical 
benefit, and could still be changed rapidly and cheaply, but was less possible to ignore as it was 
placed directly in front of the spectator.  It was, unfortunately for Hayes, also a much more 
limited form of advertising, as any given sign could be seen by, at most, a few spectators.  As 
such, it would have required either extreme cheapness of sign production – which is unlikely due 
to the need for special paint – or the renting of a massive number of spaces to a single 
advertiser.
36
  Both of these problems would have rendered Hayes’ technology troubling to in-
cinema advertisers accustomed to a low cost-per-thousand views as the most prominent 
description of the venue. 
 A much flashier – and in hindsight significantly less useful – technology was Norman T. 
Whitaker’s elapsed-time tracker.  According to Whitaker, one convenience that motion picture 
theaters were not then providing was a revelation of the duration (both elapsed and remaining) of 
a given film.  Whitaker’s invention was from the waning days of the dominance of short films, 
when a culture of ‘transient’ patrons were first learning to coordinate their entrance and exit from 
the theater to the ‘start’ and ‘end’ of the program (or, at least, to the feature).  Whitaker argued 
that a patron might choose to delay entry until one film finished, and that a patron already within 
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the theater, but with time constraints, “might stay somewhat longer if he knew there were only a 
few feet more of the [current] film to be shown.”37  As such, he invented a device which, when 
synchronized to the projector, would deliver periodic updates via a box onstage.  The updates 
would have been rendered visible as light shining through cuts in a rolling paper strip.  Whitaker 
then suggested that in the interim moments one could scroll other messages in front of the 
audience (like the patent’s example “Eat Smith’s Good Eats”).38  Whitaker’s concept was 
admittedly a bit more intrusive – as one would have been encouraged to read the box expecting a 
message about length and would instead have received an advertisement.
39
  It was, of course, 
also woefully impractical – as the modern day practice of a printed list of start and end times 
would have been cheaper and could even have been included in the handbill (resulting in the 
need only for a clock within the theater).  Despite these problems, the idea remains the paragon 
example of ‘public service’ technologies, as it combined flashy technology, a beneficial 
convenience, and advertising all in one place. 
 In broad terms, these technologies of convenience were designed with a very different 
notion of both advertising and the cinema audience in mind.  As mentioned at the outset of this 
section, these technologies attempted to invade the space not by crowding the entertainment, but 
by providing a service.  As such, they tended to be much farther from the screen; with the 
possible exception of Whitaker’s elapsed time box (which may or may not have been placed 
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directly beside the screen), the advertising integrated into such inventions was on the side walls, 
by the doors, and on the seats.  As such, the inventors discussed advertising much more 
positively.  For example, though Francis T. Hayes’ patent appears, at first glance, to echo the 
audience definition of Thomas, Verran, and Groetz, in asserting that his glowing seat-backs 
would “break the monotony of a darkened theater,” note the decided lack of cynicism in the 
phrasing.  For Hayes, the cinema audience simply wanted pleasure – which could have been 
provided by the film, advertising, or simply by noticing clever lighting techniques.  As such, 
these inventors were not only explicitly responding to spectator complaints about advertising – 
moving it decidedly to the periphery and making it more clearly voluntary – they were trusting 
that voluntary advertising would still be attended to.  Their faith in the audience to seek the 
greatest pleasure, wherever it may be found, placed all elements of the theater on an even 
footing.  The possibility of poor quality films on the screen (so vital in frame tech patents) was a 
non-issue for these inventors.  The goal was a cost-effective improvement of the space. 
 At least one – Hayes’ phosphorous seat-backs, or a knock off – was put into use, though 
not particularly effectively.  Reports of a lawsuit reveal that Hal Hodes had signed two-year 
contracts with theaters resulting in a total of 225,323 seats in 1928.  The theaters were to be paid 
one dollar per seat per year, with the Thayer Advertising Corporation acting as space broker and 
retaining all income above that price.  Alleging that he had not been paid commission for this 
work, he asserted that Thayer had erroneously claimed to have contracts with multiple national 
advertisers – including the Coca-Cola Company, the Wrigley Chewing Gum Company, and the 
Ward Baking Company – in hand.  As Hodes won the suit (and was awarded, in 1932, a 23% 
commission – $104,900 for the $450,000 worth of contracted space) it can be presumed that 
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Thayer drastically overestimated the potential of the technology.
40
  That said, upwards of 1,000 
theaters signed on with Hodes for this service.  The failure was on the broker’s end, not the 
exhibitors’.  Flashy peripheral ‘public service’ tech was, thus, still a workable technique as late 
as 1928. 
 
Clocks 
 Perhaps the single most important peripheral advertising concept proposed during the 
silent era was the advertising clock.  The advertising clock blurred the lines between the 
advertising ‘frame’ and ‘public service’ technologies, and appears to have been the offscreen 
advertising technology most commonly integrated into the silent era theater experience.  An 
advertising clock, as it was marketed to silent era theaters, was a high tech, peripherally 
projected variant of a lantern slide projector.  Advertising clocks consisted both of a visible clock 
face, and a rotating sequence of advertising slides, which were projected simultaneously (often 
overlapping the clock image), on the theater wall.  Nothing in their designs required a hijacking 
of the motion picture screen, or even placement on same wall – though, in fairness, all extant 
example drawings and descriptions placed the clocks right next to the screen in a position 
echoing frame technologies. 
Although the concept of projecting ads within the wheel of a clock face had patent 
antecedents dating back to 1905,
41
 clocks specifically designed for cinema usage arose from one 
direct and one indirect cause in the early 1910s.  Indirectly, they emerged in the wake of the slide 
crisis of the early 1910s, and may well have been inspired by the clock slides which had become 
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popular in 1912 and into early 1913 (see chapter three).  Directly, a growing sense that 
overcranking during projection was a way for the theater to ‘chase-em-thru’ led F.H. Richardson 
to propose that theaters install clocks in plain view of the audience, so that they could see that the 
‘one hour program’ promised was delivered.42  Although Richardson would come to loathe the 
light pollution caused by in-theater clocks, if his call in 1912 resulted in actual increased 
demand, then the appearance of advertising funded variants should not be surprising. 
The earliest to directly offer a slide based advertising clock to motion picture theaters was 
the J.H. Genter Company, of Newburgh, NY, which offered its “Announceoscope” in the pages 
of the Moving Picture World during 1913.
43
  The General Sales Company of America, from 
Pittsburgh, offered a more basic contraption – dubbed the Wonder Clock – late that same year.44  
It is easy (though perhaps inaccurate) to infer that neither product met with much success in the 
market: Genter’s Mirroroid Screen remained his most heavily advertised item as the 
Announceoscope drifted slowly out of the company’s self-advertising; General Sales abandoned 
the Wonder Clock little over a year later, selling their remaining stock for a cut rate at the end of 
1914.
45
  However, at least five further companies would pick up the baton.  The Kineto Machine 
Company of Chicago, and the Publicity Clock Company and Standard Manufacturing Company, 
both of New York, were all advertising the availability of their own advertising clocks, also in 
the Moving Picture World, by the latter half of 1915.
46
  Though they would not nationally 
advertise until 1917, in Printers’ Ink, New York’s Wonder Clock Advertising Company (no 
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relation) also appeared in a 1915 New York directory.
47
  In 1917, the Kalck Safety Specialty 
Company, of Amityville, NY, received a small write up in Motography offering advertising 
clocks as well.
48
  At least one of the above companies – the Publicity Clock Company – was still 
actively selling space on the clocks of cinema theaters into the 1930s.
49
  As such, advertising 
clocks, like slides and trailers, persisted in cinema theaters long past the transitional era and 
were, for some filmgoers, a recognizable and regular element of their cinema experiences. 
 In general, there were three different types of clocks which could be purchased for use in 
motion picture theaters, ranging from the extremely simplistic to the relatively complex.  The 
earliest was also the most complex.  J.H. Genter’s ‘Announceoscope’ was an exceptionally 
useful technology – almost excessively so, as though Genter was attempting to provide as much 
‘use value’ as possible to justify its inclusion in theaters.  The Announceoscope could project a 
clock (either as a standard dial face or digital, depending on the model), while projecting a list of 
further information.  In the sample layout on the patent, Genter provided a long space for the 
name of the current film to be displayed (thus labeling the screen so that patrons could follow 
along in the printed program, much like Whitaker’s elapsed time clock), along with two smaller 
squares for advertising messages.
50
  Slides, of apparently American standard size, would rotate 
automatically through the clock at whatever rate the theater chose – presuming they were 
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labeling the films, the slides would likely only change every fifteen minutes.  Although no 
information survives indicating the number of slides or advertising messages that the machine 
could hold, the flexibility of use of the device is indicative of both a creative mind and an 
unconventional product. 
 Rapidly, the machines streamlined.  The General Sales Company’s Wonder Clock was 
the influential model.  Projecting a round image with the advertisement contained within the dial 
of the clock, custom designed slides would rotate automatically through the projector.
51
  
Although it is difficult to make out the images in the display advertising for the General Sales 
Company, the slides were presumably round, so as to fit neatly inside of the clock dial.  This 
same round-slide design was adopted by Kineto, Kalck, Publicity Clock Company, and the later 
Wonder Clock Advertising Company.  Although not all companies listed official numbers of 
slides slots within their machines, eight and twelve slot models appear to have been the norm.  
The most simplistic – the second, New York based Wonder Clock – used no rotation mechanism 
at all, allowing “but one product at a time [to] take advantage of th[eir] service”).52  Kineto and 
Publicity Clock both offered eight and twelve slot models, while the Kalck patent indicated an 
eight slot model as well.
53
  The Standard Manufacturing Company’s clock, though it used square 
slides, only offered six slots, and did not overlap the clock face and the advertisement (the maker 
opted instead for a stacked image), varied in no mechanical respects.
54
  All clocks which offered 
multiple slide slots also offered the convenience of infrequent winding, and the ability to select 
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the speed at which slides would change (for Publicity, the standard speed was a change every 
thirty seconds
55
). 
 Unlike slides and trailers, either an exhibitor or a local agent was usually expected to 
purchase an advertising clock.  Only the Wonder Clock Advertising Company gave any 
indication that they sold the space on their own clocks after installation.  Offering, in their only 
known advertisement, to rent space on their clocks “in 75 leading moving picture houses” in 
New York, the company treated local cinemas like newsprint – integrating as much of New 
York’s filmgoing populace as possible and reaching them all simultaneously.56  For all other 
companies, clocks were likely a one-off.  Whether or not assistance was offered in gathering 
advertisers, each clock was an individual item, purchased, owned, and operated primarily by the 
theater or regional representative.  The costs of clocks for such exhibition varied unexpectedly 
widely.  The General Sales Company claimed their wonder clock to be “a One Hundred and 
Twenty Five Dollar instrument,” but then sold their remaining inventory for the clearance price 
of $35 each in the very same ad.
57
    The Standard Manufacturing Company, however, sold their 
clocks for “$35 complete” – no clearance needed.58  A Minnesota lawsuit reveals that an 
agreeable price, in 1917, for Kineto clocks was $95 for the eight slide version, and $120 for the 
twelve slide model.
59
  Publicity Clock offered a profit to cost ratio of “$75 Weekly from a $500 
Investment,” though this was clearly a dealer price and it is impossible to know whether this was 
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a profit and cost estimate for one clock or many.
60
  The costs, therefore, could be relatively 
exorbitant, and the assistance in rounding up advertisers to fill the spaces could be slight or 
nonexistent. 
For such an investment, profit similar to that of slide and trailer advertising was 
promised.  Genter promised “anywhere from 20 to 50 dollars weekly” in his 1913 ad.61  In 1915, 
Standard Manufacturing suggested charging “$2 to $5 weekly” for each of the six slide slots, 
producing “$600 to $1500 yearly profit.”62  The aforementioned, indecipherable promise of $75 
from the Publicity Clock Company gets no clearer with two such extraordinarily different profit 
quotes.  However, the fact that they were selling space in Brooklyn theaters for $1.25 per week 
in 1932 and $1.50 per week in 1938 implies that the initial profit estimate of $75 per week was 
for multiple clocks.
63
  In either case, the purchaser of these clocks was intended to see them as a 
gravy train – effectively like buying their own medium to place within cinema venues which, 
once the device was paid off, would print money unfettered into a golden future. 
 Although the initial cost was an entry barrier, such clocks were used remarkably often.  
The Wonder Clock Advertising Company, of course, claimed to have 75 clocks scattered 
throughout New York in 1917.
64
  The General Sales Company claimed that “hundreds of 
theaters” were using their ‘Wonder Clock.’65  The aforementioned Kineto lawsuit was for a 
broken contract which initially called for the purchase of 242 clocks to cover the Minnesota 
                                                          
60
 Classified Ad, Cosmopolitan July 1919: 165.  The price quoted might have been, for example, five $100 clocks 
each returning $15 per week. 
61
 Display Ad, Moving Picture World 16.2 (12 April 1913): 197. 
62
 Display Ad, Moving Picture World 26.2 (9 October 1915): 354. 
63
 Three signed contracts from the author’s private collection list the following information.  On 2 March 1932, a 
Brooklyn drug store signed a contract for a year of service at the Graham Theater at $1.25 per week.  On 6 April 
1938, the Glen Morris Meat Market signed a contract for sixteen weeks of service at the Farrell Theater for $1.50 
per week.  On 8 September 1938, a man (J. Barker?) signed a contract for twenty-eight weeks of service at the Echo 
Theater, also at the rate of $1.50 per week. 
64
 Display Ad, Printers’ Ink 98.5 (1 February 1917): 102. 
65
 Full-Page Display Ad, Moving Picture World 22.10 (5 December 1914): 1413. 
248 
 
 
territory.
66
  While none of these claims can be taken entirely at face value, persistence is also an 
indicator of success.  As the Kineto Machine Company was in operation for at least five years – 
in Chicago, a hub of advertising dollars – and its head, George Willens, invented similar clocks 
for years to come, one must assume that the device was relatively profitable.  The Publicity 
Clock Company likewise seems to have turned a tidy profit for its owners, as the company 
persisted, as has been mentioned, into the late 1930s.
67
  Publicity Clock was profitable enough, 
in fact, that it suffered not one, but two forms of theft, without collapsing under the weight of 
financial losses or advertiser distrust.  In 1916, salesman Harry Smith was caught “collecting 
money of the firm and appropriating it to his own use.”68  In an unknown year, the company 
circulated a card to its advertisers offering a reward for the capture of man who was collecting 
the business names from active clocks, and then presenting a bill for continuing the service – 
absconding with the funds.
69
  The fact that either of these acts of criminal behavior could provide 
enough income to be worth the risk indicates that Publicity Clock was turning quite a bit of 
profit.  The weight of scant evidence implies, then, that the advertising clock found a 
comfortable niche in a small subset of theaters and had a reasonably long and profitable life.
70
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 The advertising clock phenomenon was, in fact, widespread enough that installations and 
territorial contracts were occasionally reported in the Moving Picture World.  In 1916, the 
Empire Theater of Auburn, Indiana, installed an 8 slot model from an unidentified company.
71
  
John C. Green, manager of the Temple Theater in Galt, Ontario, purchased the distribution rights 
for Kineto machines for the entire province.
72
  In February of 1916, F.H. Richardson had already 
given his blessing to the adoption of almost any such advertising clock by declaring that such a 
device was “the way” to integrate advertising into the cinema theater, as “several theater 
managers” had installed them and communicated a favorable impression.73  If even the 
notoriously anti-advertising Moving Picture World was willing to report clocks this often and 
this favorably, they were a blessed form of advertising indeed.   
 In any case, the sales rhetoric was simple and, as such, we can relatively safely assume 
that those exhibitors who did adopt the clock did so for one of two reasons: they needed a clock 
but couldn’t afford the added expense, or they needed the income from advertising but could not 
tolerate, or could no longer justify, an onscreen advertising break.  Kineto sold its product under 
the former argument.  Their self-advertising described the Kineto clock as “designed to meet a 
long felt want in furnishing theatres with an attractive time-piece that could be seen at all times 
by the entire audience.”74  Kineto and General Sales even went so far as to imply that such a 
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clock would draw business: Kineto called its clock “a decided and distinct attraction” for the 
theater opting to use it; General Sales called their ‘Wonder Clock’ a “crowd puller” and praised 
its ‘startling,’ looming size as a novelty that would, itself, attract a crowd.75  Kalck used the 
latter, arguing that their clock could bring advertising revenue “without the delay that 
intermissions often occasion.”76   
 Printed opposition to advertising clocks was very limited, and skewed entirely towards 
either technical malfunctions or inherent light pollution.  All of the public criticism of 
advertising clocks comes from Richardson’s nationwide critical tour of theaters in 1917.  In one 
particularly memorable week in April, three clocks – only one of them an advertising clock – 
raised Richardson’s ire.  An advertising clock in Pearce’s Tudor Theater in New Orleans was 
chastised for including “an illuminated green-letter sign, presumably advertising the jeweler who 
supplied the clock,” and for causing “a smear of white light…clear across the front end of the 
auditorium over the screen.”  A second clock, from the Empire theater in Mobile, Alabama 
(“more light on the wall than is on the clock dial”) and a third clock, from the Globe Theater in 
New Orleans (“smeared all over with white light”) were also given harsh reviews.77  In October, 
the Graphic Theater in Bangor, Maine, raised Richardson’s blood yet again with an advertising 
clock, by including “two or three [brightly illuminated] advertisements beneath its dial.”78  
Although we cannot interpret such comments to be outright condemnation of all clocks, 
Richardson’s critiques clearly imply both the difficulty of confining the light from an advertising 
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clock to its desired region (the constantly invoked ‘smears of white light’) and the fact that their 
placement right next to the screen may well have been distracting in the best of circumstances.  
As such, the lack of clear growth in the field of advertising clocks is also not surprising, as 
audience irritation once again kept the industry as a whole from prospering. 
 
‘Active Audience’ Rhetoric and the Cinema as Venue 
 The multiplicity of peripheral advertising techniques – resulting in permanently visible 
but optionally viewable advertising – added an important wrinkle to the terms of the in-cinema 
advertising debate.   The then increasingly common notion, on the part of advertisers and the 
general public, of the film audience as a passive collection of sponges, soaking up the onscreen 
material, was partly counterbalanced by peripheral advertisers’ more realistic approach which 
acknowledged what the film studios and exhibitors had known all along: that viewers were 
thinking, unpredictable individuals, whose attention was given rather than compelled.  Peripheral 
advertising functioned by rigorously dividing advertising content from the entertainment – rather 
than trying to ‘slip it through’ – and then justifying it’s presence as a service or an alternative 
diversion.  As such, these early 20
th
 century inventors described viewers who were subject to 
their own tastes and whims, and whose motivations and interpretations were therefore individual.  
Operating under this definition of an audience, attention was redefined as something for which 
advertisements could compete without describing it as a completely unwanted presence. 
Attention was, in theory at least, closer to a meritocracy.  The bulk of the companies and 
inventors working in the arena of advertising marginalia would, therefore, repeat the standard 
critiques of onscreen advertising – that it was “a source of more or less dissatisfaction to your 
252 
 
 
patrons”79 – before defending their own technology as a site from which advertising would be 
willingly and voluntarily read.  Rather than attempting to force the audience’s attention at a 
specific time, then, these men encouraged advertisers to place their ads “in full view of the 
audience during the entire exhibition” as this would provide “the assurance that at least a 
majority of the persons in the audience [would], at some time before they le[ft], read the 
advertisement.”80 
Frame tech designers – perhaps evidenced by their desires to crowd advertising as close 
to the screen as possible – were frequently pessimistic about advertising’s ability to draw 
attention on its own merits.  The advertising needed, at the very least, to be “associated with the 
main screen” to be considered viable; as such, positioning, even if the screen was off limits, still 
implied that the audience needed to be nearly, if not entirely, forced to read an ad.  Reading of 
ads would then happen almost naturally when the spectator became bored or otherwise irritated 
with the films being projected.  Frank C. Thomas, for example, asserted that nearness to the 
primary image was a virtue on the grounds that “the pictures being displayed upon the screen 
[might] fail to interest anyone in the audience.”  Harry Verran and Alfred R. Groetz claimed 
nearly the same thing when they argued that the audience might voluntarily look away from the 
screen if “any particular portion of the picture exhibition [did] not prove of interest.”  As such, 
active audiences were acknowledged, by frame inventors, negatively – their attention was 
something that an entertainment film could lose, leaving it up for grabs.  As such, there was an 
element of cynicism and fearfulness to these inventors’ takes on audiences. 
                                                          
79
 “The Publicity Clock” pamphlet (eight slot version), Publicity Clock Company Advertising Cards and Brochures, 
David M. Rubinstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University. 
80
 Harry Verran and Alfred R. Groetz, “Advertising Device,” U.S. Patent 1,321,863, filed 10 March 1919, and 
issued 18 November 1919. 
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The problem with this description is that, in abandoning the need for compulsion by 
stressing the possibility of a crummy film, they abandoned not just the value of a compulsory 
screen, but also the sense of the ‘receptive mood.’  If as the above thinkers implied, the ads were 
being perused at moments when the audience was bored, or disappointed in the films on the 
program – so bored that they were more interested in their surroundings than the show – how 
would the advertising have been received?  If the uniform happiness of the cinema audience 
could no longer be assumed, was there even any value to advertising in the venue?  Such claims 
are the only point in the historical record of silent era cinema advertising where the proponents 
relied overtly on a cynical view of the audience. 
The bulk of the proponents of peripheral advertising, perhaps realizing the danger of 
stressing a bored or irritable viewer, took a more optimistic approach, and asserted that their 
technologies were an alternative but no less valid way to appeal to the viewer’s attention.  Kineto 
company head George Willens almost imperceptibly slipped from the valuable notion of 
compulsion to an acknowledgement of choice.  Indicating first choice, and then compulsion, 
Willens claimed that the placement of an ad placed upon his invention “compels one to see an 
advertisement when looking at the time on my clock.”81  Frank C. Thomas, possibly in an attempt 
to overcome the cynicism of the rest of his patent, included perhaps the most over-zealous claim 
for the appeals of quality advertising, when he argued that patrons could “look at the 
advertisement several times…[and] thoroughly assimilate the idea” if they found the ad 
particularly interesting or amusing.
82
  Put simply, the quickest and most compelling way to sell 
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peripheral advertising was to treat advertisements as miniature entertainments which could 
appeal just as well to a spectator. 
 As such, patent inventors took a wholly different approach to the debate – not just 
defending cinema audiences as desirable and reachable, but defending advertising as, itself, a 
part of the modern entertainment environment which could enter an entertainment venue without 
necessarily being pre-judged as an unwanted intrusion.  The choice of rigidly separating the 
theatrical sites of ‘art’ and ‘commerce’ into ‘screen’ and ‘margin’ paradoxically allowed these 
men to describe the two in fundamentally similar experiential terms.  The advertisements at the 
margins became potential alternative diversions – something else to see if one was inclined to 
appreciate one’s surroundings, or if the screen failed to entertain.  Implicitly conceiving of 
cinema advertising not in the temporal terms assumed by others, but as yet another site where 
advertising was an element of personal selection, their notion of the cinema was experientially 
parallel to magazines and billboards.  These men argued that, though one may not have had any 
control over the progress of the main entertainment (no ability to ‘turn the page’ or, in a vehicle 
metaphor, skip past the less beautiful pieces of landscape), one could, at least, look to the 
advertising for alternative material. 
 Unfortunately for these advertising proponents, the notion of ‘breaking the monotony of a 
darkened theater’ by adding secondary attractive elements was, even then, running in the 
opposite direction.  The picture palace movement arose in the early 1910s, alongside an embargo 
on ‘scandalous’ films in favor of ‘high-class’ dramatic films, and became part of the industry’s 
appeal to upper class audiences, in an attempt to turn them from censorship advocacy into film 
fans.  The ‘palatial’ architecture of massive first-run theaters encouraged the building of intricate 
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and beautiful structures, rather than bland environs filled with tacky advertising lights.
83
  The 
same theaters that were leading the attack against onscreen advertising – refusing to include it in 
their high class entertainments – were, therefore, also filling all the offscreen space with 
sumptuous architectural flourishes.  The type of active audience then being solicited by the film 
industry was one which purportedly would choose to turn their attention to the ornamental 
curlicues and faux Grecian columns on the theater walls, rather than to an advertising sign.  In 
attempting to shift to a high-art aesthetic, anti-advertising snobbery would have rendered 
peripheral signage less and less likely in more and more theaters.  As such, off-screen advertising 
was a dead end at the time that it arose, as the periphery was becoming the venue of ostentation 
and beautification rather than technological gimmickry. 
 
Conclusion 
 Advertising at the margins of the theatrical experience has, unfortunately, left the fewest 
historical traces.  It is difficult to know just how many of these technologies were put into use.  
Of those technologies which were adopted for use, it is almost impossible to know if any were 
widely used nationally, regionally, or locally.  Indeed, the historical traces of such technologies 
are often grotesquely unhelpful; witness the following news report – reproduced in its entirety: 
Central City, Neb. – The Donelson theater has recently installed an advertising 
machine.
84
 
 
For the historian of such material, this is a frustrating tease.  What type of machine?  What did it 
do and when?  Although this is an extreme example, the bulk of the analysis in this chapter has 
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been extrapolated from primary documents only marginally more helpful – either patents with no 
connection to actual usage, two-sentence dismissals from F.A. Richardson, or trade materials 
(like business cards) with little more content than a slogan.  In terms of actual usage, advertising 
clocks were clearly the most commonly available concept (particularly in New York), while the 
placement of lit signage next to the screen appears to have been a Plains state fad.  Any further 
analysis about adoption patterns is impossible. 
Despite the lack of clarity about the actual use of the objects, the concept of peripheral 
advertising is vital to our understanding of silent era debates about advertising.  It provides our 
only direct evidence of attempts to respond to concerns about the ‘commercial caesura’ in ways 
other than simply removing all consumer goods advertising from the theater, and provides us 
with the most tantalizingly unfulfilled glimpses of how the cinema experience might have been 
different.  The motion picture theater, still connected to (at least the perception of) lower-class 
and immigrant audiences, could have metamorphosed into a circus-like riot of lighted 
entertainment and advertising elements – a technological rather than architectural wonderland – 
with the film itself privileged only in its central placement.  The decision to pursue a high-class 
ambiance foreclosed this possibility just as it was being conceived.  However, the existence of 
the idea, and the implication that it was incompatible with ‘high class’ cinema, reveals that 
‘class’ and ‘advertising’ were drifting more firmly into separate spheres in early 20th century 
American media. 
 Peripheral advertising was simultaneously backward looking (inherently non-temporal 
and ‘print-esque’) and forward looking (it would take decades for the ‘active audience’ to 
become second nature in media research).  Its existence vividly displays the subtlety of 
American advertising thinking at the time.  While there were significant historical barriers to its 
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adoption – including the cultural pretensions of the film studios and the swelling opposition to 
cinema advertising caused by onscreen methods – peripheral advertising techniques are the 
strongest evidence of the inherent complexity of the cinema as an advertising venue, and they 
presage the difficult rethinking of advertising in the wake of digital media.
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CHAPTER 6.  “INTEMPERATE PROCLAMATIONS”: EXHIBITION, TICKETS, AND THE 
BIG CHILL OF CINEMA ADVERTISING 
 
Think of it!  People will pack your house day after day, 
and night after night, because it costs them nothing to see 
your show, still you are paid cash for every admission. 
- The Robyn-Kander Service (1915)
1
 
 
 
In early 1915, Moving Picture World columnist W. Stephen Bush sarcastically reviewed 
the avalanche of in-cinema advertising tactics which had hit his beloved film industry in the 
preceding few years.  In deriding “the screen advertisement” as the greatest “[o]f all the follies of 
the screen,” Bush worked himself up to a quite a lather, revealing, mid-tirade, that he felt that 
advertising men are not and cannot be moved by appeals to their aesthetic 
sensibilities.  They have none.  They climb…our own glorious mountains and 
upon those awe-inspiring heights, when man is nearest to the blue vault of 
heaven, they paint the name of some tooth paste with an adjuration to use the 
same. […] Men to whom Nature, in her most solemn moods, fails to make the 
slightest appeal cannot be expected to stand in awe of the screen.  I am often 
surprised that our great dramas are not interrupted at tense moments by the 
intemperate proclamation of the merits of so-and-so’s cigarettes and of so-and-
so’s cheese.2 
 
Bush’s article, regardless of its intent as condemnation, points to the myriad ways in which 
consumer goods advertising, had it been allowed, could have fundamentally altered the standard 
business and aesthetic models of motion pictures.  Though the advertising-filled intermission 
between turns of the program was, and remains, an important interweaving of advertising content 
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2
 W. Stephen Bush, “Follies of the Screen,” Moving Picture World 23.9 (27 February 1915): 1261. 
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with the film program
3
, the possibilities for interpenetration with the cinema were much more 
vast. 
The following year, the Edison Film Company’s young acting star Edward Earle, in an 
interview with motion picture advertising proponent Ernest A. Dench, restated Bush’s hypothesis 
– though without the vitriol – as a legitimate theory of the future of cinema.  Earle asserted: 
[i]f I am not mistaken, there will spring up a chain of photoplay theaters in the 
large cities to which the public will be admitted free.  At these ‘billboard stations’ 
short, regular photoplays will be sandwiched in between the ad. films so as to 
attract the folks inside. 
 
Accepting that “compulsory” advertising in a ticketed environment was “abhorrent to the people 
of this democratic country,” Earle presumed that – for good or ill – the way around the 
moviegoer’s reluctance was to do away with admission prices.4  Reading through the logic leaps 
in his comments, Earle’s rational differentiation between ‘optional’ print advertising, which one 
could skip past, and ‘forced’ cinema advertising, which the spectator had to wait through even if 
disinterested, was the breaking point for a dual-market system.  If the advertiser was going to 
hijack the viewer’s attention rather than ask for it, then the spectator must be ‘paid’ for his time; 
a free show would fit the bill.  Earle was not alone in this belief.  For many of the proponents of 
connecting the cinema to consumer goods advertising, the problem was ticket prices.
5
  For 
                                                          
3
 As referenced in chapter three, American cinema advertising is now dominated by National CineMedia (or NCM: 
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4
 Ernest A. Dench, Advertising by Motion Pictures (Cincinnati: Standard Publishing Company, 1916), 141, 145. 
5
 “Among the Slide Makers,” Moving Picture World 3.19 (7 Nov 1908): 357; “Advertising Slides,” Nickelodeon 
July 1909 (2.1): 3; James H. Collins, “Advertising Via the Moving Picture,” Printers’ Ink 70.8 (23 February 1910): 
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cinema advertising to function, perhaps the entire film industry needed to be freed from the 
burden of consumer cost. 
 Earle’s comments were not without precedent.  Various means of delivering cinema free 
of charge had been, and would continue to be, attempted during the silent era.  Indeed, in the 
wake of the mainstream film producers’ turn away from nonfiction just before 1910, the film 
reform community developed a cottage industry of ‘non-theatrical’ screenings, often in an 
attempt to influence the film content which their patrons would consume.  Church shows were a 
common form of this ‘community theater’ concept – an offering of educational, religious, and 
eventually even mainstream studio pictures, as “ministers sought to recapture the attention of 
their straying parishioners…by adopting the movie theater’s products and appeal.”6  Children’s 
matinees (often held in legitimate cinema theaters) and school affiliated shows were also 
common forms of community cinema.
7
  Free ‘censored,’ targeted, and otherwise non-theatrical 
shows became common enough by 1920 that the Motion Picture Theater Owners of America 
were compelled to publically criticize the non-theatrical ‘free cinema’ as “unfair competition,” 
and discourage mainstream film producers from circulating films to non-theatrical venues like 
churches and schools.
8
  In short, the notion of a cinematic experience with no admission fee was 
a growing trend at this point – though exhibitor distrust of the form was also growing.9 
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Even the notion of an advertising-supported ‘free cinema’ was not out of the ordinary.  
Screenings funded in the name of particular consumer goods had been tried numerous times.  
Both theatrical and non-theatrical free screenings of advertising films were a regular occurrence.  
Manufacturers would often simply rent out theaters – a practice common enough for non-
mainstream films (advertising, educational, and exploitation) that it would eventually earn the 
industry nickname ‘four-walling.’10  In the absence of a theater to rent, advertisers would pay 
traveling film trucks, or have films screened in store windows or other places of business.
11
  
Under the auspices of Camilla Donworth, of the Films-of-Business Corporation, New York’s 
Rialto Theater even inaugurated a regular tradition of free morning screenings of advertising 
films in mid-1920.  Begun on July 1
st
, with a screening of four industrial films, showings were to 
occur every Tuesday and Thursday morning from 10:00 til 12:00.
12
  Evidence for similar 
screenings at the Rialto exists as late as the 9
th
 of December that year.
13
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Alternatively, many merchants – having negotiated the privilege with a particular theater 
– offered free tickets to regular film screenings in exchange for purchases.14  E.H. Hill’s Rex 
Theater of Arkansas, KS, even adopted the idea for its own use, and offered free tickets to 
children who brought in 1,000 dead flies – a philanthropic ‘advertisement’ for summer pest 
control.
15
  The ‘free ticket’ option was so common that at least two nationwide services formed 
in the mid-1910s to capitalize on the movement: the Robyn-Kander Ticket Service
16
 and the 
National Free Movie Picture Ticket Company.
17
  Robyn-Kander’s model was promising enough 
that a major film studio, Universal, offered to back the company, with the product then renamed 
Universal Moving Picture Tickets.
18
 
 All of these commercial precursors, however, were slightly incomplete iterations of 
Earle’s concept of the ‘billboard station.’  Screening advertising films for free was not really an 
attempt to provide free film; it was an admission that industrial films were almost impossible to 
screen in any paid venue.  Meanwhile, free tickets, while directly linking consumption to free 
cinema, were a scattershot affair which did not produce a free theater so much as a single, 
random free admission.  Earle’s notion, though uncommon, was much more grand and seems to 
presage advertising formats central to entertainment in the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
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Participating Sponsorship as a Model of Cinema Exhibition 
 Earle’s perspective encouraged an interleaving of the ‘rented theater’ approach and the 
community screening, combining both mainstream entertainment films and advertising content 
into a form much like the later ‘participating sponsorship’ model of television, where advertisers 
bought “interstitial ‘pages’ of time” in an otherwise unrelated program.19   When he spoke in 
1916, the breaking-up of a sequence of film reels with advertising slides had been relatively 
common in movie houses across the country for several years, though it was then a waning 
exhibition model.  The one or two-reel advertising short was by then also well known, and the 
advertising trailer was in its early stages of development.  Trailers, shorts, and slides all provided 
possible models for a pause in the entertainment – an interleaving of entertainment and 
advertising.  If one then adds the snide 1915 comments of W. Stephen Bush, about “interrupt[ing 
great dramas] at tense moments,” to the theory espoused by Edward Earle, it is plausible to 
imagine a free cinema in which the advertisements were not simply inserted in between short 
reels, but between reels of a feature, and at moments of the keenest interest.  Indeed, the 
popularity of serials had recently crested, as both The Perils of Pauline and The Exploits of 
Elaine were initially released in 1914.  With serials, the multi-climax narrative structure, in 
which pauses were inserted at moments of heightened tension, was known.  Bush’s comments 
provide direct evidence that transitional era film theorists were able to conceive of a link 
between dramatic high-points and the retention of viewer interest across an advertising break.
20
  
It is, therefore, possible to see in Earle and Bush’s comments a template not just for participating 
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sponsorship of a program, but indeed for proto-television, in which a larger narrative was 
provided free of charge but broken up by advertising material.  At the very least, Earle was 
willing to gamble (and even Bush may have been willing to admit) that a ‘variety program’ of 
shorts, fully underwritten by advertising would have drawn urban crowds.  The theory of 
‘participating sponsorship’ is, therefore, nearly as old as cinema advertising itself. 
 Importantly, the ‘free cinema’ was not entirely theoretical.  Several iterations of the 
concept were, in fact, attempted in the ten years between 1911 and 1921.
21
  Often these were 
simple one-off attempts in theaters otherwise operated on a ticket basis.  In 1914, Atlanta’s Gem 
Theater funded free Saturday matinees for ten weeks through the sponsorship of local 
merchants.
22
  In mid-1916, clever Tennessee exhibitors in both Memphis and Nashville were 
running free, advertising slide supported screenings on Sundays as a means to evade local blue 
laws.
23
  A few years later, in 1921, Atlanta society women even attempted to fund a children’s 
matinee screening via the inclusion of an ‘educational’ short advertising the Biliken Shoe 
Company.
24
 Although these were not fully ‘billboard stations’ – and possibly were not even 
successful, one-time ‘billboard screenings’ – they are evidence that even established urban 
exhibitors were aware of, and in some cases intrigued by, the concept. 
 The most prominent and consistent usage of the concept was in the creation of free ‘open 
air’ exhibitions, providing community performances through private advertising funding rather 
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than donations or government dollars.  The concept appears to predate its common reportage in 
the film trade press.  The Moving Picture World’s resident cinema advertising curmudgeon, F.H. 
Richardson, confidently asserted, in late 1911, that no one with experience in exhibition would 
attempt to completely fund a touring open-air show through advertising slides.  Writing as 
though from real-world experience, Richardson asserted that any such attempt would be beset 
with the following problems: 
where he…figures one dollar expense it would really take nearer five.  The local 
papers would knock you.  The local showman would inspire local authorities to 
make things unpleasant for you in the way of license holdups, etc.  Bad weather 
could smite you.  Breakdowns and delays would conspire to make life miserable 
for you.  Railways would lose your stuff and break what they couldn’t manage to 
lose.  Verily, your joys would consist mainly of anticipating the day of your 
return, a chastened, sadder, and wiser man – oh yes, and a poorer one too.25 
 
To hear Richardson tell the tale, ‘free cinema’ had already left a trail of broken hearted and 
impoverished men in its wake.  At least one recent, real-world example could have inspired 
Richardson’s account.  Three months earlier, an open-air free theater in Jackson, Tennessee drew 
the ire of two local exhibitors – Capt. W.D. Ament (of the Elite) and D.L. Williamson (of the 
Marlow) – on the grounds that it operated without paying rent to the city for the park in which 
the films were shown.  Ament and Williamson asserted that the license for the free show should 
not have been granted on the grounds that it “permit[ted] the use of public property by 
individuals to the great harm of other citizens engaged in a legitimate and useful business.”26  
Though it is unclear how this conflict ended, the circulation of moral (“unfair competition”) and 
financial (bad business concept) arguments from Ament and Williamson in the trade press may 
have helped to put a stop to the practice – though only for a few years.  By mid-decade, free 
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open-air community theaters ran wild in a three-state region consisting of Illinois, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee. 
Perhaps the first free show in the area appeared in mid-1914 in Chicago Heights, Illinois 
(a suburb of Chicago).  In Chicago Heights, a man named Delmar Lee was said to have been 
showing films “on the streets” (presumably on a screen erected on the back of a truck), funding 
the screenings through merchant advertising.
27
  In June 1915, enterprising individuals in 
Louisville proposed using a downtown site for “a free motion picture house” where “the cost and 
a profit [were to be covered] by showing a number of advertising slides” in between each short 
subject reel; the originators of the plan even attempted to financially justify it by claiming that 
downtown theaters in the city earned between $2 and $10 per week from each slide screened – a 
price presumably, therefore, high enough to completely fund the project via a manageable 
number of slides.
28
  In February 1916, the small town of McClure, Illinois – with “practically 
unanimous” support – got on the bandwagon, and inaugurated weekly free screenings “to 
improve the social life of the community and the church and give merchants a chance to exploit 
their wares.”29  In June of 1916 free park-screenings hit two major cities in Tennessee.  In 
Nashville, the Crescent Amusement Company began using city parks for screenings which were 
two-thirds entertainment and one-third “advertising matter” – which likely included industrial 
films, as the Company had “been instructed…to secure…pictures having an educational value 
along with comedy and other subjects.”30  Nearby, a “[m]ain street moving picture man” from 
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Chattanooga started a similar open-air theater in Warner Park, but remained determined to fund 
the screenings entirely with slides, putting an embargo on “travel stuff and…educational pictures 
dealing with the manufacture of this and that.”31  By 1917 the concept approached the Missouri 
border, as promoter Ed Batts persuaded the Park Board of East St. Louis, Illinois, to show films 
“from one to three times a week” in five different parks (Jones, Emerson, Franklin, Virginia, and 
Edgemont), funding the screenings with advertising slides.
32
   
Though the practice was, if reports can be trusted, relatively contained in this one region, 
it was not solely an urban and suburban phenomenon.  A Wisconsin entrepreneur attempted to 
tour free, ad funded screenings through local small towns.  In 1916, the Open Air Dome 
Company of Green Bay, after “several weeks” of screenings in Green Bay, began a touring show 
with trips to West De Pere and Kaukauna – two towns on a line southwest of Green Bay.33   
Despite F.H. Richardson’s 1911 warning (which effectively critiqued exactly this action), the 
notion of free, ad supported cinema – even as a model of itinerant exhibition – was persistently 
enticing. 
The bulk of these screenings likely failed to turn a profit.  Indeed, the 1915 Louisville 
proposal admitted that “[t]he plan has not proven successful in other cities” before optimistically 
asserting that a downtown location might work better.
34
  However, the important thing to note is 
not whether or not such screenings were successful, but whether or not they were attempted.  The 
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concept of participating sponsorship of a free electronic medium was alive in 1910s cinema 
circles, even if it was never perfected. 
 Edward Earle was thus both spectacularly correct and incorrect, depending on your 
perspective.  In the end, motion pictures did not widely develop into ‘billboard stations’; the rise 
of the feature film and the palatial theater discouraged alternative models of cinema, as desires 
for both ‘respectability’ and profit encouraged an increase, rather than a decrease, in ticket 
prices.  However, if one thinks of the mass electronic media as interrelated and mutually 
influencing, rather than rigidly demarcated, then Earle was highly prescient…though a decade 
ahead of his time.  In the 1920s, American broadcast radio developed a business model which 
provided entertainment free of charge and profited entirely from advertising dollars.  By the 
advent of commercial television, the concept of visual entertainment, provided at no cost through 
advertising dollars collected from participating sponsors, was a reality.  Earle had predicted not 
the future of motion pictures, but of broadcasting – where the ‘billboard stations’ were on dials 
in our living rooms, rather than the downtown shopping district.
35
 
 
The Incredible Shrinking Field of Cinema Advertising 
 In the wake of the auteur theory (a screen rather than audience based theory), the advent 
of television (which compelled the industry to stress the aesthetic elements of color, widescreen, 
and 3-D rather than the venue), and the recent mobility of film texts (first to television, then 
home video, and now onto portable devices), it can be difficult to remember just how important 
the structures of both the venue and the program were to the silent era experience of motion 
                                                          
35
 See Kenneth Lipartito’s article in which he argues persuasively that, due to similar conceptions of use, the 
Picturephone could have filled the cultural role that the internet has grown into, had the technology been 
successfully adopted.  (Kenneth Lipartito, “Picturephone and the Information Age: The Social Meaning of Failure,” 
Technology and Culture 44.1 (January 2003): 70)  In much the same way, the cinema could have been television, 
given the acceptance of advertising breaks and ticketless entry. 
269 
 
 
pictures.  Studies of regional viewing habits, segregated theaters, and non-theatrical screenings 
remind us of the importance of these structural elements of the cinema.  The unsettled conditions 
of both film programs and theaters also gave rise to the variety of cinema advertising tactics in 
the transitional era. 
The institutionalization of the American cinema experience under the narrower thinking 
of the mainstream studios, however, ultimately condemned cinema advertising to a long life at 
the periphery of film culture.  During the American cinema’s period of greatest novelty and 
appeal as a potential advertising venue – the decade prior to the commercialization of American 
radio – the film industry went through a transition to features, vertical integration, and a large 
scale campaign to elevate the perceived status of the medium.  The shift to feature dominated 
programs limited the screening options for advertising.  As W. Stephen Bush indicates (and 
Edward Earle implies, with his assumption that ‘billboard stations’ would screen only “short” 
entertainment films), fragmenting a single plotline with advertising breaks was perhaps the least 
likely option for cinema advertising in a culture which was hostile to the form under even the 
least intrusive circumstances.  As the industry underwent simultaneous vertical integration and 
the picture palace revolution, the film industry erected even broader barriers to cinema 
advertising.  In a picture palace, and even a smaller town theater with pretentions to palatial 
esteem, the screen was to be dominated by high end feature dramas, and remain unsullied by an 
association with commercialism.  The offscreen space was to be kept dignified and opulent to 
match.  The cinema theater itself became an advertisement for the quality of the content 
projected on the screen and, as such, high-brow considerations drove a wedge between studio 
production and exhibition and the desires of advertisers.  There was no place left for cinema 
advertising in the mainstream theaters.  Direct advertising thus became a trait of rural and mom-
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and-pop theaters, and product placement began its slow rise as the method favored by an 
oligopoly of producers.  At exactly the moment when in-cinema advertising was at its most 
vibrant, then, and when advertising itself was experiencing phenomenal growth (post World War 
I), the studio-dominated film industry declared it unacceptable. 
 This is not to say, however, that cinema advertising was solely the victim of the cinema’s 
growing cultural pretentions.  While cinema-cultural preconceptions that advertising was 
‘lowbrow’ were undoubtedly important to the marginalization of cinema advertising, abusive 
practices were equally important in declaring cinema advertising an irritant.  The early hostility 
created by excessive quantity, broken, endlessly reused, or simply ugly slides was persistent.  
Indeed, deriding the shoddy work of extant and defunct competitors was even a part of the sales 
pitch at the Alexander Film Company as late as 1921.  As such, it is clear that the sense that 
cinema advertising was generally low quality and unlikeable remained common nearly a decade 
after its emergence in the specific context of the price-cutting conflict in the slide industry.  
Slides created a reputation that was difficult to live down.  The major studios thus also wanted 
the cinema to be free – free of advertising, not ticket prices. 
Functional difficulties with the form also kept advertiser interest in the cinema low.  
Circulation was a persistent problem, as there was no central authority through which one could 
purchase national space from multiple cinema advertising space brokers.  Money was also an 
issue, as the production costs for trailers, for example, were relatively high, even if the cost-per-
thousand viewers was low.  Even the quantity of available forms may have had a negative impact 
on advertiser interest, as the multiplicity of options may have made cinema advertising seem 
even more unsettled than it already was.  It is likely, therefore, that the film industry was fighting 
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a lopsided battle against cinema advertising, as advertisers themselves did not rush to the new 
medium in support. 
In short, consumer-goods advertising for the American cinema was born in a hole – one 
which it took decades, rather than a few years, to climb out of.  Local exhibitors were hesitant 
about the impact advertising might have had on their small profit margins.  National production 
and exhibition companies – with greater financial flexibility – were more concerned with freeing 
cinema from its low cultural esteem, than creating open access.  With the advent of a national 
plan for commercial radio, the cinema’s slim hold on the advertising industry evaporated along 
with its novelty.  Rather than escalating acceptance of consumer goods advertising in the 
mainstream experience of cinema, then, the American film industry’s interest went from hesitant 
to hostile, while advertiser interest went from moderate to indifferent.  The American film 
industry opted to consider a ‘dual product’ business model (in which the films were sold to 
audiences in order to sell the audiences to advertisers) to be synonymous with the lowbrow 
aesthetic they were attempting to avoid.  In the studios’ definition of culture, overt advertising 
did not suit the feature film experience. 
 
Cinema Advertising as Media Development 
 The history of silent era advertising provides evidence of multiple possible models of an 
ad supported cinema (ranging from minimal to full funding, via onscreen and offscreen tactics), 
and multiple plausible arguments for why such models would succeed or fail.  The appeal of the 
communicative powers of what was then the most up-to-date medium led advertisers to theorize 
both temporal and spatial flows of attention, and to conceive of restrictions on cinema 
advertising effectiveness ranging from the financial (ticket prices) to the psychological (the 
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‘combative spirit’ or ‘ill will’ caused by compulsory attention).  Advertising could have led to a 
cinema program with frequent direct advertising caesuras, a proliferation of viewing choices 
within the theater, or even ‘free cinemas’ (possibly including both spatial and temporal ads).  
Instead, due to the lack of easy national circulation through theaters, combined with the 
relatively unified bloc of opposition from exhibitors and filmgoers (citing both ticket cost and 
issues of opulent theatrical spaces), the silent American cinema became a site of only infrequent 
and restrained advertisements, restricted in most cases to appearances in intermissions and on 
clocks and handbills, and much more common in small town or neighborhood theaters than 
urban palaces. 
 Despite marginalization of advertising in the mainstream American silent cinema, the 
experiments in and debates over cinema advertising were an important stage in the development 
of 20
th
 century advertising.  Indeed, although Michele Hilmes was correct to assert that the 
structure of television could only be understood by acknowledging that it “grew directly out of 
three decades of radio broadcasting, from which it carried over not only its economic, regulatory, 
and institutional structures but also its familiar program forms,”36 the cinema’s influence should 
also not be forgotten.  The concept of an advertising supported medium of imagery (and/or 
audio) was an idea with a long gestation.  The cinema experience set the terms for early radio, 
which then set the terms for television, which, paradoxically, set the terms for the rebirth of 
cinema advertising at the close of the 20
th
 century. 
Although a study of the cinema’s direct and indirect influences on later media is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, one clear link between cinema advertising and early radio is 
commonly known – although the importance of cinema to the equation has never been stressed.  
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As mentioned in chapter two, in the 1925 book Broadcasting: Its New Day, cinema exhibition 
guru ‘Roxy’ Rothapfel asserted, in a direct quote of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, that 
“if you try to sell…some brand of shoes or anything else over the radio [then] you’ll have no 
radio audience.”37  This restatement of the cinema myth of the vanishing audience, in a book by 
a cinema exhibitor, is an absolutely clear indication that radio theorizing began where 1910s film 
theorizing left off.  Importantly, this was not a minority opinion in early American radio.  A 
sense of the fragility of audience attention to a temporal medium, and the claim that direct 
advertising would shatter that audience, was widely held in early radio.  AT&T rented time to 
advertisers for ‘selling talks’ in the early 1920s under the provision that direct advertising 
(specific information on product qualities and prices) was forbidden.
38
  Hoover made his 
comments in 1924, declaring, in short, that direct advertising would “kill broadcasting.”39  As 
networks arose, this opposition to direct advertising was institutionalized; NBC specifically 
declared that radio must function through indirect good will advertising, and could not be “a 
selling medium.”40  As should be apparent from the preceding chapters, this was a lesson 
advertisers and the entertainment industry believed had been learned from experiences with 
motion picture related advertising.  The fact that Rothapfel, AT&T, NBC, and Hoover believed 
direct advertising on radio to be a dead end should come as no surprise, considering that 
opponents of advertising in motion pictures had rallied around the rhetorical claim that slide and 
photoplaylet advertising was likewise incompatible with ‘moving’ entertainment.  Although the 
film industry was not ultimately allowed to directly control and develop the new medium, early 
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radio advertising theory did not diverge from the developed film sense.  Mainstream commercial 
radio history in America is, therefore, predicated on cinema advertising theory.
41
 
 
Gone Today, Here Tomorrow 
Early conclusions about the non-suitability of advertising to the motion picture theater 
became standard presuppositions of the mainstream film industry for decades – with some 
persisting to the present – and have appeared in studio claims routinely whenever cinema 
advertising discourse has increased.  Indeed, film historian Christopher Anderson has asserted 
that the American film industry, after the establishment of television, explicitly differentiated 
itself as a highbrow entertainment on the grounds that film screenings did not contain 
advertising.
42
  Film industry hostility to overt advertising remained a point of pride.  It was not 
until a late 1970s crisis among independent exhibitors that cinema advertising would have its 
renaissance – finally flowering into the mainstream in spite of persistent attacks on its lack of 
‘taste.’  However, this story remains slanted towards the top-flight, urban theaters.  A more 
complete sense of the growth of cinema advertising is more complex. 
The eventual expansion of the onscreen advertisement – predominantly the trailer – 
began relatively quickly after the institutionalization of silent era split between the first run 
theaters and the rural and neighborhood theaters.  By 1938, in the words of the J. Walter 
Thompson Company’s Fred Fidler and Wallace Boren, “more or less regula[r]” advertising film 
screenings had expanded to “over half” of the 16,000 theaters in the country, but this half was 
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disproportionately made up of “the country theatres or hole-in-the-wall type of 10-cent movie 
houses.”43  By the late-1950s, the differentiation of advertising vs. non-advertising theaters had 
become even more polarized.  A second J. Walter Thompson Company research team indicated, 
in 1959, that the urban/rural divide had grown in importance, with “theatres in the eight major 
metropolitan cities” having become so hostile to screen advertising, that they were omitted 
completely from the research report.
44
  Opposition had clearly not abated.  Although neither 
report clearly indicated reasons for the obviously increasing usage in lower end and rural 
theaters, these two J. Walter Thompson Company studies were completed conspicuously near 
two historical events: the transition to sound, and the rise of national television.  As such, it is 
possible that a widening gap between the fortunes of top-flight and lower-end theaters was acting 
to increase advertising consistently over the years, with transitional moments in media acting as 
flash points for significant increase. 
In the latter decades of the 20
th
 century, old hostilities have persisted.  In the late 1970s, 
Norman Levy, executive vice president of Columbia, and Irving Ludwig, of the Walt Disney 
Company’s distributing subsidiary Buena Vista, continued to voice silent era perspectives on 
cinema advertising.  Levy asserted that such advertising was “in terrible taste” and suited only to 
“low class theaters.”  Ludwig repeated the obsession with ticket prices, declaring that “a patron 
[who] has paid $3.50 for a seat…[should not receive] three minutes of commercials before my 
picture.”  As recently as 1990, both Warner Bros. and the Walt Disney Company refused to 
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circulate their films to theaters which used direct, pre-film advertising content.
45
  Exhibitor 
concerns from this later era are strikingly similar to silent era concerns as well.  Kim B. Rotzoll, 
perhaps unwittingly, used a silent era phrase to describe 1980s exhibitor concerns when she 
declared that many theaters were holding out “based on some sense of ‘good faith’ with the 
audience.”46  Concerns from the perspective of advertisers, though often given much more up to 
date language, likewise sound familiar.  The ‘absent audience effect’ (viewer’s intentionally 
arriving late to avoid advertising content), or more perilously the possibility of a theater 
committing ‘suicide-by-advertising’ (viewers abandoning the theater altogether to avoid 
advertising content), along with concerns about audience irritation continued (and continue) to 
arise in the literature on cinema advertising.
47
 
 Despite the entrenched reluctance of both the producers and exhibitors in the American 
film industry, and the continuing fears of advertisers to adopt a medium which might produce ‘ill 
will,’ cinema advertising experienced a surprising renaissance in these recent decades.  As Deron 
Overpeck has observed, the decreasing output and increasing profit-percentages demanded by 
major studios in the late 1970s may have been a key factor in the return to prominence of cinema 
advertising, despite ongoing hostility from certain producers and exhibitors.  Both independent 
exhibitors and large theater chains experimented with pre-film advertising as a means to boost 
receipts, resulting in the formation of Screenvision and National CineMedia.  The combination 
of national chain circulation, a smaller number of tactical choices (only slides and trailers), and 
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simple persistence appears to have increased both viewer and advertiser acceptance of the form.  
Even the agencies jumped onboard quickly; the J. Walter Thompson Company was a partner in 
the acquisition of Screenvision, in 1981.   Over the course of the 1980s, pre-film advertising, 
under the auspices of the large-scale space brokers Screenvision and NCM, became the norm in 
American theaters.
48
  The fragmentation of the television market in the wake of the multi-
channel transition, and the subsequent havoc wrought by DVR and online video, only added to 
the trend, as advertisers sought out new media markets.
49
   
 In light of this surprising turn of events, it is revealing to note that rhetoric in support of 
cinema-advertising likewise continued to parallel silent era claims.  Twenty-first century scholars 
Michael Ewing, Erik du Plessis, and Charles Foster reference the appeal of ‘mood carryover’50 – 
effectively a contemporary version of the old theory of the ‘receptive mood.’  Joanna Phillips 
and Stephanie M. Noble’s research into current issues in cinema advertising acceptance includes, 
among a number of issues, frustrations about captivity (fear of losing your seat or missing some 
of the film if one leaves), repetition (seeing the same advertisement at successive visits to the 
theater), unexpected delays prior to a film, preconceptions that ticket price ought to buy “the 
right to view a movie in a commercial-free environment,” and even the assumption that 
advertisements in a cinema should be entertaining in content.
51
  Each of those concerns was 
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voiced in the American transitional era as well.  Cost rationalization likewise occurs with 
familiar tortured reasoning.  For example, compare the following two arguments: 
Francis T. Kimball (1921): [T]he cost of one page in one issue is about three-
tenths of a cent a possible prospect.  And the ‘possible’ is used advisedly, 
because it is far from certain that every individual in the total circulation is 
going to get the message.  […Meanwhile] the trailer costs the manufacturer 
about six-one-hundredths of a cent a prospect – and here the ‘possible’ is 
advisedly omitted, since in a motion picture theater there is but one attention 
focus!
52
 
 
Kim B. Rotzoll (1984): Although cinema advertising’s costs…are four or more 
times those of prime time television…cinema advertising is shown to deliver 
recall scores 3-5 times greater than that of television ads, so the initial cost 
disadvantage rapidly turns into a cost efficiency as measure at the more 
meaningful level of cost-per-thousand-impressions.
53
 
 
Despite the shift from magazines to television as the point of comparison, and Kimball’s elision 
of the fact that cinema advertising required a larger outlay to reach the superior ‘cost-per-
prospect’ number, the two rationalizations, separated by decades of experience, are nearly 
identical – greater expense is countered with a claim of greater attention and memorability.  Even 
the voluntary limitations are familiar, as a limit of “two or three” commercial advertisements, 
rather than a half hour onslaught of advertising, has been proposed repeatedly and even adopted 
as a working practice during the renaissance of cinema advertising.
54
 
 In sum, all involved parties appear to hold positions remarkably similar to their silent era 
counterparts, and yet cinema advertising is significantly more common now that it was in the 
mid-1920s.  The pertinent question, then, is: what has changed?  Overpeck is, of course, correct 
                                                          
52
 Francis T. Kimball, “The Film Trailer and What It Will Do,” Moving Picture Age February 1921: 18. 
53
 Kim B. Rotzoll, “The Captive Audience: The Troubled Odyssey of Cinema Advertising,” Current Research in 
Film 3 (1987): 83.  Though this citation is from a 1987 publication, the essay itself dates to 1984. 
54
 Herbert Jack Rotfeld, “Misplaced Marketing: Movie Theaters’ Suicide-by-Advertising with Income from Abusing 
Customers,” Journal of Consumer Marketing 23.7 (2006): 480; Joanna Phillips and Stephanie M. Noble, “Simply 
Captivating: Understanding Consumers’ Attitudes Toward the Cinema as an Advertising Medium,” Journal of 
Advertising 36.1 (Spring 2007): 92; Deron Overpeck, “Subversion, Desperation and Captivity: Pre-Film Advertising 
in American Film Exhibition Since 1977,” Film History 22.2 (2010): 225.  As Overpeck points out, Cineplex Odeon 
specifically adopted a two ad maximum in 1989. 
279 
 
 
to point to the changing structure of media ownership, and the fall-from-grace of the television 
spot.  With the same conglomerates owning television and cinema outlets, decreasing reluctance, 
by company heads, towards cinema advertising is plausible.  As the diminishing returns from  
television advertising encourages multimedia campaigns, advertisers’ attraction to the ‘captive 
audience’ of the cinema is also less surprising than we might, at first, be inclined to believe.  
Cultural preconceptions are perhaps even more important.  Even in the 1930s, the J. Walter 
Thompson Company’s Fred Fidler and Wallace Boren had begun to feel that persistence, even in 
the face of hostility, could create an “appreciative tolerance” in the audience.55  Overpeck points 
to the fact that those who grew up in the United States in the 1980s and beyond have done so in 
an environment in which advertising has been more widespread; that the young display a general 
indifference to the question of cinema advertising is part of a trend away from 
compartmentalizing life into elements where advertising is and is not expected.
56
  As the young 
continue to dominate cinema attendance, their across-the-board tolerance of ubiquitous 
advertising is an important one.  Television and advertising in the broader culture may have 
begun to outweigh the film industry’s own precedents. 
However, cultural changes – important though they may be – are only a part of the story.  
More concrete, institutional changes have also been instrumental to cinema advertising’s 
changing fortunes.  One important element is the increasing centralization of distribution, 
culminating in the digital distribution of cinema advertising through the massive systems of both 
Screenvision and NCM.  The ability of advertisers not only to buy significant space from a single 
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company, but also to have the advertisement broadcast to theaters – rather than having to send 
individual slides or prints and rely on hundreds of projectionists – has both reduced the costs and 
increased the reliability of cinema advertising.  Technological improvements and national 
oligopoly have, thus, removed some significant barriers to the circulation of cinema 
advertisements.
57
  Oligopoly has not just been a factor in distribution, however; it has also 
simplified tactical choice.  Early cinema advertising, as a young theory in a transitioning 
medium, was awash with competing tactics and theories of the audience.  The array of options 
may have been bewildering and kept adoption low.  The recent claim that “low…environmental 
clutter” contributes to a heightening of viewer ‘captivity’ (there are fewer options when a viewer 
desires to turn from the screen) not only suggests that simplified architecture of the multiplex era 
is important, but also implies that the absence of offscreen advertising technologies as an option 
– there are no more lighted clocks or wall advertisements – is driving renewed faith in the 
‘captive’ spectator.58 
 In short, new electronic delivery technologies, cultural acceptance of advertising 
intrusions into temporally bound entertainment, the increasingly corporate conditions of the 
American media, and fears that television’s advertising value was eroding all helped to awaken 
cinema advertising from a long coma.  However, the practices, concerns, and effects have 
remained remarkably unchanged over a century.  Both the means of integrating advertising into 
                                                          
57
 Recall that the first national distribution plan for cinema advertising was not put into effect until 1929.  All 
previous circulation plans for cinema advertising had regional limitations.  Even then, with the availability of cross-
company space-brokering, circulation of advertisements still required the circulation of a vast number of physical 
copies if an advertiser desired a simultaneous, nationwide campaign.  Digital circulation through a single large 
network is immeasurably more cost efficient than the circumstances in, say, 1918.  For the 1929 plan, see: 
Alexander Cooperator October 1929, p. 5, Box 8, Folder 1, Alexander Industries Records (MSS 0056), Special 
Collections in the 1905 Carnegie Library, Pikes Peak Library District, Colorado Springs. 
58
 Michael T. Ewing, Erik du Plessis, and Charles Foster, “Cinema Advertising Re-Considered,” Journal of 
Advertising Research 41.1 (January/February 2001): 79. 
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the cinema space, and the reluctance advertisers have attempted to overcome in order to do so, 
are legacies of the transitional era American cinema. 
 
Implications for Further Research 
 While this study has added significantly to our understanding of both the American 
cinema and advertising industries, especially in the transitional era, it raises many questions.  As 
indicated above, the conditions of cinema advertising at mid-century require  more scrutiny.  
While Deron Overpeck provides good reason to believe that the late 1970s cinema advertising 
renaissance originated in the changing conditions of American film production and exhibition 
associated with ‘New Hollywood’ practices, the research reports of the J. Walter Thompson 
Company indicate a greater continuity in cinema advertising history than has yet been 
acknowledged.  Specifically, significant material may remain undiscovered in the Alexander 
Film Company records in Colorado Springs, which contains multiple boxes of material from the 
1930s and beyond.  More work needs to be done before we can completely understand the 
developmental trajectory of American cinema advertising; Kerry Segrave’s 100 year history of 
Product Placement in Hollywood Films is only a small piece of a larger history. 
 For the transitional era itself, this study begs the question of what a study of indirect 
advertising, similarly structured and with similar goals, would reveal about the other practices 
and theories of cinema advertising in the transitional era.  As mentioned at the outset, the two 
wings of cinema advertising can be separated cleanly, as they were produced by different 
companies, operated on different fundamental theories of the audience, and funded different 
players in the film industry.  However, the fact that they can be separated does not mean that 
there is nothing to be learned from studying them side by side.  The theory and practice of direct 
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advertising in the American cinema is only one half of dialectic.  Indirect and direct cinema 
advertising both emerged together at the dawn of cinema, both went through a period of 
experimentation in the 1910s, and both experienced a renaissance around 1980.  This is not 
coincidence; their fates have been tied together all along, despite their differences.  Knowledge 
of the shifting conditions of indirect cinema advertising in the transitional era would provide a 
more complete understanding of the ebbs and flows of cinema advertising acceptance, and the 
breadth of advertising practices experienced by transitional era American cinema audiences. 
 The two above suggestions would add breadth to our understanding.  This particular 
study would also withstand deeper probing.  As stated at the outset, this study was designed to 
draw the broad contours of direct cinema advertising over the course of the transitional era 
American cinema.  But broad contours are never the whole story.  A study of the regional 
differentiation of production would be helpful.  Divergences in theory and practice between 
Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, and other production and reception cultures in silent cinema 
advertising would give us a better understanding of the flow of the idea around the United States.  
Why, for example, did so many of the slide patents emerge from New York?  Company by 
company specificity would also help.  Why was Joseph Coufal central to American government 
slide production during World War I?  What was the working relationship (or conflict) between 
the Kansas City and Neosho Slide Companies?  Did other trailer makers suggest that their 
salesmen deride the competition, or was that a practice exclusive to the Alexander Film 
Company?  How creatively autonomous were slide and trailer filmmakers from company to 
company?  This study, through limitations in source material, has drawn attention to the general 
trends and most commonly espoused beliefs in the era.  Local studies in newspapers, archives, 
and even with family descendents (the Erker Bros. Optical Company remains a family business) 
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could add significantly to our understanding of the likely hundreds of companies active in this 
field during this era.  This dissertation is a step into a surprisingly vast arena of the transitional 
era film experience. 
 Beyond studies focused on cinema advertising, this research compels us to give greater 
attention to the ways in which transitional era cinema, in both its national and local contexts, was 
informed by commodification and consumption.  The rise of the star-system and palatial 
cinemas, the advent of popular film magazines, the adoption of advertising practices and 
experienced professionals to market the cinema, and the creation of film related products are all 
part of the larger interaction between the institutionalizing American cinema and modern 
consumer culture.  Palatial cinema architecture both nationalized the local (by appealing to 
cinema trends) and localized the national (by appealing to cinema audiences).  Jackie Coogan’s 
star image sold hats as well as it sold tickets.  Photoplay Magazine sold film to fans and sold 
their collected attention to advertisers.  And the entire industry became one long commercial for 
California.  Consumption is a web of practices, and the film industry – as evidenced by its 
response to cinema advertising – was attempting to negotiate a particular position for film 
between commodity, gallery, and trend. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Advertising Slide Companies 
 The following is a complete list of all 104 lantern slide companies which I know to have 
been willing and able to produce advertising slides for use in American motion picture theaters 
between the years of 1908 and 1922.  The company name(s) and home city are provided.  
Undoubtedly countless additional companies slipped through the cracks of my research, either 
because they did not place self-advertising material in national trade journals, or because they 
placed them in periodicals to which I had no access. 
 
Adfilm Company – Kansas City, MO 
Advertising Slide Company – St. Louis, MO 
Advertising Specialty Company – Louisville, KY 
A.J. Clapham – New York City 
Alfred L. Simpson, Inc. – New York City 
American Advertising Company – Columbus, OH 
American Motion Slide Company – Chicago, IL 
American Slide and Poster Company – Chicago, IL 
American Slide Company – Columbus, Ohio 
American Song Slide & Poster Company – Chicago, IL 
American Typo-Pad Company – Raleigh, NC 
Art Slide Company – (unknown) 
Auerbach Advertising Agency – Butte, MT 
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Battershall & Oleson – Chicago, IL 
Best Slide Company – Kansas City, MO 
Brayton Manufacturing Company – Chicago, IL 
Brite Lite Film Advertising Company – New York City 
Burden & Salisbury Company, Inc. – Rochester, NY 
Business Efficiency Company – (unknown) 
Clarice K. Rogalla – Chicago, IL 
Columbia Slide Company – Chicago, IL 
Curtainyline Curtain and Producing Company / New Process Film Title Co. – Chicago, IL 
Denver Theater Supply Company – Denver, CO 
Des Moines Slide Company – Des Moines, IA 
D.P. Shull – Long Beach, CA 
Economy Supply Depot / Economy Film Exchange – Chicago, IL 
E.L. Dyer Slide Company – Kansas City, KS 
Erker Bros. Optical Company – St. Louis, MO 
Emnkay Moving Picture Company – Terre Haute, IN 
Enterprise Optical Manufacturing Company – Chicago, IL 
Excelsior Slide Company / Excelsior Illustrating Company – New York City 
Flashagraph Company – Chicago, IL 
Florida Photographic Concern – Fort Pierce, FL 
F.M. Tisdale Enterprises – Chicago, IL 
George Birt – Indianapolis, IN 
Genre Transparency Company – Chicago, IL 
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Grant Carder Slide Company – Portland, OR 
Gunby Bros. – New York City 
Greater New York Slide Company – New York City 
Harold Ives Company – New York City 
Hill & Orr – Chicago, IL 
Houston Slide Company – Houston, TX 
Ideal Amusement Company – Louisville, KY 
Illinois Motion Picture Advertising Corporation – Chicago, IL 
Independent Advertising Company, Inc. – New York City 
International Film Products Company – Cincinnati, OH 
J.E. Naylor & Company – Chicago, IL 
Kansas City Slide Company – Kansas City, MO 
Keeshen Advertising Agency – Oklahoma City, OK 
Kleine Optical Company – Chicago, IL 
Kurtz & Mack – Sandusky, OH 
L.B. Adkins Company – Columbus, OH 
Lee Lash Company – New York City 
Manhattan Slide and Film Company – New York City 
Marshaw Slide Manufacturing Service – Kansas City, MO 
McFerran-Knopf Company – Louisville, KY 
Metropolitan Slide Company – New York City? 
Mica Non-Breakable Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA 
Midland Transparency Company – Omaha, NE 
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Motion Picture Advertising Company – New York City 
Mott-Le-Gaige Animated Advertising Company – New York City 
National Moving Picture Advertising Company – Charlotte, NC 
National Song Slide Exchange – Chicago, IL 
Ned Cleaveland – Washington Court House, OH 
Neosho Slide Company – Neosho, MO 
New York Advertising Slide Company – New York City 
Niagara Slide Company – Lockport, NY 
No-Destructo Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA 
North American Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA 
Northwestern Amusement Syndicate – Seattle, WA and St. Paul, MN 
Novelty Slide Company – New York City 
Ohio Transparency Company – Cleveland, OH 
Paris Slide Company – Philadelphia, PA 
Peerless Slide Company – (unknown) 
Perfection Slide Company / Levi Company, Inc. – New York City 
Photo Specialty Company – Keenesville, NY 
Premier Slide Company – New York City 
Premo Company – Philadelphia, PA 
Preston Lombard – Boston, MA 
Quality Slide and Photo Makers – Chicago, IL 
R. Naylor & Company – Chicago, IL 
Radio Ad Slide Company – (unknown) 
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Scott & Van Altena – New York City 
Seattle Slide Company – Seattle, WA 
Shepherd’s Song Slide Service – New York City 
Shreveport Advertising Slide Company – Shreveport, LA 
Slidene Manufacturing Company – Columbus, NE 
Specialty Slide Makers – Chicago, IL 
Standard Slide Corporation – New York City 
Superior Advertising Slide Company – Cleveland, OH 
Thornton Advertising Company – Chicago, IL 
Three Star Slide Company – Chicago, IL 
Tilley Bros. – Austin, TX 
Troy Sign and Slide Company – Troy, OH 
Unique Slide Company, Inc. – New York City 
U.S. Slide Company – Kansas City, MO 
Utility Transparency Company / F.H. Richardson – Brooklyn, NY 
Vitaslide Company – San Francisco, CA 
Well’s Moving Picture Enterprises – New York City 
White Specialty Company – New York City 
William A. Lochren Film & Slide Company – Minneapolis, MN 
Wm. H. Swanson & Company – (unknown) 
Williams Advertising Slide Company – New York City 
Young Advertising Service – Manning, SC 
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Appendix B: Advertising Trailer Companies 
 The following is a list of the 31 companies I know to have been making or encouraging 
the use of commercial advertising trailers in the United States between the years of 1914 and 
1922.  As with the slide producers, a significant number may have slipped through the cracks 
during the research process.  As before, the company name(s) and home city are provided. 
A caveat is warranted here: It can be very difficult to determine what, specifically, 
individual companies were making in the early years of advertising film production, as length 
and style of product were frequently veiled by indistinct terminology.  This list includes 8 
debatable, but plausible, inclusions.  Companies which definitely specialized is advertising 
cartoons but did not overtly refer to them as trailers have been included as theatrical cartoons 
were predominantly, then as now, half reels or less; thus, all advertising cartoons would have 
been de facto trailers, even if they were significantly longer than the typical one-minute in 
duration.  Five companies are known to have offered animation but did not overtly describe their 
products as ‘trailers’: the American Cartoon Film Corporation, the Dra-Ko Film Company, the 
Metropolitan Company, the Pacific Coast Film Advertising Company, and the Standard Motion 
Picture Company.  A sixth company – the Quality Film Company – was even more vague, 
offering only “animated advertising along commercial lines” in its 1918 publicity blurb.  In early 
film discourse, ‘animated’ was often simply a synonym for ‘motion picture.’ However, 1918 is a 
late enough date that the implication of the term was more likely ‘cartoon,’ and as such they are 
also included here.  Two other concerns offered only a product ‘superior to slides.’  As trailers 
were the only celluloid product I have run across which were marketed as a replacement for 
slides, I presume these companies were making trailers rather than longer films or offscreen 
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technologies.  In this list, American Commercial Film and James P. Simpson describe their 
wares in this way. 
 
Alexander Film Company – Colorado Springs, CO 
American Bioscope Company – Chicago, IL 
American Commercial Film Company – Chicago, IL 
Animated Cartoon Film Corporation – (unknown) 
Artfilm Studios – Cleveland, OH 
Brite Lite Film Advertising Company – New York, NY 
Camel Film Company – Chicago, IL 
Dra-Ko Film Company – New York, NY 
Effankay Film Company – Austin, TX 
Federal Development Company – Alliance, OH 
Fort Wayne & Northern Indiana Traction Company – Fort Wayne, IN 
Fox-Burgh Syndicate – San Francisco, CA (and possibly Chicago) 
Industrial Moving Picture Company / Rothacker Manufacturing Company – Chicago, IL 
James P. Simpson Company, Inc. – Dallas, TX 
Kansas City Slide Company / Kansas City Film Ad Company – Kansas City, MO 
Manhattan Slide and Film Company, Inc. – New York, NY 
Metropolitan Company – Detroit, MI 
National Advertising Motion Picture Weekly, Inc. – [somewhere in New England] 
National Motion-Ad Company – Chicago, IL 
Nelson Motion Picture Studios – Detroit, MI 
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Pacific Coast Film Advertising Company – (unknown) 
Quality Film Company – Davenport, IA 
Ray – New York City 
Raymond Anderson Company – Louisville, KY 
Real Publicity Company – Kansas City, MO 
Scenic Film Company – Atlanta, GA 
Screen Advertising, Inc. – Washington DC  
Southern Film Service, Inc. – Houston, TX 
Standard Motion Picture Company – Chicago, IL 
Tilford & Tilford – Chicago, IL 
Triograph Film Manufacturing Company – Atlanta, GA 
 
Appendix C: Offscreen-Advertising Companies 
 The following is a list of the 10 companies I know to have been offering offscreen 
advertising technologies for use in American cinemas in the 1910s and 1920s.  I suspect that 
more examples have been missed in this category than in either of the others, as offscreen 
advertising tactics were frequently ‘home-brewed’ adaptations designed either by an exhibitor 
for his or her own use, or sold in a limited region by the original inventor.  Trade press 
advertising was extremely rare for these products.  As always, company name and home city are 
provided. 
 
Fowler Sign Company – Tacoma, WA 
General Sales Company of America – Pittsburgh, PA 
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J.H. Genter Company – Newburgh, NY 
Kalck Safety Specialties Company – Amityville, NY 
Kineto Machine Company – Chicago, IL 
Publicity Clock Company – New York City 
Standard Manufacturing Company – New York City 
Thayer Advertising Corporation – New York City 
United Exhibitors’ Advertising Corporation – Wilmington, DE 
Wonder Clock Advertising Company – New York City 
